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INTRODUCTION 
Bismarck once said that there are two things you do not want to 
witness being made: one is sausage, the other is legislation. l In' the 
hundred years since that observation, we have taken impressive steps 
to ensure the wholesomeness of processed meats., bu't the legislative 
1. See Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-LendiJlg 
Act, 80 CEO. LJ. 233, 306 (1991); Symposium, The Legislative Role in the American Republic, 23 
CUMBo L. REv. 7, 24 (1993) (comments of Prof. Martin H. Redish). 
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process remains unseemly.2 Part of the public disillusionment with 
the legislative process comes from the perception that legislatures are 
becoming estranged from their fundamental purpose: finding worka-
ble solutions to social problems.3 This Article suggests that the failure 
to find workable solutions results from the failure of legislatures to 
employ a problem-solving methodology. 
The problem-solving enterprise lies at the heart of the legislative 
effort. Yet, when legislators try to perform that function, their efforts 
often fall short. The federal Truth in Savings Act (Truth in Savings) 
provides one example of failed legislative problem solving.4 On its 
face, Truth in Savings is a congressional attempt to solve constituents' 
problems. The statute, however, appears unlikely to resolve the issues 
presented to Congress and may even create new and unintended 
problems that will make matters worse. Truth in Savings, like many 
other legislative efforts, fails adequately to address constituents' 
problems because the methodology employed by legislative drafters 
suffers from a fundamental flaw-it has no built-in mechanism to de-
fine rigorously the problem being addressed. Without first identifying 
the problem, legislation stands little chance of providing an effective 
solution. 
2. At least the public perceives the legislative process to be unseemly. Since the 
1970s, public support for Congress as an institution has been quite weak. See Samuel C. 
Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Standing Up for Congress: Variations in Public Esteem Since 
the 1960s, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25, 25-30 (1990); see also Kimberly Coursen et aI., Restoring 
Faith in Congress, YALE L. & POL'y REv. 249, 250-56 (1993) (noting similar lack of public 
support and trust). A comparison of historical polling data prepared by The Roper Center 
for Public Opinion Research shows that during the past 40 years the public has 
increasingly viewed Congress as out of touch with the people, unethical, and ineffectual. A 
Public Hearing on Congress, PUB. PERSP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 82, 82-88. 
3. In the words of Ross Perot, who has come to symbolize the current wave of voter 
dissatisfaction with government: "Our political system has lost its moorings. It no longer 
rises to meet new challenges. It seems designed to avoid solving problems." Ross PEROT, 
UNITED WE STAND: How WE CAN TAKE BACK OUR COUNTRY 21 (1992); see also Donald 
Rumsfield, Foreword to THOMAS B. CURTIS & DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT at xiii, xiii (1992). Donald Rumsfield, a former member of Congress and cabinet 
member during the Nixon administration, stated: 
Anyone who has served in the Congress of the United States or studied it 
closely knows that Congress has lost its way. It has departed from its 
essential purposes and functions as set forth in the U.S. Constitution. It has 
grown self-satisfied and isolated to a point where it is mistrusted and held in 
contempt by a startling and worrisome number of Americans. 
Id.; cJ. Christopher Edley, J r., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 
DUKE LJ. 561, 564-66 (listing contemporary public concerns regarding the democratic 
process). 
4. Truth in Savings Act, §§ 261-274, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4314 (Supp. V 1993). 
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Legal scholars have been slow to give the subject of legislative meth-
odology the attention it deserves.5 Although statutes cover much of 
the legal landscape and have to a great degree eclipsed the common 
law in importance,6 most legal scholarship still focuses on the judge's 
art, rather than the legislative drafter's art. This Article counters that 
prevailing tendency by considering an important aspect of legislative 
methodology-the framing of problems for legislative attention and 
the selection of appropriate legislative responses. 
The problem-framing exercise as an aspect of legislative drafting 
has received remarkably little attention.7 Most discussions of statutes 
and the legislative process skip over the process of framing the prob-
lem and assume the existence of a problem that is being, or has been, 
addressed in the legislature. Articles dealing with statutory interpreta-
tion, for instance, deal with a statute that has already been drafted and 
enacted into law.8 Although scholars examining techniques for legis-
lative interpretation sometimes try to determine the original problem 
Congress sought to address, their purpose for doing so is to aid in the 
interpretation of the law, rather than to help shape the law's initial 
design.9 Similarly,' many excellent works describe the process by 
5. Some scholars have called for the development of a general theory of legislation to 
correct this neglect. See Robert B. Seidman.]ustifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist 
Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 fuRV. J. ON 
LEGIS. I, 2-3 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REv. 369, 369-71 (1989). 
6. As far back as 1947, the number of controversies before the United States Supreme 
Court that did not involve a statute had declined to almost zero. Since that time, both 
Congress and the various state legislatures have considered tens of thousands of new 
proposals for legislation every year. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian 
Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1752, 1753 (1982). 
7. The only two articles that I am aware of which discuss the matter of problem 
framing in the context of legislative drafting are Rubin, supra note I, and Seidman, supra 
note 5. 
8. This Article does not address the topic of statutory interpretation. Rather, it is 
concerned with the need to frame problems in order to promote a legislative problem-
solving methodology and to improve the substance of legislation. Although a more 
effective problem-solving methodology will likely result in more transparent laws which, in' 
turn, should facilitate statutory interpretation, this Article focuses on the problem-framing 
step within the larger project of creating the substantive provisions of a statute, rather than 
on the interpretation of existing statutes. 
9. Traditionally, interpreters of statutes have inquired into the purpose of a statute to 
understand the statute's meaning .. Such an exercise assumed that inquiring into the 
purpose was merely an "archeological" exercise that would yield a determinate answer. T. 
Alexander A1ienikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 21 (1988). The 
archeological approach can be used to interpret statutes under the various "originalist" 
theories of statutory interpretation. Originalist theories include "intentionalism," which 
focuses on the drafters' intention, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983), "purposivism," which 
focuses on the original purpose behind the legislation (an approach most frequently 
attributed to Henry M. Hart,Jr. and Albert M. Sacks), see, e.g., William N. Eskridge,Jr. & 
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which bills become law. lO Yet, these works, too, pay only cursory atten-
tion to the task of specifically identifying the problem the bill was 
designed to address or, alternatively, they just assume the existence of 
a drafted bill that has been placed in the ~egislative hopper. ll Finally, 
some literature deals with the way bills should be drafted as a matter 
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 332-39 
(1990), and "textualism," which focuses on the "plain meaning" of the statute's text as 
adopted by the legislature, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in 
Statutory Construction, 11 HARv.].L. & PUB. POL'y 59 (1988). 
Originalist theories of statutory interpretation have been severely criticized. See, e.g., 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra. Scholars have pointed out that trying to determine the intent or 
the purpose a legislature had in mind when it passed a statute is a fool's errand because 
legislatures do not speak with one voice; therefore, attempts to determine a particular 
intent or purpose must fail. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 533, 547-48 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains]. Textualism has 
received criticism for failing to deal with the inherent uncertainties of language, especially 
in light of the modern scholarship dealing with the intimate interaction between the 
reader and the text. See, e.g., Francis]. Mootz, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern 
Warld?, 68 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1993). 
Nevertheless, the approaches to statutory interpretation seeking to supplant originalist 
techniques continue to undertake an inquiry into the purpose of the legislation. See, e.g., 
Alienikoff, supra (arguing that current values confronting courts cannot and should not be 
excluded from the courts' interpretation of statutes, but that originalist techniques playa 
role); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 
(1987) (being informed by hermeneutics and arguing for interpretations that are coherent 
when viewed in the context of a larger web of beliefs, including the intent, purpose, and 
text of the law); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Farmalism, and 
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 537 (1992) (proposing an approach to statutory 
interpretation, after reviewing and updating the views of Karl LJewe\lyn, based on 
"practical reason," rejecting the view that normative conclusions can be deduced from a 
single unifying principle and instead permitting a judge to consider many factors in the 
interpretation process, including the presumed purpose of the statute); Edward L. Rubin, 
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y. U. 
L. REv. 1 (1991) (refuting the trend toward textualism and arguing for a system of 
"comprehensive rationality" that would allow judges to take into account both normative 
theory and pragmatic considerations, including the purpose of the statute). 
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM]. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: 
CONGRESS AND THE STATES (7th ed. 1989); ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 
(1973); STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE 
(1989). 
11. For instance, in his famous descriptive account of the evolution and eventual 
adoption of the National Health Service Bill, Eric Redman spends approximately three 
pages of the 298-page account discussing the problem that the law was supposed to 
correct-the shortage of doctors in poor areas. REDMAN, supra note 10, at 31-33. The 
proponents of the legislation engaged in no formal analysis of the problem. Id. The idea 
for the legislation seems to have come from Dr. Abe Bergman, an advisor to Senator 
Magnuson, who believed that the National Health Service Corps would be more successful 
than other programs had been at bringing doctors to poor areas. Id. at 31. Other than Dr. 
Bergman's personal understanding of why doctors choose to locate their practices in 
middle class communities rather than in poor communities, no attempt was made to 
determine ~e cause of the doctor shortage or to correct that cause. [d. at 32-33. Instead, 
the bill introduced to Congress followed Dr. Bergman's concept. Id. at 34-38. 
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of legal writing. 12 These works, however, also avoid an in-depth dis-
cussion of the problem-framing task. 
The problem-framing aspect of the legislative drafting process de-
serves closer attention. As part of a true legislative problem-solving 
• methodology, the problem-framing step should provide the founda-
tion upon which the legislative drafter builds the entire statute. Legis-
lators should evaluate the appropriateness of the proposed solution in 
light of the problem identified. In turn, alleviating the problem 
should serve as a standard against which to judge the effectiveness of 
the statute. I3 By adopting a problem-solving methodology, drafters 
can improve the quality of legislation. 
Extrapolating from the experience of Truth in Savings, this Article 
examines the common failure of legislatures to analyze carefully the 
policy choices they make, and it identifies the reasons why the legisla-
tive process fails as a problem-solving method. While this Article fo-
cuses on Truth in Savings as one example of congressional lawmaking, 
much of what follows applies to the legislative process generally.I4 Be-
cause proposals for legislation come from so many different sources, 15 
12. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (2d ed. 1986); 
LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE (1992); DONALD HIRSCH, 
DRAFTING FEDERAL LAw (2d ed. 1989); MAxWELL J. MEHLMAN & EDWARD G. GROSSMAN, 
YALE LEGISLATIVE SERVICES HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (1977). 
13. Legislative drafters receive remarkably little reliable feedback concerning the 
success or failure of legislative enactments. As a matter of designing more effective 
legislation, drafters need a more reliable feedback loop in order to evaluate whether a bill 
has failed to achieve its purpose. On this point, designers of statutes could take a lesson 
from the designers of tangible artifacts. Engineers of tangible artifacts have long-
recognized that when an object fails to perform its function well, its design must be 
changed in order to make it more effective. Artifacts evolve in this manner-in the words 
of Professor Henry Petroski, "form follows failure." HENRY PETROSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF 
USEFUL THINGS 22-33 (1992). Without failure, artifacts do not evolve. This engineering 
principle should apply to statutes as well, which, after all, are intangible artifacts produced 
by "social engineers." Designers of statutory artifacts must have some way to determine a 
statute's success or failure in order for the design of the legislative artifact to improve. 
Without identifying the problem that the statute addresses, however, we cannot evaluate its 
failure or success. Without the prospect of failure, the design process loses a vital link and 
hopes dim for more effective legislation. 
14. More specifically, this Article focuses on the substantial number of bills that come 
into being from the drafting efforts of a member of Congress without explicit policy 
analysis from institutional analysts such as the General Accounting Office, the Office of 
Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, or the analysts in an executive 
or administrative office. 
15. Proposals for legislation considered by Congress come from many different 
sources. Businesses, public interest groups, trade associations, constituents, executive 
departments, and administrative agencies all produce draft bills for introduction to 
Congress. In addition, members of Congress can originate legislation. The bills they 
prepare may be the result of years of study by a special commission or executive branch 
department, may be the work of congressional committees, or may be the fulfill~ent of a 
campaign promise or the result of personal experiences. As a result of these diverse paths, 
I ' .• 
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however, and because the course of their development varies as well, 
not all of these observations apply with equal forceto all types of pro-
posed legislation. The idea of developing a more explicit legislative 
problem-solving methodology, however, lies at the heart of this Arti-
cle, and that central idea applies to all bills-regardless of how they 
come into being. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I presents a case study 
of Truth in Savings as a failed congressional attempt to solve a per-
ceived problem. Part II examines the deficiencies in the problem-solv-
ing methodology employed in the legislative process that produced 
Truth in Savings. Finally, Part III discusses prospects for improving 
the methodology employed in the legislative process. 
I. TRUTH IN SAVINGS: A CASE STUDY 
Although most Americans are taught in civics class that bills are in-
troduced into Congress when enough citizens say "there ought to be a 
law,"16 the actual legislative process does not always work this wayP 
Instead of starting the legislative process with constituents crying out 
for a solution to a recognizable problem, Congress frequently starts 
the process with a draft-bill solution and then proceeds to hold hear-
blanket statements about the way in which bills come into being are difficult to make. 
ROBERT u. GOEHLERT & FENTON S. MARTIN, CONGRESS AND LAw-MAKING: RESEARCHING THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 10-11 (2d ed. 1989); EDWARD F. WILLETT, JR., How OUR LAws ARE 
MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 139, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1990). 
16. The "civics class" model of legislative behavior permeates our culture. A cartoon 
that aired regularly on the ABC television network in the 1970s, entitled "I'm Just a Bill," 
accurately summarizes th!'= civics class model of legislative behavior. Schoolhouse Rock: 
History Rock - I'm Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast, 1973) (video copy on file with 
author). The cartoon told about a small town where school buses regularly crossed the 
railroad tracks. The townspeople worried that trains might not be visible to the bus 
drivers. They wanted to make school buses stop at railroad crossings. They called their 
congressional representative and he said, ''You're right, there ought to be a law." Then he 
drew up a bill and introduced it to Congress. "Bill," an anthropomorphic piece of paper, 
starreq in the cartoon. He sat on the capitol steps and sang a song, part of which described 
the committee process and suggested that he would have to wait "while a few key 
Congressmen discuss and debate whether they should let me be a law." Bill did eventually 
get signed into law by the President. This cartoon crystallizes the civics class model of the 
legislative process that most Americans learned in school. In this model, legislation is a 
method of solving social problems. Legislators are motivated to solve those problems out 
of a sense of civic duty. These civic-minded representatives deliberate to find the best 
outcome for the process. They do not make special deals for themselves or act solely to 
ensure their reelection. 
17. For instance, in the case of Truth in Savings, the chief sponsor of the bill during 
the 1980s-Representative Lehman of California-stated that his motivation for 
introducing the legislation came from personally viewing misleading advertisements, not 
from constituents' pressure. The Truth in Savings Act: Hearing Before the Suhcomm. on 
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking 
Finance1and·Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Hearings]. 
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ings to find out what the problem is.IS The proposed legislative solu-
tion may be modified in response to comments of witnesses or 
concerns of legislators, but, in many cases, to a great extent the basic 
first solution directs the evolution of the bill. 19 
Of course, not all legislation develops in the same way. Some con-
gressional efforts in especially complicated or politically sensitive areas 
such as social security reform,20 military base closings,21 bankruptcy 
law,22 and copyright law23 have departed radically from the typical 
18. Many commentators have noted Congress' propensity to propose "solutions" 
without first figuring out what the "problems" are. Professor Linda Mullenix has discussed 
the development of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 as a solution in search of a 
problem. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural justice, 77 MINN. L. 
REv. 375 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civiljustice Reform Act 
and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283 (1993). Professor Rubin described a similar 
situation in connection with Truth in Lending. See Rubin, supra note I, at 268-69. Eric 
Redman described the hearing process in the case of the National Health Service Bill as a 
window-dressing exercise, where the witnesses 'were carefully chosen to establish the 
existence of a preconceived problem that the legislation addressed and to support the 
bill's approach to that problem. REDMAN, supra note 10, at 114-37. Of course, sometimes 
the "bill" submitted for consideration is not seriously considered a solution to a problem, 
but rather is merely an "idea draft" that makes a general point but is not fully fleshed out. 
The "idea draft bill" might be proposed as a formality in order to initiate the legislative 
process, hold hearings, and determine the best way to proceed. FILSON, supra note 12, at 
35. 
19. Roger Purdy, Professional Responsibility for Legislative Drafters: Suggested Guidelines and 
Discussion of Ethics and Role Problems, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 67, 98 (1987). 
20. In the early 19805, republicans and democrats in Congress assembled an ad hoc 
committee.,...-the National Commission on Social Security Reform-to prepare legislative 
reforms to the Social Security System, thereby avoiding the possibility of unmitigated 
partisan political battles over the much-needed legislation. Warren Weaver, Jr., New Panel 
Asked on Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1981, at A8. 
21. Congress recognized the need to reduce the military budget and to eliminate 
unnecessary military installations. Susan F. Rasky, House Votes BiU That Could Bring 
Shutdown of 20 U.S. Bases in '89, N.Y. TIMES,July 13, 1988, at AI. Closing a military base has 
historically been a difficult task because of the political difficulties of removing an 
important economic activity from a congressional representative's district. To avoid the 
unpleasant political realities of the base-closing decision, Congress established a 
commission to undertake the task of identifying bases to be closed. Id. Once the 
commission prepared its list, Congress could only act to reject the entire list, not individual 
sites on the list. Id. The vote to reject the list would require a two-thirds majority to carry. 
M . 
22. In the early 1970s, faced with the daunting task of revising the bankruptcy law, 
Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to 
"study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" in the existing bankruptcy hlW. SJ. 
Res. 8, 9Ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (enacted as Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91;354, 84 
Stat. 468 (1970)). The Commission held public hearings, gathered evidence, sought the 
views of interested parties, and made a general study of the bankruptcy system. Mter its 
two-year study, the Commission reported its findings to Congress in 1973. 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE 
UNITED STATES, REpORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973). The bankruptcy law was eventually revised 
in 1978. ' 
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procedure. The recent experience with health care reform also pro-
vides an alternative model for the production oflegislation.24 In addi-
tion, most substantive bills originate in the executive branch or in the 
administrative agencies.25 Often those agencies have an internal pol-
iey analysis function that defines the problem with some rigor before 
considering solutions.26 Nevertheless, for many of the remaining bills 
generated in a given session of Congress, the initial development of 
the legislative solution evolves without the benefit of an explicit prob-
lem-identification or policy-analysis process.27 This Article examines 
one of those bills, Truth in Savings. 
Mter considering the idea for twenty-three years,28 Congress passed 
Truth in Savings as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991.29 Truth in Savings regulates the way depos-
23. U.S. copyright law was comprehensively revised in 1976, culminating a long process 
initiated by the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1955, which appropriated funds for the 
Copyright Office to conduct a thorough review and reevaluation of the existing copyright 
law. The Copyright Office delivered its "Report of the Register of Copyrights on the 
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law" to Congress in 1961. 1 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 1 
(Oct. 1988). A revised copyright law. was finally passed 15 years later after many 
congressional hearings and false starts. Id. 
24. The Clinton administration's approach on health care reform has been to canvas 
the nation to seek the views of various constituencies. This fact-finding project was 
conducted to flesh out the issues and was not linked to any specific statutory language. 
Although when the actual proposal was unveiled it precipitated the predictable political 
wrangling, the great deal of presubmission homework done on this matter sets it apart 
from the typical bill considered by Congress. The administration's approach to 
policymaking may reflect a communitarian philosophy. See Amitai Etzioni, Is Bill Clinton a 
Communitarian?, 82 NAT'L CIVIC REv. 221 (1993). 
25. FILSON, supra note 12, at 29 ("Most bills taken seriously in any legislative forum are 
simply designed to clear up difficulties that have come to light in the everyday 
administration of some existing law or program."). 
26. Most executive departments and administrative agencies have policy analysts on 
staff. In addition, all bills that originate in the administration must be cleared through the 
Office of Management and Budget'S (OMB) Legislative Reference unit, which acts as a 
clearing house for administrating proposed bills. JOHN M. KERNOCHAN, THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROC;::ESS 9-10 (1981). For a general discussion of the strong points and shortcomings of 
the OMB's policy-analysis function, see THOMAS O. MCGARllY, REINVENTING RATIONALllY: 
THE R,OLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 271-91 (1991). 
27. Of t;:0urse, not all bills originating in Congress lack this step. As an institution, 
Congress does have several resources to call on for policy analysis, including the Office of 
Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, and probably most importantly, 
the q~rieral Accounting Office. For example, the General Accounting Office has assessed 
pending legislation to reduce financial regulation in light of existing safety and soundness 
policies. ,See GAO Warns Against Weakening FDICIA, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. ISIS, 
at 6 (Oct. I, 1993) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION: 
FDIClA SAFElY AND SOUNDNESS REFORMS NEED TO BE MAINTAINED (1993) (assessing H.R. 
962, the "Economic Growth and Financial Institutions Regulatory Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1993"». 
28. See infra note 222. 
29~ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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itory institutions may advertise deposit accounts and also requires 
comprehensive disclosure of deposit account terms, such as the 
method by which interest will be calculated and the fees that will be 
imposed.30 If we assume that Congress enacted Truth in Savings to 
correct a social problem,31 the hearings held on the Act should shed 
some light on the specific problems Congress was attempting to 
address. 
This section of the Article describes the problems that proponents 
of the legislation identified during the hearings on the Act and the 
legislative response to those problems. It also includes a critique of 
the legislative response. 
A. The Witnesses' Problems 
We will never know for certain what underlying problems Truth in 
Savings was supposed to address. Like with many statutes, no place 
exists in the vast legislative materials that accompanied this relatively 
modest statute to determine exactly what phenomenon the law aimed 
to correct. One can scour the committee and subcommittee hearings 
and learn of many different problems. The difficulty in trying to di-
vine the problem is that witnesses identified many problems of various 
scope and severity during the hearings, while those same problems 
were denied by other witnesses. Of course, because congressional 
hearings only took place after the bill had been drafted, it is difficult 
to say that the bill responded to any problem in particular, other than 
its sponsor's personal discomfort with what he considered misleading 
advertising of deposit products.32 The hearings, therefore, do not set 
30. Truth in Savings Act, §§ 263-268, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4303-4308 (Supp. V 1993). 
31. The assumption that Congress enacts laws in order to solve problems may strike 
some readers as questionable. One's theory of legislative behavior may shape one's 
perception of the significance of Congress' problem-solving role. The most recent debate 
about legislative behavior seems to come down to a competition between two world views-
the republican model and the public choice model-although each of these models in 
turn has given rise to numerous related or derivative approaches (such as liberal 
republicanism and positive political theory). The republican model posits that problems 
of concern to the community are addressed through public-spirited deliberation in the 
political arena. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 
102 fuRV. L. REv. 1695, 1698 (1989). A competing model of legislative behavior, 
sometimes called the public choice model, holds that legislation amounts to nothing more 
than a product that effects a wealth transfer from one group to another. For a general 
discussion, see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988). 
I believe that whether one adopts a republican view, a public choice view, or a 
combination of the two, problem solving provides the central focus of the legislative effort. 
Whether the problem has been identified by the people or by an interest group, the 
legislative drafter must still confront the challenge of identifying the purpose of the 
legislation and devising an effective method to achieve that end. See infra notes 165-73 and 
accompanying text. 
32. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 5. 
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out an explicit and coherent articulation of the problem that Trutll in 
Savings was designed to address. 
Nevertheless, the congressional testimony reveals a pattern among 
witnesses who supported the proposed legislation. They perceived the 
need for federal action on at least three grounds: (1) misleading and 
deceptive advertising, especially in connection with "teaser" rates on 
individual retirement accounts;33 (2) the inherent unfairness in the 
relationship between banks and their customers due to unequal bar-
gaining power;34 and (3) the confusing (and perhaps unconsciona-
ble) array of methods by which depository institutions legally could 
calculate interest.35 
1. Misleading and Deceptive Advertising 
Historically, unfair advertising practices have not been a major 
problem in the banking industry.36 During the 1970s, however, the 
financial services industry experienced tremendous changes. Non-
bank providers of financial services, such as mutual funds and insur-
ance companies, began to compete actively for depositors' dollars. As 
the 1970s drew to a close, bankers found themselves in an intensely 
competitive market. 
33. See id. at 11-25, 48-52 (statements of Thomas G. Riley, Senior Vice President, 
Washington Federal Savings & Loan, and Albert Sklar, Member, American Association of 
Retired Persons, respectively). 
34. See id. at 52-57 (statement of Mark Hannaford, President, Bankcard Holders of 
America). 
35. See id. at 25-32 (statement of Stephen Brobeck, Executive Director, Consumer 
Federation of America, Washington, D.C.). 
36. The lack of abusive advertising came about largely as a result of Regulation Q, 12 
C.F.R. §§ 217.1-.6 (1993), which, prior to 1980, set the maximum interest rates that banks 
could pay for deposits. See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial 
Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 
681-82 (1987). The Regulation aimed to increase the stability of the banking system by 
eliminating dangerous competition between banks for deposits. JONATHAN R. MAcEY & 
GEOFFREY P. MILLER,·BANKING LAw AND REGULATION 30-31 (1992). Because banks were 
limited by law as to the interest rate they could pay on deposit accounts, when banks 
competed with each other for deposit accounts they were precluded from engaging in a 
"price war" by offering more and more attractive rates. [d. Instead, as a method of 
product differentiation, banks focused on other incentives, such as premiums or no cost or 
no fee accounts to attract depositors. [d. During the halcyon days of Regulation Q, 
bankers attracted deposits while paying low interest, then lent the money at a higher 
interest rate and profited from the spread between the two. These were the days of "3-6-3" 
banking: bankers took money from depositors at 3%, lent it to borrowers at 6%, and were 
on the golf course by 3:00. John S. Gordon, Understanding the S&L Mess, AM. HERITAGE, 
Feb./Mar. 1991, at 49,65. The spread was attractive because Regulation Q kept the cost of 
the deposits artificially low. 
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In 1980, Congress responded to the realities of the financial mar-
ketplace and ordered interest-rate ceilings phased OUt.37 When the 
artificial regulatory constraints on the price of deposits disappeared 
and deposit interest rates soared, the traditional wide spread between 
deposit rates and loan rates disappeared.38 In light of the shrinking 
interest rate spread, noninterest income, in the form of fees and 
charges, began to play an increasingly important role in the finances 
of banks.39 This development resulted in banks' charging fees for 
services and products they had previously provided for free. At the 
same time banks were increasing fees to offset the loss of interest in-
come, they also changed their marketing tactics to attract deposit ac-
counts. The intense competition for deposits resulted in the 
development of marketing-driven deposit products designed to lure 
customers away from money market funds. Some of the deposit prod-
ucts were advertised in a deceptive and misleading manner. 40 
The abusive advertising practices were not, however, taking place in 
a legal vacuum. Federal regulators had the authority to regulate ad-
vertising and, in fact, had promulgated regulations to address the is-
sue.41 The regulators' response, however, was not enough for many 
37. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 204, 94 
Stat. 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988)). For a general discussion of the legislation, 
see Ronald L. Weaver & Andrew M. O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980: An Overoiew, 98 BANKING LJ. 100 (1981). 
38. The decline in the interest-rate spread was quite dramatic. For example, in 1975, a 
bank could lend money to a corporate customer at two percentage points above the bank's 
cost of funds. By 1985, that spread had shrunk to about half a percentage point. Sarah 
Bartlett, Are Banks Obsolete?, Bus. WK., Apr. 6, 1987, at 74, 75. 
39. Banks began' to appreciate the importance of activity-related fees, such as 
commitment fees, origination fees, points, trust services, and other charges that extracted 
income from customers without relying on a stream of interest income from the borrowing 
relationship. DONALD R. FRASER & JAMES W. KOLARI, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS IN A 
DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT 200-01 (1985); Richard I. Kirkland,Jr., Banks Seek Life Beyond 
Lending, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 54. In addition, bankers focused on ways to reduce 
costs as a way to improve their profitability. Id. at 56. 
40. Even bankers admitted that some account advertising crossed the line into the 
realm of the misleading. Laura L. Mulcahy, Fine Print in New Account Ads Draws Some 
Complaints; But DIDC Spokesman Says Deregulation Requires Consumers to Be More Astute, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 1, 1983, at 1. The hearings held in 1984 on an early version of Truth in 
Savings legislation were full of examples showing abusive advertising practices by banks 
attempting to lure depositors. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, passim. 
41. Prior to the adoption of Truth in Savings in 1991, applicable federal banking 
regulations relating to deposit account advertising and disclosure included the following: 
(1) Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.6 (1989), for national banks and state chartered member 
banks; (2) 12 C.F.R. § 329.3 (1989), for state·chartered nonmember banks insured by the 
FDIC; and (3) 12 C.F.R. § 563.27 (1989), for institutions under the jurisdiction of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision. The regulations were fairly consistent with each other and 
dealt primarily with deposit account advertising. Among other things, they required the 
following: (1) that interest rates be stated in terms of the annual rate of simple interest, 12 
C.F.R. §§ 217.6(a), 329.3(a), 563.27(a) (1); (2) that the percentage-yield figures be based 
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consumer groups, or legislators,42 who used the emergence of mis-
leading advertising to renew the campaign for Truth in Savings.43 
2. The Bank-Customer Relationship 
The changing economics of the banking industry resulted in fees 
and charges for services that had previously been provided for free. 
While these fees were not illegal, they often came as an unwelcome 
surprise to the customers who had to pay them.44 Customers fre-
quently were unaware that their banks had the right, under the form 
documents that created the account, to impose fees unilaterally and 
raise them at wil1.45 . 
on a period of not more than one year and, if such a figure is used, that the annual rate of 
simple interest also be stated with equal prominence, with a reference to the period of 
compounding, §§ 217.6(b)(c), 329.3(b)(c), 563.27(a)(2)(3); (3) that any time or amount 
requirements necessary in order to earn the advertised rate be clearly and conspicuously 
stated, §§ 217.6(d), 329.3(d), 563.27(a) (4); (4) that advertising for time deposits include a 
clear and conspicuous statement that a substantial penalty is required for early withdrawal, 
§§ 217.6(e), 329.3(h), 563.27(a)(5); and (5) that banks not engage in advertising that is 
inaccurate, misleading, or that misrepresents its deposit contracts, §§ 217.6(g), 329.3(f), 
563.27(b). 
[d. 
42. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 6 (statements of Rep. Lehman). 
Many people ask what the Federal bank regulators are doing to stop these 
advertising practices, and to be fair I must say that they are trying. 
However, the mail from my constituents who have asked the Federal 
Reserve Board to intervene on their behalf indicates that the Fed seeks to 
appease dissension between depositors and financial institutions, rather 
than looking out for the rights of the consumer. 
43. Mulcahy, supra note 40. 
44. As a legal matter, banks have no special duty to provide full and fair disclosure to 
their customers about the fees or material terms of the relationship. The law of debtor and 
creditor governs the relationship between a bank and its deposit account customer. 
Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243 (Kan. 1982); Consolidated Bearing & 
Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.w.2d 647, 650 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). A bank has no 
duty of disclosure to a customer unless a fiduciary relationship exists. See Barnett Bank v. 
Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986) (holding that bank could have duty to disclose to 
customer certain material facts peculiarly within bank's knowledge and not otherwise 
available to customer where bank had fiduciary or confidential relationship with customer 
and stood to gain financially at expense of customer); Macon County Livestock Mkt. Inc. v. 
Kentucky State Bank, 724 S.W.2d 343, 349-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that bank 
had no duty to disclose to customer information concerning customer's business 
associate). For a discussion ofthose situations where a bank might be considered to have a 
fiduciary relationship with its customer, see Neils B. Schaumann, The Lender as 
Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 21, 40-43 (1992). 
45. A depositor usually creates the deposit-account relationship with a bank by 
executing a "signature card." The fine print on most signature cards reserves to the bank 
the right to unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. While the typically onerous 
terms of these bank form documents have been challenged by disgruntled customers, they 
rarely win. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Citibank, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 1183-84 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that 
bank charges to customers who had checks returned for insufficient funds, where charges 
exceeded actual overdraft processing costs, did not breach deposit-account agreement and 
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Although bankers usually held the upper hand in the relationship 
with their customers (partly through the use of onerous form docu-
ments), their position of primacy was severely shaken by a 1985 Cali-
fornia class action suit, Perdue v. Crocker National Bank.46 In Perdue, the 
plaintiffs' causes of action for unconscionability and breach of good 
faith based on the bank's form documents survived a motion for sum-
mary judgment.47 Although the case settled before being tried, it sent 
shock waves through the banking community.48 The case made bank-
ers realize that their once hallowed form documents were subject to 
the same contract analysis as other standard business forms. 
3. Method of Interest Calculation 
Confusing, deceptive, and arguably unconscionable methods of cal-
culating interest on deposit accounts emerged as a third problem re-
vealed by Truth in Savings' proponents during the congressional 
testimony.49 The phase out in the early 1980s of federal limits on the 
were not "penalties" in violation of VCC provisions on liquidated damages); Dietrich v. 
Chemical Bank, 454 N.Y.S.2d 490, 490-91 (Sup. Ct. 1981), a/I'd, 459 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. 
Div. 1983) (holding that by signing a signature card and receiving a copy of pertinent rules 
and regulations, a customer assented to the bank's service charges as term of the deposit 
relationship, and the bank did not breach its contract by imposing fees for checks returned 
for insufficient funds, even though the fees charged may have been, as alleged by plaintiff, 
"grossly disproportionate to the actual costs, if any, incurred"). 
46. 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). In Perdue, the 
plaintiff claimed his bank's charges for checks returned for insufficient funds were 
unconscionable and invalid. Id. at 508. The California Supreme Court held that the 
signature card signed by the depositor was, "as a matter of law," a contract that authorized 
the bank to impose fees and charges, even though the plaintiff had argued lack of mutual 
assent. Id. at 509-10. The court also found, however, that the bank's power to impose fees 
and charges was subject to a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 510. The court 
characterized the signature card as "a classic example of a contract of adhesion."' Id. at 
511. Under the contract of adhesion analysis, the plaintiff's claim that the charges were 
unconscionable stated a cause of action because the court found that there could be "price 
unconscionability" in the deposit account context. Id. at 512. 
47. The Perdue case has been followed in at least one other jurisdiction. See Best v. 
United States Nat'l Bank, 714 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Or. Ct. App.), a/I'd, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 
1986). The Best case was another class action claiming unconscionability and invalidity of 
charges for checks returned because of insufficient funds. Id. at 1050. The court held that 
the power of the bank to set charges under the account agreement is not unlimited, but 
rather must be exercised within an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 
1056. 
48. See, e.g., William Alsup & Lawrence Lincoln, A Management and Litigation Strategy 
Under Perdue, 42 Bus. LAw. 893 (1987); Michael D. Finnegan, Perduev. Crocker National Bank 
- The Attack on Pricing, 41 Bus. LAw. 997 (1986); Robert L. Lofts, The Perdue Case and Other 
Litigation Involving Bank Charges, 42 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 97 (1988). 
49. This problem had existed even under Regulation Q, when banks were limited by 
law as to how much interest they could pay. Because of the many variables that go into the 
calculation of interest, two banks could claim to offer the "highest interest allowed by law" 
and yet pay their depositors radically different amounts of interest. Among the many 
variables affecting the amount of interest earned are such matters as frequency of 
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amount of interest banks could pay on deposits50 .,resulted in ever 
more complicated methods of calculating interest as the banking in-
dustry developed new marketing-driven products, thereby aggravating 
the perceived problem of interest calculation methods.51 
Proponents of Truth in Savings found the myriad methods of calcu-
lating interest on deposit accounts unnecessarily complicated and 
confusing to the average customer. 52 In addition, the proponents tes-
tified that some methods of interest calculation were not only confus-
ing to the customer, but were actually unconscionable.53 The 
consumer groups called for the "investable balance" method of inter-
est calculation to be banned. In their testimony, these witnesses 
clearly considered Truth in Savings to be more than a disclosure stat-
ute. To them, it regulated the substantive aspects of deposit accounts 
as wel1.54 . 
B. The Legislative Scheme 
Supported by the testimony presented in the hearings, Congress 
considered-and eventually passed-a bill to require comprehensive 
compounding, whether the bank uses a 360- or a 365-day year, minimum balances, 
computation of balance upon which interest is paid, and service charges. Michael J. 
Bonfanti, Truth In Savings - Is There a Need? 1 (1981) (unpublished thesis, Graduate 
School of Retail Bank Management, University of Virginia) (on file with author). 
50. See supra note 38. 
51. Deregulation Has Potential for Consumer Confusion, Abuse, AM. BANKER, July 12, 1983, at 
6. 
52. For instance, a survey by the Consumer Federation of America found that there 
were more than 50 different ways of describing the balance on which a customer would 
earn interest. See Fees for Routine Bank Services Climbed Sharply in Last Year, CFA Study Finds, 
48 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 997 Gune 8, 1987) [hereinafter CFA Study]. To make 
matters even more complicated, the survey found little standard terminology in the 
brochures and other material received from various banks. [d. 
53. In their testimony, the consumer groups complained most vociferously about a 
method of calculation called the "investable balance" method, where the depository 
institution paid interest only on that portion of the money not .tied up in reserve 
requirements. Truth in Savings, H.R 447: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs 
and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
51-55 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearings] (testimony of Edmund Mierwinski, consumer 
advocate representing U.S. PIRG, Consumers Union, and the Consumer Federation of 
America). 
54. For example, the Consumer Federation of America and U.S. PIRG would have 
preferred to move beyond mere disclosure and to pass legislation regulating banks like 
public utilities. Consumer Groups Allege Price Gouging, Fed. Banking L. Rep .. (CCH) No. 
1499, at 6 Gune 11, 1993). Their approach to Truth in Savings indicates a tendency for 
substantive regulation of banking practices, rather than mere disclosure. Sensing that the 
goal of regulating banks as public utilities is politically impossible, however, these 
consumer groups may be attempting to get their agenda adopted piecemeal. In addition 
to Truth in Savings, they have championed life-line accounts and government check-
cashing laws. [d. 
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disclosure of deposit account terms.55 On its face, Truth In Savings 
55. Comprehensive account disclosure has been the essence of Truth in Savings since 
its original introduction in 1968. Bonfanti, supra note 49, at 12. The Truth in Savings Act 
that was finally passed in 1991 has as its major provisions the following: 
(1) Required Disclosure. The statute mandates that each advertisement, announcement, 
or solicitation made by any depository institution that mentions a specific rate of interest 
payable on an account state in a clear and conspicuous manner: (a) annual percentage 
yield (APY) in greater prominence than any other rate, (b) the period during which such 
APY is in effect, (c) all minimum balance and time requirements to earn the advertised 
rate of interest, (d) any initial deposit requirements, (e) a statement that regular fees or 
other conditions could reduce the yield, if applicable, and (f) a statement that an interest 
penalty is required for early withdrawal. Truth in Savings Act, § 263, 12 U.S.C. § 4303 
(Supp. V 1993). 
(2) Regulation of Advertising. The statute directs the Federal Reserve Board to 
promulgate regulations consistent with the law prohibiting misleading or inaccurate 
advertisements and restricting the use of terms "free" or "no-cost." Id. § 263(c), (d), 12 
U.S.C. § 4303(c), (d). The Federal Reserve Board was also empowered to exempt by 
regulation communications made by radio, TV, or on billboards. Id. 
(3) Account Schedule. The statute requires each depository institution to maintain a 
schedule of fees, charges, interest rates and terms, and conditions applicable to each class 
of accounts offered by the depository institution. Id. § 264, 12 U.S.C. § 4304. Disclosure 
must be in plain English and include, among other things, the following items: (a) a 
description of all fees, charges and penalties, (b) minimum balance requirements that 
affect fees and description of how minimum balance is determined, (c) the minimum 
initial deposit, (d) APY, (e) the period during which APY will be in effect, (f) the annual 
rate of simple interest, (g) the frequency with which interest is compounded and credited, 
(h) a clear description of the method used to determine the balance on which interest is 
paid, (i) minimum balance requirements, m minimum time requirements, (k) a 
statement, if applicable, that interest that has accrued to an account but has not been 
credited at the time of withdrawal will not be paid or credited to the account, (I) any 
provision or requirement relating to the nonpayment of interest, including penalties for 
early withdrawal, and (m) "other information" as per Federal Reserve Regulations, 
including frequency of rate adjustments and renewal policies on time deposits. Id. 
(4) Disclosure Requirement for Certain Accounts. The law further provides that the Federal 
Reserve Board shall promulgate regulations to modify the disclosure requirements of the 
Act with regard to: (a) accounts with APY guaranteed for less that a year, (b) variable rate 
accounts, (c) accounts which, pursuant to law, do not guarantee payment at a stated rate, 
(d) multiple rate accounts, and (e) accounts with respect to which determination of 
annual percentage yield is based on an annual rate of interest that is guaranteed for a 
stated term. Id. § 265, 12 U.S.C. § 4305. 
(5) Distribution of Schedules. The statute requires that notices be mailed to account 
holders within 180 days after promulgation of the regulations, informing the account 
holders of their right to receive an account schedule upon request. Id. § 266, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4306. Otherwise, schedules shall be made available in the following manner: (a) to any 
person, upon request, (b) to a potential customer before the account is opened, (c) in the 
case of any time deposit that is renewable at maturity without notice from the depositor, at 
least 30 days before the date of maturity, (d) within 10 days after the opening of an 
account, if the account is not opened in person, and (e) to all depositors affected by an 
adverse change in account terms within 30 days prior to any such adverse change. Id. 
(6) Payment of Interest. The statute prohibits the "investable balance" method of interest 
calculation and requires that interest be paid on the entire amount of principal in the 
account. Id. § 267, 12 U.S.C. § 4307. The Act does not prohibit any particular method of 
compounding or crediting interest, although it requires that interest begin to accrue not 
later than the date the funds become available as required by the Expedited Funds 
Availability Act (Regulation CC). Id. 
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appears to address the issues identified in the hearings. Closer analy-
sis, however, shows that the legislative action either added nothing to 
the existing law or provided ineffective solutions. 
1. Misleading and Deceptive Advertising 
The statute clearly appears to address the issue of misleading or 
deceptive advertising in connection with deposit accounts. It specifi-
cally prohibits misleading or inaccurate advertisements and restricts 
the use of terms "free" or "no-cost."56 While the statute appears to 
address the problem, however, that perception is incorrect. Federal 
banking regulations enacted before Truth in Savings had already pro-
hibited misleading or inaccurate advertisement of deposit accounts. 57 
As a result, the provisions of Truth in Savings devoted to this problem 
were redundant with existing regulations. The statute, in fact, added 
nothing except, perhaps, a clear message from Congress to the bank-
ing regulators that Congress expected more results from the regula-
tors on the topic of account advertising.58 
Not only did Truth in Savings do little, if anything, to strengthen 
deposit account advertising regulation, it also failed to provide any 
new protection to unsophisticated savers against unfair advertising 
practices of financial services providers other than banks. Truth in 
(7) Periodic Statements. The statute requires that periodic statements contain 
conspicuous statements showing the annual percentage yield earned. the amount of 
interest earned. the amount of any fees charged and the number of days in ~he reporting 
period. [d. § 268. 12 U.S.C. § 4308. . 
(8) Administrative Enforcement. The law provides for enforcement of the Act by the 
primary regulator of the various types of depository institutions. [d. § 270. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4310. 
(9) Civil Liability. Finally. Truth in Savings establishes a cause of action for bank 
customers and limits liability of banks. [d. § 271. 12 U.S.C. § 4311. This section makes 
banks liable to private plaintiffs for actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. plus an 
additional amount between $100 and $1.000. [d. The law provides ground rules for class 
actions. limiting the total recovery thereunder to the lesser of $500.000 or 1 % of the net 
worth of the depository institution. but also providing for reasonable attorney's fees. [d. 
Under the law. banks are permitted to raise defenses based on "bona fide errors" and 
"good faith reliance" on Federal Reserve Board rulings. [d. 
56. [d. § 263(c). 12 U.S.C. § 4303(c). 
57. See supra note 41. 
58. The idea of sending a message to the regulators by introducing legislation in 
Congress was on the minds of at least some congressional representatives. Representative 
Annunzio. an early sponsor of Truth in Savings. has stated: 
In a previous Congress I introduced my own version of Truth in Savings but 
did not push for its passage because I had hoped that the regulatory 
agencies would deal with the problem on their own. Unfortunately. the 
regulatory agencies have not acted in this area .... I cannot wait any longer 
for the agencies to act. 
Seroices Disclosure Bill Reflects View There is Still Unfairness to Consumers. AM. BANKER. Mar. 29. 
1979. at 4. 
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Savings did not broaden the coverage of the advertising regulatory 
scheme to include investment products outside of bank deposits. Wit-
nesses during the hearings on the bill had suggested that if the law 
was needed to protect unsophisticated savers and investors from un-
wittingly getting into disadvantageous transactions, it should cover all 
such transactions regardless of whether the financial services provider 
was a bank, a thrift, a mutual fund, or an insurance company.59 Truth 
in Savings, however, does not reach that goal. Although money mar-
ket mutual funds60 and insurance annuity contracts61 serve as close 
substitutes for bank deposit accounts, these products are not covered 
by Truth in Savings. Even deposit-like products offered by banks, such 
as mutual funds and repurchase agreements,62 do not come under the 
law's coverage. Therefore, while Truth in Savings appears to address 
deceptive advertising issues, it adds nothing to the existing regulatory 
scheme and falls short of the larger goal of protecting unsophisticated 
investors from unscrupulous investment and savings advertising. 
59. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 27-38 (statement of Consumer Bankers 
Association), 39-50 (statement of Russell Dunman, Senior Vice President, First Alabama 
Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association). 
60. A mutual fund is a pool of investors who invest in securities indirectly by 
purchasing shares in an "investment company" regulated by the Investment Company Act 
of 1940. The investment company (mutual fund), in turn; invests the shareholders' money 
in securities in accordance with an investment policy articulated in a prospectus covering 
the mutual fund shares. Like deposit accounts, "open end" mutual funds provide investors 
with a high level of liquidity by standing ready to redeem shares in the fund on demand. 
Mutual funds may invest in a range of underlying securities, including relatively safe 
investments such as short-term government securities or money market instruments. The 
combination of relative safety and liquidity make mutual funds a close substitute for bank 
deposit accounts in the minds of many customers. For an overview of mutual funds, see 
GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 245-
49 (4th ed. 1989). 
61. Annuities are technically insurance products, but they can provide a vehicle for 
long-term savings. See THE WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL 
FINANCE 98-99 (Kenneth M. Morris & Alan M. Siegel eds., 1992). Typically, an investor 
makes a single payment or a series of payments in exchange for an annuity contract that 
guarantees the payment of a future income stream. See id. at 99. Annuities often figure in 
retirement planning strategies because of their tax-advantaged treatment. See id. at 89. 
62. A repurchase agreement, or "repo," is a form of a short-term secured loan, where 
the borrower "sells" a security, typically an obligation of the U.S. treasury, to the lender 
and, at the same time, the borrower agrees to repurchase the security at a given time and 
price from the seller. The difference in the prices represents the interest on the loan. The 
lender is protected from the borrower's failure to repurchase the security by having title to 
the security and therefore the ability to sell the security on the secondary market. 
Although repurchase agreements once were employed primarily as a method for banks to 
lend money to each other for short periods of time, today many banks make these 
arrangements available to deposit customers, especially those customers whose deposit 
accounts exceed the deposit insurance limit. Steve Cocheo, MunicipalDeposits: "Yes," "No," 
and "Maybe," ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1992, at 22; Banks Weigh the Costs of Deposit Insurance, 
ABA BANKING J., Sept. 1991, at 45; Old Tool Brings New Bucks to Oregon Bank, ABA BANKING J., 
June 1991, at 7. 
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2. The Bank-Customer Relationship 
The statute appears to address the imbalance of power between 
banks and their customers by mandating comprehensive disclosure of 
deposit account terms.63 At least intuitively, requiring disclosure of 
key terms is an attractive way to "level the playing field" between the 
bank and its customer~64 On closer inspection, however, the disclo-
sure approach in the Truth in Savings context may not only fail to 
provide an advantage to consumers, but may actually put them at a 
disadvan tage. 
Truth in Savings requires disclosure of a great deal of informa-
tion,65 apparently on the assumption that the consumer receiving the 
information possesses the ability to process it in a meaningful way.66 
Truth in Savings, however, does not concern itself with whether a 
bank customer can appreciate the differences between deposit ac-
counts based on the information provided.67 Experience with other 
disclosure statutes tells us that consumers often are not capable of 
assessing the significance of the information disclosed.68 By requiring 
63. Truth in Savings Act, § 263, 12 U.S.C. § 4303 (Supp. V 1993). 
64. Disclosure frequently has been employed as a method of relatively unobtrusive 
regulation that respects the autonomy of the parties to the underlying transaction by 
refraining from direct commands to producers to behave in a particular way and by 
allowing individuals in the marketplace to chose their own course of action after being 
informed of relevant information through the disclosure process. Stephen Breyer, 
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. 
REv. 547, 579 (1979). 
65. See supra note 55. The disclosure of this type has been characterized as 
"hypertechnical trivia" by one banking industry observer. Jo Ann S. Barefoot, How 
Consumer Regs Can Work Against Consumers, ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1993, at 26. 
66. The underlying assumption of disclosure statutes is that consumers act as rational 
wealth-maximizers and will use the information supplied by disclosure statutes to shop 
around to get the best deal. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: 
The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home 
Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1113-14 (1984). Empirical studies have 
tended to show, however, that consumers do not actually behave that way. Id. at 1114-15. 
67. Although Truth in Savings was designed to facilitate comparison shopping by 
requiring that all deposits accounts disclose the annual percentage yield (APY), some 
factors that do not enter into the APY calculation, such as minimum balances, fees, and 
interest penalties, nevertheless affect the economic attractiveness of the account. The 
Truth in Lending Act suffers from similar shortcomings. Under that statute, comparison 
shopping for consumer credit is facilitated by requiring creditors to disclose the annual 
percentage rate (APR). Depending on the type ofloan, however, the regulations prescribe 
different methods of calculating APR. In addition, some costs of lending are not reflected 
in the APR, such as real estate related fees, late payment fees, and other costs. For a 
description of the problems under the Truth in Lending Act, see Griffith L. Garwood et 
aI., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 777, 786 (1993). 
68. Ironically, the disclosure of information often makes the decisionmaking process 
less effective for consumers. Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: 
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists 
Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 13, 27-30. Consumers often make poor choices when 
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banks to disclose technical information that the typical consumer can-
not use, therefore, the disclosure method of consumer protection 
tends to defeat itself.69 
Although some studies suggest that required disclosures have some 
beneficial effect on the level of consumer knowledge,70 other studies71 
and anecdotal evidence72 suggest that required consumer disclosures 
impose considerable costs with little concomitant benefit. Our collec-
tive faith in the value of disclosure to "level the playing field" between 
sophisticated banks and their unsophisticated customers should be re-
examined in light of a recent survey by the Educational Testing Ser-
vice and the Department of Education. This survey showed that 
almost half of all Americans over age sixteen lack basic reading and 
math skills.73 These findings suggest that account disclosure may have 
little meaning for the very people it has been designed to protect. 
they are overcome by "information overload." Id. at 27-28. The oversupply of information 
may itself become a barrier to the information acquisition process. Melvin Eisenberg, Text 
Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 309-10 (1986). 
69. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 690-91 
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 407, 424-25 
(1990). 
70. Many studies carried out in connection with the Truth in Lending Act suggest that 
the law made consumers more aware of the annual percentage rate and costs of credit. See, 
e.g., William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior: An 
Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending. 7 U. MICH.j.L. REF. 297. 302-03 (1974); Eskridge, 
supra note 66. at 1163. 
71. Some researchers have concluded that the information made available by the 
Truth in Lending Act did not in fact promote comparison shopping for credit. Rather, 
researchers found that comparison shopping for financial services remained limited to the 
relatively sophisticated consumers who would have been able to comparison shop even 
without the law's information requirements. See, e.g .• Joseph O. Eagan et aI., The Impact of 
Truth-in-Lending on Automobile Financing - An Empirical Study, 4 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 179. 194 
(1979). 
72. Bankers complain that required disclosures do not have any real effect on 
customer behavior. In the words of David K. Smith. senior vice president. Union State 
Bank. Arkansas City, Kansas: "I see so many of the other regulatory disclosures we are 
required to give them in lobby trash cans or worse yet. blowing down the street in the 
Kansas wind." Steve Cocheo, Savings Reg Yields Banker Distress, ABA BANKING j.. Aug. 1992, 
at 10. 
73. The study tested more than 26.000 Americans on practical, everyday matters such 
as reading newspaper articles and bus schedules. filling in simple business forms like bank-
deposit slips. and answering questions involving basic math skills. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, AoULT LITERACY IN AMERICA xii-xv (1993). 
The test's questions were categorized into five levels of difficulty. Id. at xiv-xv. 
Extrapolating from the test results. approximately 40 to 44 million Americans perform at 
the lowest level. meaning they are unable to calculate the total of a purchase. determine 
the difference in price between two items. read a street map, or enter information on a 
simple form. See id. It also indicates that an additional 50 million perform at the second-
lowest level: they are unable to answer specific questions about facts in a newspaper article 
or to interpret charts summarizing information. Id. at xv. With regard to the rest of the 
difficulty levels. the test found that 61 million Americans function with middle-level skills. 
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A great irony of Truth in Savings is that it presents customers with 
information they cannot use, while at the same time creating a possi-
ble safe harbor for banks to gain protection from customer claims. 
The 1985 decision of Perdue v. Crocker National Bank put banks on no-
tice that business dealings with customers had to meet minimum stan-
dards offairness.74 Although the standard was not statutorily defined, 
it nevertheless modified bankers' behavior. In the post-Perdue world, 
banks understood that they could be subject to potential liability 
under state banking regulations, consumer protection laws, unfair 
trade practices, common law fraud, unconscionability, or any number 
of other state-law-based legal theories.75 
The passage of Truth in Savings may make state courts reluctant to 
follow the Perdue line of cases to address the imbalance of power be-
tween banks and their customers. The Perdue court expressly deter-
mined that California law governed the bank-depositor relationship 
because the court found no federal preemption of the subject. 76 In 
light of changes in the federal law since Perdue was decided, however, 
a court reviewing the issue today might not reach the same 
conclusion.77 
Even if not preempted by federal law, courts may be reluctant to 
entertain Perdue-type claims in light of the fact that consumers were 
fully informed of the terms of the account relationship at the time the 
30 million function at the next level, and up to 8 million function at the highest level. Id. 
at 50. 
74. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
75. See Alsup & Lincoln, supra note 48; Finnegan, supra note 48; Lofts, supra note 48. 
76. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 516-25 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986). ' 
77. Since 1985, when Perdue was decided, federal law has taken a larger role in the legal 
relationship between banks and their depositors. In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,100 Stat. 3207 (1986), which expanded the scope of 
the Bank Secrecy Act. In 1987, the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 248a, 
4001-4010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), became law, which was followed closely by the 
expansion of Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1994), dealing with the check-collection 
process. In 1991, Truth in Savings appeared. These laws, together with the federal laws 
regulating deposits that were in place at the time Perdue was decided, such as the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), Regulation D reserve 
requirements, 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1994), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 264,1728,1811-1831 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (which was also strengthened in 1991), 
could be seen as so thoroughly occupying the legislative field "as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992). It would appear from the Cipollone case, 
however, that the preemption clauses (if any) of each act would control and that matters 
outside the scope of the explicit preemption clauses would be within the province of the 
state to regulate if not implicitly preempted. Not all of the federal laws touching on the 
deposit relationship have preemption provisions, however, so the implied preemption 
question remains an open issue. 
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account was opened.7s Courts might view Truth in Saving's compre-
hensive disclosure requirements as the measure of protection ac-
corded depd~itors and limit review of account relationships to 
compliance with these requirements.79 Truth in Savings, therefore, 
might in effect provide a "safe harbor" for banks regarding the 
amount and type of disclosure required in the deposit account con-
text, thereby precluding consumers from making Perdue-type claims. 
While the creation of a safe harbor may take away some causes of 
action, customers nevertheless can sue for failure to comply with 
Truth in Savings. The statute explicitly provides for a civil cause of 
action. Unfortunately for customers, however, the civil liability provi-
sion does not pose much ofa threat to banks.so Given the weakness of 
this provision, the law will be enforced primarily through its adminis-
trative enforcement section.Sl Because the primary federal banking 
regulators have gone on record as being opposed to the idea of Truth 
in Savings,S2 one might expect the banking regulators to be less than 
enthusiastic about enforcing strict compliance with the law. In addi-
tion, the violations are not the type that would affect the "safety and 
78. After Perdue was decided, some commentators suggested that full disclosure of 
account terms was the best defense against Perdue-type claims. See Alsup & Lincoln, supra 
note 48, at 900 ("In virtually all states, a seller who made full disclosure up front would be 
immune from unconscionability suits. This is not necessarily true under Perdue, although 
full disclosure is a powerful consideration and (me which, as a practical matter, will 
discourage almost all suits."). With Truth in Savings mandating disclosure, it may have the 
effect of precluding Perdue-type suits. 
79. Certainly, states adopting the view that adhesion contracts will be enforced 
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties will have a difficult time 
overcoming the "unfair surprise" requirement of that doctrine after Truth in Savings. The 
account disclosure required by the law should create the reasonable expectation in the 
mind of the account customer of what the terms of the relationship will be. Finnegan, 
supra note 48, at 1000-03. 
80. The law caps the maximum penalty for a violation at $1,000 per individual action, 
or, in a class action, the lesser of $500,000 or 1 % of the net worth of the depository 
institution involved. Truth in Savings Act, § 271, 12 U.S.C. § 4311 (Supp. V 1993). In 
addition, the law allows banks defenses for "bona fide errors" and for reliance on Federal 
Reserve Board rulings. Id. § 271(c), (f), 12 U.S.c. § 4311 (c), (f). The combination of 
these factors results in a civil liability section that does not impose much of a threat to 
banks and, combined with the one-year statute of limitations, id. § 271 (e), 12 U .S.C. 
§ 4311 (e), makes banks' exposure under this proposed law very limited. 
81. Id. § 270, 12 U.S.C. § 4300. 
82. See, e.g., 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 56-67 (statement of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board); HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN 
AFFAIRS, TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, MINORllY AND DISSENTING VIEWS, 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS Acr OF 1988: REpORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 5094, H.R. Doc. No. 
822, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 384, 399, 406-08 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. 5094 
REpORT], reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1245, at 384,399,406-08 (Aug. 12, 
1988) (statements of the Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal 
Deposit, Insurance Corporation, respectively). 
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soundness" of a financial institution,83 so the regula..tors might not be 
willing or able to use all of the administrative sanctions at their dispo-
sal84 to force banks to comply.85 
Therefore, the statute's attempt to solve the problem of the imbal-
ance of power between banks and their customers by bombarding cus-
tomers with a great deal of information will likely be ineffective. The 
disclosure requirement may not only be ineffective protection for con-
sumers, it may be a boon for bankers if it creates a safe harbor for 
banks by foreclosing Perdutrtype claims. In any event, neither the stat-
ute's limited private right of action nor the administrative remedy 
pose a serious threat to banks. The attempt to equalize the relation-
ship between banks and their customers through this legislation, 
therefore, also appears to fall short of the mark. 
3. Method of Interest Calculation 
Truth in Savings also addresses the problem raised during the hear-
ings that banks sometimes employ unfair methods of interest calcula-
tion. The statute prohibits the use of the "investable balance" method 
of calculating interest.86 If the 'problem identified during the hear-
ings consisted only of the use of the investable balance method of 
83. Generally speaking, an unsafe or unsound practice embraces any action, or 
lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent 
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be 
abnormal risk of loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the 
insurance fund administered by the corporation. 
Overdrafts and Correspondent Banking Practices: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1977) (statement of George LeMaistre, 
Chairman, 'Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), quoted in EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & 
JAMES]' WHITE, BANKING LAw 554 (3d ed. 1991). 
84. The banking regulators have an array of sanctions available to use against financial 
institutions and institution-affiliated parties, ranging from cease-and-desist orders through 
civil money penalties to criminal prosecutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), (i), (j) (1988). 
85. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 
1983); Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). In Gulf, the court noted that an "unsafe or 
unsound" practice must threaten the financial integrity of the institution before a cease-
and-desist order may issue. [d. at 264. In a footnote, the court left open whether a cease-
and-desist order based on a violation of law must meet the same standard: "The 'violation 
of law' provision ... may be subject to the same limits as the 'unsafe or unsound practice' 
provision discussed ... above. If so, the cease and desist power would arise only when an 
association violates a law which protects the association's financial integrity." [d. at 265 n.5; 
cf Saratoga Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 879 F.2d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 
1989) (finding that a specific violation of a law or regulation would not have to' affect the 
stability of the institution or create a risk for the deposit insurance fund as long as "the 
underlying regulation [being violated] has the financial stability of the bank. as its 
purpose"). Because the official finding of Truth in Savings lists "stability" as one of the 
purposes for the law, the cease-and-desist power would presumably be available to enforce 
the law under the Saratoga test. 
86. Truth in Savings Act, § 267, 12 U.S.C. § 4307 (Supp. V 1993). 
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interest calculation, the statute clearly addresses that problem. On 
the other hand, if the problem identified extends beyond a particular 
method of interest calculation-to unfair methods of interest calcula-
tion generally-the statute does not fully address the problem. The 
statute prescribes no particular method of interest calculation and 
does not articulate a standard of fairness that interest calculation 
methods must meet.87 Given bankers' ingenuity, they almost certainly 
can devise new unfair methods of interest calculation for which Truth 
in Savings will offer no remedy. 
C. The Failure of Legislative Methodology 
As the previous section illustrates, determining the effectiveness of 
the legislative action in light of the problems identified during the 
committee and subcommittee hearings presents a difficult challenge. 
Deceptive advertising by banks, the unfair nature of the relationship 
between banks and their customers, and unfair methods of calculating 
interest seem like specific problems for which the proposed legislation 
provided a solution. On closer examination, however, these 
"problems" really are quite broad issues, rather than specific 
problems. For example, while the hearings produced some degree of 
consensus that deceptive advertising was a matter of concern,S8 the 
apparent consensus did not constitute a rigorous definition of the 
problem because the witnesses spoke with more than one voice. 
While some witnesses focused on the advertising practices of banks, 
others focused on the advertising practices of other financial services 
providers.89 Therefore, even though most witnesses concurred in 
87. An alternative Truth in Savings proposal considered during the lOlst Congress, 
H.R. 6, did contain a provision mandating a standard method of interest calculation. H.R. 
6, § 1l09(a), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). That approach was rejected in the mark-up of 
the competing Truth in Savings bills, H.R. 6 and H.R. 447, that were eventually reported 
out of committee as H.R. 2654. Some witnesses saw the omission as a major mistake that 
would prevent the Truth in Savings law from achieving the purpose of preventing unfair 
methods of interest calculation. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 52-54 (testimony of 
Edmund Mierwinski). Other witnesses thought prescribing a method of calculating 
interest would go beyond the scope of the legislation's disclosure purpose. See id. at 62 
(statement submitted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Once 
again, the testimony reveals that the hearings process did not identifY a specific problem to 
be solved. 
88. All of the pro-consumer witnesses and at least one thrift banker believed that 
advertising was out of hand. 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, passim. 
89. The banking industry repeatedly insisted that the mutual fund industry should be 
covered by Truth in Savings, as well. See, e.g., Truth-in-Savings Act - H.R 736: Hearing 
Befare the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong., 1st. Sess. 8-10 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings] (statement 
of Joe Belew, President, Consumer Bankers Association, accompanied by Russell Dunman, 
First Alabama Bank, representing American Bankers Association). 
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identifying this particular issue, they did not concur in defining the 
specific problem. 
Similarly, some testimony noted the disparity in power and knowl-
edge between banks and their customers.90 The hearings, however, 
did not consider whether the imbalance in the bank-customer rela-
tionship was a problem in and of itself or whether it was merely symp-
tomatic of the larger problem that customers do not possess enough 
sophistication to deal with banks.91 The latter problem suggests a dif-
ferent set of solutions than the former. The former problem assumes 
the capacity on the part of the customer to stand up to the bank if 
given the appropriate information; the latter suggests that even with 
the information, the customer will be at a disadvantage. 
Identifying the problem makes an important difference in the selec-
tion of an appropriate solution, but what the problem is depends on 
the perspective of the problem framer. Both consumer and bank lob-
byists perceived the bank-customer relationship to be a problem, but 
the problems they each saw were very different. Consumer groups 
focused on the disparity in bargaining power between banks and their 
customers, and at least some testimony before Congress suggested 
that Truth in Savings should correct that imbalance.92 Banks, for 
their part, recognized a problem in the bank-customer relationship in 
that they feared customers would subject them to Perdue-type claims.93 
The congressional testimony, however, never clearly articulated to 
what extent the imbalance of power was to be addressed by Truth in 
Savings or how it should be resolved. 
Finally, proponents raised concerns about the methods used by 
banks to calculate interest on accounts.94 From the testimony, how-
ever, one cannot determine whether the "problem" identified was 
merely the use of the "investable balance" method of interest calcula-
tion or a broader concern with such practices as calculating interest 
on a 360-day year.95 Some witnesses believed that any regulation of 
90. See, e.g., 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 52-57 (statement of Mark Hannaford, 
President, Bankcard Holders of America). 
91. Lack of consumer sophistication often serves as the foundational premise for 
consumer protection laws. See Sovern, supra note 68, at 25. 
92. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 104-12 (testimony of Consumers Union and 
Consumer Federation of America). 
93. See, e.g., Alsup & Lincoln, supra note 48; Finnegan, supra note 48; Lofts, supra note 
48. 
94. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
95. 1984 Hearings, supra note 17. at 59 (statement of Richard L.D. Morse). The survey 
prepared by the Consumer Federation of America noted the lack of standard terminology 
and the bewildering array of interest-rate calculation methods. See CFA Study, supra note 
52. Although the investable balance method received the most attention during the 
hearings. these other methods were arguably before the committee as well. [d. 
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the substantive terms of the interest calculation was beyond the law's 
purported scope.96 Like the other identified areas of concern, the 
"problem" of interest rate calculation methods was really an "issue" 
that needed further definition. The legislative process, however, 
never focused the issue with the degree of specificity necessary to de-
termine exactly what the problem was. 
D. Unintended Consequences of the Legislative &sponse 
Because we can never know the real problem at which Truth in Sav-
ings was aimed, we will never know for certain whether the law will 
achieve the ends sought by its proponents. The effectiveness of the 
law must be judged in terms of the problems it sought to correct, but 
the existing problem-definition process stops far short of rigorously 
defining exactly what the legislation was supposed to achieve. While 
failure to identify the problems may make evaluating the legislative 
response difficult, it may also give rise to unintended consequences. 
1. Costs of the Legislation 
Without rigorously defining what the statute aims to achieve, the 
law might have the unintended consequence of imposing a greater 
cost on society than the benefit it returns. Truth in Savings saddles 
banks with substantial compliance costs.97 Although banks will pass 
along the cost to their customers in the form of higher fees and lower 
interest rates,98 the added compliance costs will nevertheless hurt the 
banking industry. 
96. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 62 (statement submitted by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System). 
97. Truth in Savings compliance involves retaining professionals for assistance, such as 
attorneys to review the regulations, training-professionals to educate the workforce, 
computer programmers, et cetera. Phil Roosevelt, Banks Scramble to Meet Truth in Savings 
Deadline, BANKING WK.,jan. 11, 1993, at 10. In addition, compliance entails the production 
of complicated documents that require staff time, training of bank personnel, printing 
costs, review of marketing plans, and the adjustment of complicated computer programs to 
facilitate data provision. Truth in Savings Nears. Are You Ready?, ABA BANKING]', Sept. 1992, 
at 36-38. The costs of compliance are especially high for small banks. Bill Atkinson, Small 
Banks, Big Compliance Load, BANKING WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1. For example, Metcalf Savings 
Bank of Overland Park, Kansas, a $120-million institution, spent $30,386 in Truth in 
Savings compliance costs. Beth Piskora, Metcalf Savings Howls Ouer Cost of Truth In Savings, 
BANKING WK., Aug. 9,1993, at 1. The bank's entire operating budget for 1993 totaled only 
$172,500. Id. 
98. Commenting on the compliance costs imposed by Truth in Savings, john Brittain, 
vice president of retail deposit product management at Meridian Bancorp, Reading, Pa., 
said: "[It] will be made up in slightly lower interest rates and slightly higher fees." Barbara 
A. Rehm, Moment of Truth-in-Savings Arrives, and Banks Wince, BANKING WK., june 28,1993, 
at 10. 
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The federal banking regulation burden imposes considerable costs 
on the banking industry, placed by one estimate at fifty-nine percent 
of profits.99 The costs imposed by Truth in Savings compliance make 
bank deposit products more expensive relative to similar products 
available through mutual funds and insurance companies. In the ag-
gregate, these adqitional costs create an incentive for depositors to 
move their money out of banks and into mutual funds. lOo The dis-
intermediation to which high compliance costs contribute runs di-
rectly counter to the overall goals of banking regulation. IOI 
99. Barbara A. Rehm, Compliance Cost Put at 59% of Profits, BANKING WK.,June 22, 1992, 
at 10. The cost of regulatory compliance has long been a rallying cry of the banking 
industry against further regulatory mandates. See, e.g., Patrick Dalton, Red Tape Maze 
Hinders Credit, ABA Tells House Subcommittee, ABA BANKERS WKLY., Aug. II, 1992, at 6. The 
banking industry has found some support for their position on Capitol Hill among some 
congressional representatives who have proposed legislation to reduce the crush of federal 
banking regulatory paperwork, especially for small banks. See Patrick Dalton, Bereuter 
Introduces Bill to Ease Compliance Burden, ABA BANKERS WKLY., June 3D, 1992, at 6; Patrick 
Dalton, Senator Places Burden in the Record, ABA BANKERS WKLY., May 26, 1992, at 7. In the 
102d Congress, as of mid-summer 1993, four bills dealing with regulatory relief-H.R. 59 
(Rep. Bereuter, R-Neb., sponsor), H.R. 269 (Rep. Bill McCollum, R-Fla., sponsor), S. 265 
(Sen. Richard Shelby, D-Ala., sponsor), and S. 1124 (Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y., 
sponsor)-were under consideration. The industry also has found support among the 
banking regulatory agencies, see Claudia Cummins, Regulations Too Costly, Agencies Tell 
Lawmakers, BANKING WK., Dec. "21, 1992, at I, and especially one member of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,John P. LaWare, a former commercial banker, see 
John Ginovsky, Governor LaWare Feels Pain Of Overregulated Industry, ABA BANKERS WKLY., 
June 2, 1992, at 8. 
Governor LaWare has spoken out on many occasions concerning the burden that 
compliance costs impose on the banking industry. See, e.g., Simplifying the Regulatory Burden 
on Well-Run Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions 
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 66-79" (1992) (statement of John P. LaWare, Member, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board), reprinted in 78 FED. REs. BULL. 607, 607-
12 (1992). While many industry observers believe the cost of the regulatory burden to be 
substantial, the exact cost of regulatory compliance remains undefined. See Barbara A. 
Rehm, Compliance Price Tag: $3 Billion, BANKING WK., June 15, 1992, at 1. But see Steve 
Klinkerman, Banks Accused of Inflating Compliance Cost Estimates, BANKING WK., Apr. 12, 1992, 
at 10. 
100. Banks suffer from a structural handicap when competing against mutual funds on 
yield alone, because the costs of doing business as a bank are higher than the costs of 
doing business as a mutual fund, especially if one takes into account the cost of deposit 
insurance premiums, reserve requirements, and compliance with social policy legislation 
such as the Community Reinvestment Act. See Randall Smith, Banks Could be Pinched for 
Deposits to LendAfter Consumer Exodus, WALL ST. J., June 3D, 1993, at C1. 
101. The Credit Crunch and Regulatory Burdens in Bank Lending: Hearings Before the 
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government 
Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess 118, 124-26 (1993) (statement of John P. LaWare, Member, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, and Chairman, Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council), reprinted in 79 FED. REs. BULL. 466, 468 (1993). The 
flight of funds from bank accounts into mutual funds has caused some concern among 
economists, who fear that with fewer financial assets in the hands of banks, the Federal 
Reserve will have a much more difficult time controlling the money supply and responding 
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2. Reduction in Variety of Financial Products 
If the market for deposit account products behaves in the same way 
as the markets for other products subject to comprehensive disclosure 
requirements, another unintended consequence of the statute will be 
to reduce the types of financial products that banks offer to consum-
ers.102 Experience has shown that when a previously unregulated area 
becomes subject to regulation, the products offered become relatively 
standardized and innovation in the marketplace diminishes. 103 
3. Promotion of Interstate Banking 
Truth in Savings likely will have the effect of promoting interstate 
banking. Prior to the enactment of Truth in Savings, regulation of 
deposit disclosures varied significantly from one state to the next.'04 
Although the banking lobby had hoped for a stronger preemption 
to short-term volatility in the economy. Phillip R. Mack, Recent Trends in the Mutual Fund 
Industry, 79 FED. REs. BULL. 1001, 1011-12 (1993). In addition, as banks lose deposit 
accounts they have less cash available to lend to borrowers. The flight of money from 
banks could cause another credit crunch for small businesses, who rely on banks much 
more than larger businesses do to raise money. Kenneth H. Bacon, Bank's Declining Role in 
Economy Worries Fed, May Hurt Firms, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1993, at AI. 
102. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 58 (statement submitted by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System: "[Wj e have learned that rules that are not intended to affect 
the variety of products offered nonetheless may have the practical effect of standardizing 
products and reducing the options available to customers"). 
103. FFIEC Study on Regulatory Burden: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions 
Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 33-34 (1993) (statement of John P. LaWare, Chairman, 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, and Member, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve Board), reprinted in 79 FED. REs. BULL. 281, 283 (1993). 
Id. 
The current approach to regulation, which often relies on mandates and 
uniform standards, has led to inflexibility, which can be costly. Very 
specific requirements necessarily bring standardization ... such inflexibility 
can be costly because it tends to preclude new approaches, prevent 
innovation, and even limit access to new technology and new markets. 
104. Prior to the enactment of Truth in Savings, several states had enacted their own 
versions of deposit account disclosure laws. State laws requiring disclosure of deposit 
account terms varied greatly. In general, the state law responses fit into four broad 
categories: (1) states with no explicit disclosure requirements; (2) states requiring that 
fees, rules, and regulations be posted in the banking lobby or offices, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 06.05.120 (1988 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.20.060 (West 1986 & Supp. 
1993); (3) states requiring that bank rules and regulations be printed in the passbooks 
evidencing the accounts or delivered to the customer, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-350 
(Michie 1989); HAw. REv. STAT. § 403-123 (1985); R.1. GEN. LAws § 19-11-14 (1989); and 
(4) states imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure regarding the calculation and 
payment of interest, fees and charges, and advance notice of changes in these terms, see, 
e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE, §§ 865-865.10 (West 1989) (repealed 1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
140E, § 2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. BANKING LAw §§ 14[1], 14-c (McKinney 1990 & 
Supp. 1994). See Mary Jane Large, Deposit Account Disclosure, 37 Bus. LAw. 1317, 1319 
(1982). 
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provision,105 Truth in Savings nevertheless bestows a major benefit to 
institutions engaging in interstate banking. While the law does not 
explicitly preempt existing state statutes,I06 it does make compliance 
across state lines easier. This result obtains because the advent of fed-
erallegislation likely will prevent additional state statutes from c~ming 
into existence. 
Complying with the federal law and a few special state laws (assum-
ing th'at some state laws are not preempted completely by Truth in 
Savings) will be a much easier task for institutions engaged in inter-
state banking than complying with fifty different statutes on the same 
topic. In addition, some states are moving to repeal their deposit dis-
closure laws in light of Truth in Savings. 107 If one federal standard 
applies to require disclosures on deposit accounts rather than fifty dif-
ferent standards, compliance costs for interstate banks could be re-
duced, thereby making interstate banking marginally less expensive. 
The law's effect, therefore, may change the existing costs and benefits 
that define the competition between interstate and intrastate banks in 
favor of the interstate banks. 
4. Aggravation of Compliance Cost Economies of Scale 
The mere existence of a new regulation has ramifications for the 
banking market. New regulations create advantages for medium- to 
large-sized banks over their smaller competitors. The advantage 
comes from the economies of scale that medium- to large-sized banks 
enjoy in compliance costs. lOB Although studies of economies of scale 
The lack of uniformity among states may have been due to existing federal regulations 
that already required a certain amount of disclosure, or merely to philosophical 
differences between the various states. The passage of Truth in Savings, however, 
squelches any state-level preferences and disregards the special kind of federalism that 
exists in the banking area. For a discussion of the rise of federal power in the demand 
deposit account context and its ramifications, see Edward L. Rubin, Unifrmnity, Regulation, 
. and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1251 
(1989). Although Truth in Savings does not necessarily preempt additional state laws on 
the topic, it certainly takes away a great deal of the incentive for states to act as 
"laboratories" in enacting new and innovative ways to deal with the perceived problems 
raised by Truth in Savings' proponents. 
105. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 28-29 (testimony of the Consumer Bankers 
Association), 45 (statement of the American Bankers Association). 
106. Truth in Savings Act, § 273, 12 U.S.C. § 4313 (Supp. V 1993). 
107. Lynne B. Barr & Anne Wallace, Deposit Account Developments: Truth in Savings, 48 
Bus. LAw. 1129, 1131 (1993). 
108. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System commissioned a report to 
determine whether banks enjoy economies of scale in compliance with consumer 
protection regulations. The study found modest economies of scale in compliance costs 
for institutions up to an optimal size of 375,000 consumer credit accounts. Mter that 
point, the researchers noted small diseconomies of scale. GREGORY E. ELLIEHAUSEN & 
ROBERT D. KURTZ, SCALE ECONOMIES IN COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR CONSUMEi CREDIT 
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in the banking industry have reached somewhat different conclusions 
over the years, they quite consistently find that smaller banks have a 
higher cost of compliance per deposit account than do larger 
banks. 109 In 1989, of the approximately 13,500 banks in the United 
States, about 4,500 were small banks. IIO Truth in Savings, therefore, 
puts those banks in an even more dif~cult competitive position. 
5. Reduction of Competition for Deposits 
Some proponents of Truth in Savings argued during the congres-
sional hearings that the law would benefit the banking industry by 
setting ground rules under which accounts may be advertised. lll By 
requiring all banks to adhere to the same fair disclosure require-
ments, the argument went, bankers would compete on the real terms 
of their products, rather than on hype.1l2 While that proposition may 
be true, the law might also have the effect of dampening advertising 
for deposit accounts, which could result in reduced competition 
among banks. Bankers have an interest in preventing "advertising 
wars" that bid up the interest rates on deposit accounts, as the costs of 
runaway deposit competition could be crippling to the banking indus-
try.113 In this way, the law. could benefit the banking industry as a 
whole by keeping advertising within certain bounds, thereby reducing 
unfettered competition for deposit accounts and helping to keep the 
interest rates paid on deposit accounts at a manageable level.1l4 
REGULATIONS: THE TRUTH IN LENDING AND EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNIlY LAws 10 (1985). 
While scale economies have been obselVed in the area of regulatory compliance, whether 
overall scales of economy exist eludes a definitive answer. Over the years, different studies 
have reached different conclusions. One study suggests that where scales of economy exist, 
they are not very significant. David B. Humphrey, Cost Dispersion and the Measurement of 
Economies in Banking, EcoN. REv., May/June 1987, at 24 (published by the Federal ReselVe 
Bank of Richmond). A more recent study found that economies of scale do exist, but that 
the optimum size for a bank may be smaller than previously supposed. George M. 
Bollenbacher, America's Banking Dinosaurs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1992, at A8. 
109. ELLIEI-IAUSEN & KURTZ, supra note 108, at 6; Humphrey, supra note 108, at 32; 
Bollenbacher, supra note 108, at A8. How significant this difference in cost of compliance 
is remains an open question. See FRASER & KOLARl, supra note 39, at 128-31. 
110. "Small" banks are defined as those institutions with less than $25 million in assets. 
1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 6 (statement of Martha Seger, Governor, Federal ReselVe 
Board). 
111. As the representative of one savings and loan noted during the hearings on Truth 
in Savings, legislation that restricts the allegedly unfair practices of some banks benefits 
other banks in the marketplace by leveling the playing field. 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, 
at 16-17 (statement of Thomas G. Riley, Senior Vice President, Washington Federal Savings 
and Loan). 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
1994] TRUTH IN SAVINGS 1311 
These unintended consequencesl15 and shortcomings of Truth in 
Savings directly result from the lack of a problem-solving methodology 
in the development of the legislation. The drafter's failure to adopt a 
problem-solving methodology led to the development of a statute with 
no clear purpose and a legislative response with no clear target. As a 
result, the law's effect may be to injure the very interest groups it was 
intended to protect. 
E. The Failure to Consider Alternatives 
The failure of the legislative process to identify specifically the prob-
lem to which Truth in Savings was addressed may be due, in part, to 
the fact that the bill was cast from the start as a disclosure statute. The 
bill's title, aspiring to "Truth," implies that the underlying problem 
was something dealing with false or misleading information. The leg-
islation, therefore, invited other participants in the legislative process 
to assume a problem and not to examine rigorously the underlying 
issues. 116 By linking the legislative solution to the problem from the 
start of the legislative process, the energies of legislators and lobbyists 
115. This discussion has assumed that the intended purposes of Truth in Savings are to 
reduce deceptive advertising, level the playing field, and eliminate unfair interest 
calculation practices. One could argue, however, that the consequences that I have 
identified as "unintended" were in fact anticipated and planned for by the private interest 
groups that supported or opposed the legislation. 
116. The links between the problem identified and its proposed solution are subtle and 
complex. Findings in the field of cognitive psychology show that people tend to organize 
their knowledge into related groups, and, once a problem is framed, the problem itself 
suggests the solution. See James F. Voss et aI., Individual Differences in the Solving of Social 
Science Problems, in INDMDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITION 205, 228 (Ronna F. Dillon & 
Ronald R. Schmeck eds., 1983) (finding that experts tend to spend more time defining the 
problem at hand, but once problem is identified, only one or two solution sets emerge); 
Judith Torney-Purta, Cognitive Representations of the Political System in Adolescents: The 
Continuum from Pre-Novice to Expert, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE 11,22-23 (Helen Haste &Judith Torney-Purta eds., 1992) (noting similar 
phenomenon to Voss et aI., supra, that experts developed more sophisticated problem, 
which led to specific solutions); see also Farber, supra note 9, at 554-58 (expressing view that 
cognitive psychology supports the position that "practical reason" exists and provides the 
framework for how people do in fact make decisions); if. Anthony Palasota, Expertise and the 
Law: Some Recent Findings from the Cognitive Sciences About Complex Human Information 
Processing, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 599 (1991) (discussing cognitive psychology in the 
context of legal pedagogy); Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as 
Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1271, 1292-1301 (1991) (discussing cognitive 
psychology in the context of the learning process). 
The natural tendency to link the problem and the solution, however, may prevent the 
consideration of alternative solutions. The way a bill is characterized (for example, "Truth 
in _") by tradition and conditioning suggests a particular approach to the underlying 
problem (for example, a comprehensive disclosure statute). In the design of legislation as 
in the design of any other artifact, however, function does not dictate form. PETROSKI, 
supra note 13, at 174-75; Eugene S. Ferguson, The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in 
Technology, 197 ScIENCE 827 (1977). The legislative problem solver must be careful to 
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alike tended to focus on the solution proposed, rather than the prob-
lem to be corrected. 117 
The link between text and problem tends to develop a legislative 
response that does not necessarily address the underlying problems, 
but rather focuses on passage of the bill as the goal of the legislative 
process.11S In the case of Truth in Savings, the link between problem 
and solution prevented Congress from considering alternative legisla-
tive responses. Ai; Professor Rubin commented in connection with 
the development of Truth in Lending, the many alternative solutions 
to the problem "were simply beyond the conceptual horizon of the 
drafters because there was no methodology for identifying the stat-
ute's goals and separately evaluating its techniques."1l9 If the issues 
presented by the proponents of Truth in Savings had been reduced to 
specific problems and separated from the language of a specific legis-
lative proposal, the lawmakers could have given serious consideration 
to a number of options, including the following: 
1. Defer to Regulators 
Depending on what problem they decided the law was intended to 
address, the legislators could have concluded that the administrative 
agencies charged with regulating our nation's banks had the situation 
under control and deferred to their expertise. 120 Courts often defer 
to agency expertise,121 even though some commentators have ques-
tioned the value of the supposed independence and expertise of regu-
lators.122 In some situations, congressional deference to agencies may 
be appropriate as well, especially in highly regulated areas where the 
frame the problem completely yet flexibly in order to consider all workable solutions and 
not to exclude some inadvertently. 
117. Rubin, supra note I, at 295. 
118. Sometimes the problem being corrected by Congress appears to be the mere 
absence of the proposed legislation. This view, however, does not comport with a problem-
solving approach to legislation; rather, it suggests that the passage of the legislation itself, 
rather than the correction of an underlying problem, is the object of the legislative 
process. See Seidman, supra note 5, at 63 ("To state the absence of a proposed solution as a 
cause transforms problem-solving into an ends-means methodology."). 
119. Rubin, supra note I, at 289. 
120. The federal banking regulators had already promulgated regulations dealing with 
some issues raised by the proponents of the Truth in Savings Act. See supra notes 41-43 and 
accompanying text. 
121. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New 
Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 
1275. 
122. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 
YALE LJ. 1395, 1402-09 (1975); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984). 
1994] TRUTH IN SAVINGS 1313 
responsibility for the development of a coherent regulatory strategy 
rests with a particular regulatory agency.123 
Although the regulations in effect before the enactment of Truth in 
Savings were primarily directed at advertising,· the Federal Reserve 
Board had interpreted its regulations to address other perceived is-
sues in the bank-depositor relationship, as well.l 24 With appropriate 
direction from Congress, perhaps in the form of ajoint resolution, all 
of the federal banking regulators might have been persuaded to adopt 
similar interpretations. Even without those additional regulatory in-
terpretations, however, the fact that the Federal Reserve Board had 
taken the steps it did meant that as of June 1990, 40.7 percent of all 
banks in the country-controlling 76.2 percent of all bank assets-
already were effectively covered by regulations aimed at the issues cov-
ered under Truth in Savings. 125 
2. Target Specific Practices 
Rather than imposing an ongoing, costly requirement of compre-
hensive disclosure, Congress could have identified the underlying spe-
cific practices that the witnesses found oppressive and made those 
practices illegal. Truth in Savings effectively adopted this approach 
with regard to the investable balance method of interest rate calcula-
tion. 126 Proponents of the bill, however, did riot favor the approach 
of specifying particular methods of calculation that would be unac-
123. Cf Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a 
Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501, 568-77 (1989) (exploring the transition of 
banking regulation from a set of prophylactic prohibitions to a set of prudential 
restrictions and the challenges of banking regulators to adapt the regulatory changes to 
the realities of the banking marketplace). 
124. The Federal Reserve interpreted its regulations to require that member banks: (1) 
disclose to the depositor at the time the account is opened the method to be used in 
paying interest; and (2) that depositors be given notice of any changes that adversely affect 
the calculation of interest. Disclosure-Computation of Interest, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 
2-420 (Apr. 1982) (Board interpretation), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File; 
Contract Terms, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-514 (Apr. 1989) (staff opinion of Sept. 21, 
1979), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File; Disclosure-Reduction of Interest Rate, 
1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-523.1 (Apr. 1989) (staff opinion of Dec. 15, 1981), available 
in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File. In addition, the Federal Reserve outlawed so-called 
"teaser" rates by considering the advertising of an account with an annual rate of simple 
interest that exceeds its average effective yield to be inaccurate, misleading, and 
misrepresentative of the deposit contract. Advertising-Time Deposits Not Subject to Interest 
Rate Limitations, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-41l.1 (July 1982) (Board interpretation), 
available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File; Advertising-Multiple-Rate Time Deposits and 
IRAs, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-411.3 (May 1984) (policy statement of Mar. 22, 1984), 
available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File. 
125. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM XIX-2 (1991), 
reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1377, at XIX-2 (Feb. 14, 1991) (giving 
statistics for banks in the United States). 
126. Truth in Savings Act, § 267, 12 U.S.C. § 4307 (Supp. V 1993). 
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ceptable because they believed banks would be able to avoid the dic-
tates of the law. 127 Given the reluctance of the bill's supporters to 
agree to that approach, therefore, Congress could have mandated cer-
tain business practices, such as specific methods of interest calcula-
tion, in order to alleviate the problem. In fact, although opposed by 
the banking industry, this approach actually was considered, but was 
later rejected when H.R. 6 was combined with H.R. 447 to form H.R. 
2654, the bill that eventually became Truth in Savings. 128 In the end, 
neither approach was adopted, again illustrating that the bill did not 
address a specific problem. 
3. Create a Consumer Education Program 
Most of the issues raised in the testimony flowed from the larger 
problem that consumers were relatively unsophisticated about finan-
cial matters and were being taken advantage of by banks. If lack of 
sophistication was the underlying problem, however, and the issues 
complained of in connection with Truth in Savings were but symp-
toms, Congress could have developed the sophistication of the public 
with regard to the consumption of financial services. Although one 
could argue that a disclosure statute performs the function of making 
consumers more sophisticated, in practice, disclosure alone will not 
benefit unsophisticated consumers. 129 Unless the information dis-
closed is delivered to the consumer in a manner he or she will under-
stand, the disclosure statute will have no effect.I3o In order to correct 
this problem, therefore, Congress could have entertained the policy 
option of devising ways to increase customer sophistication. As one 
method, for instance, Congress could have created a program of con-
sumer education courses in our nation's schools. 
4. Develop a Government Rating System 
If increasing customer sophistication represented an unachievable 
end, Congress could have devised a way to communicate the relative 
127. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. 
Public Interest Research Group) ("And if you simply prohibit specifically, for example, the 
low balance method, the smart counsel for a bank will inform his or her operations staff, 
calculate interest on the next to low balance."). 
128. See supra note 87. Although the prescribed interest calculation method had been 
considered, its relative merits in light of the goals of the statute were never explicitly 
discussed in the hearings. . 
129. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text. 
130. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 163 (1982); Craswell, supra note 69, 
at 690-91; Sovern, supra note 68, at 25-27; Sunstein, supra note 69, at 424-25. While this 
point seems obvious, disclosure statutes are enacted with little discussion of whether the 
required disclosure will end up in the hands of a consumer who can actually understand 
and act on the information. 
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fairness of banking practices that eliminated the need for customer 
sophistication. The legislators might have opted to digest the relevant 
information for the people and develop a government-sponsored rat-
ing system that would let even the most unsophisticated bank cus-
tomer understand whether his or her bank was offering a fair deal.l3l 
5. Foster Industry Self-Regulation 
Although heavily regulated industries historically have not been es-
pecially effective self-policers,132 Congress could have devised a system 
to encourage self-policing in accordance with strict guidelines. In 
fact, the banking industry had considered taking the initiative to enact 
a proposed self-policing mechanism in the early 1980s.133 Although 
the banking industry missed that opportunity, Congress could have 
enacted legislation creating incentives for the industry to self-regu-
late. 1M Creating incentives for self-regulation might prove a meaning-
ful method for Congress to provide more flexible and responsive 
regulation. 135 
6. Foster Citizen Oversight 
Yet another approach might have been for the government to sanc-
tion the creation of a system of citizens' banking and insurance 
boards. 136 These boards could have served as "watchdogs" over the 
financial services industry and warned customers of abusive 
practices. 137 
Instead of considering any of these options, however, Truth in Sav-
ings marched through its twenty-three year journey as a disclosure 
131. Professor Rubin suggested the possibility of such a scheme. Rubin, supra note 1, at 
289. 
132. HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANKING REGULATION FAILED 151-52 (1991). Although, in 
general, highly regulated industries have not proven to be adept at self-regulation, 
exceptions to the general rule exist. The securities industry provides an example of a 
heavily regulated industry that nevertheless polices itself. IAN AYRES &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING'THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 104 (1992). 
133. The plan would have called for banks belonging to the American Bankers 
Association to contribute to fund an industry-run advertising enforcement agency. Alice 
Arvan, Promise-the Moon IRA Ads: Trouble Ahead, AM. BANKER, Feb. 16, 1982, at 9. 
134. Recently, the state of Texas passed legislation creating incentives for its chemical 
industry to voluntarily comply with the stringent guidelines of the Texas hazardous waste 
law. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 28, 1992) (transcript on 
file with author). 
135. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 101-32; CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC 
USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 13 (1977). 
136. An article in American Banker, the newspaper of record for the banking industry, 
discussed the possibility of such boards. Deregulation Has Potential for Consumer Confusion, 
Abuse, AM. BANKER, July 12, 1983, at 6. 
137. In the chartering legislation, Congress could have given the boards the, right to 
include notices in regular mailings of financial institutions. See id. at 8. 
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statute. The fact that the disclosure approach might not be effec-
tive,138 that it clashed with the banking regulators' agenda ofreducing 
the regulatory burden,139 and that the regulators of banking's chief 
competitor-the mutual fund industry-were proposing to require 
even less disclosure,140 had no effect on the evolution of the legisla-
tion. Truth in Savings went through the process as if in a vacuum; 
exogenous factors could not change its basic approach. It could only 
be fine-tuned by reference to its own provisions. 
What a statute aims to do and how it aims to do it are closely re-
lated, but different, questions. Different problems call for different 
solutions. By not clearly defining what problem Truth in Savings 
sought to address, Congress could not have chosen among the various 
policy options available, even if it had identified those options. While 
more rigorous problem framing and methodology will not guarantee 
a statute's effectiveness, poor problem framing and methodology 
makes failure likely. 
II. FLAWS IN THE PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODOLOGY 
If the goal of legislation is to solve problems,141 the legislative 
drafter should adopt a problem-solving methodology. Problem solv-
ing, though one of the most basic human activities, remains a poorly 
understood process. 142 While we remain in the dark about the pro-
cess by which individuals solve problems, the process by which groups 
solve problems presents an even more difficult subject of study. 143 De-
spite our collective ignorance of how both groups and individuals 
138. BREYER, supra note 130, at 162; Craswell, supra note 69, at 690-91; Sunstein, supra 
note 69, at 424-25. 
139. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 57 (statement of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System); 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 5-6 (statement of Martha Seger, 
Governor, Federal Reserve Board). 
140. Mutual fund shares are securities and, as such, may only be purchased after the 
purchaser has obtained a prospectus from the fund. The prospectus contains a great deal 
of information, but-as a practical matter-is only a formality, as the investment gets sold 
through advertisements or brokers. Recognizing the hollow nature of the prospectus 
requirement, the SEC supports a change in the mutual fund rules to allow no-load mutual 
funds to sell shares with clip out coupons in newspapers and magazines. Claudia 
Cummins, SEC Policy Likely to Support Mutual Fund Innovations, BANKING WK., Jan. II, 1993, 
at 11. 
141. For a response to the criticism that legislation is not concerned with solving 
problems, see infra notes 149-73 and accompanying text. 
142. Although no one completely understands the problem-solving process, various 
researchers have given the topic considerable thought. For a utility-maximizing approach, 
see SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE 36-50 (1992). For a 
perspective from the field of cognitive psychology, see Torney-Purta, supra note 116; Voss 
et aI., supra note 116. 
143. For a general discussion of the differences between individual and collective 
choice, see HEAP ET AL., supra note 142. at 199-216. 
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solve problems, however, intuition and logic suggest that the first step 
in any problem-solving methodology should be to identify the 
problem.144 
As currently structured, the legislative process does not necessarily 
begin by identifying and defining the problem to be corrected. 
Although the sources of legislation are too numerous to make a gen-
eral statement,145 a significant number of bills evolve in a manner sim-
ilar to the path followed by Truth in Savings. In this mode of 
legislative development, Congress essentially starts with a solution in 
the form of a bill. The existence of that bill in the legislative process 
causes a series of events to take place, including the holding of sub-
committee hearings to clarify the issues and discuss the pros and cons 
of the proposed legislation.146 When Congress operates in this man-· 
ner, it in effect puts the cart before the horse by considering the solu-
tion (in the form of the proposed bill) before it has fully investigated 
the problem (through the he,aring process). With the solution in 
hand before the problem has been fully analyzed, Congress fails to get 
the problem-solving process off on the right foot. 147 
As the following discussion illustrates, even if Congress wanted to 
engage in rigorous problem framing, however, political and structural 
impediments might prevent it from doing so. Professor Robert Seid-
man has persuasively argued that an effective problem-solving meth-
odology requires the problem framer to separate facts from values, to 
144. This intuitive step is supported by the two other works that have specifically 
addressed the challenges of legislative methodology. See Rubin, supra note I, at 285-86 
("The proper starting point for the design of effective legislation is an issue, not a bill."); 
Seidman, supra note 5, at 5 ("Following a four-part problem-solving methodology, the 
memorandum first ought to specify the behavior constituting the social problem at which 
the legislation aims .... "). In addition, material dealing with drafting legislation starts with 
identification of the jlroblems. See HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 1.1, at 2; Purdy, supra note 19, 
at 99-100. . 
145. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
146. In some circumstances administrative agencies, executive branch departments, or 
knowledgeable committee staffers prepare legislation after a thorough policy analysis. 
Under another scenario, a bill may be drafted with the assistance of policy analysis 
prepared by the General Accounting Office or the Office of Technology Assessment. 
There are other ways that bills evolve as well, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text, 
but many of the bills taken up by Congress came into being in a way similar to the path 
taken by Truth in Savings. 
147. When legislation in the Truth in Savings mode is subjected to the problem-framing 
step at all, the task appears to fall on the shoulders of the legislative drafter. FILSON, supra 
note 12, at 31-36; HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 1.1, at 2; Purdy, supra note 19, at 98-100. 
Legislative drafters (usually someone other than the elected representative), for their part, 
often find that they have no trouble grasping the problem because the sponsor of the 
legislation has instructed them what the problem is and what the bill should a.im to do. 
FILSON, supra note 12, at 31. As a result, the drafter expends remarkably little effort on 
what should be the most important aspect of the drafting process-problem identification. 
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adopt a sophisticated model of the real world, and to address causes 
rather than conditions. 148 Political realities may prevent attaining 
these conditions. In addition, problem framing may not receive· the 
attention it deserves due to the failure to appreciate the power the 
problem framer possesses in the legislative process. 
Before considering the elements that affect the problem-identifica-
tion process, however, I must first address an underlying premise of 
this discussion, which until this point has been assumed: that legisla-
tion serves a problem-solving function. This Article proceeds on the 
belief that the purpose of legislation is to solve problems. Not all 
readers, however, will subscribe to a similar belief. Therefore, before 
dealing with the failure of problem identification, a discussion of the 
role of problem solving in the legislative project is in order. 
A. The Role of Problem Solving in the Legislative Project 
The belief that legislatures exist to solve social problems is not an 
immutable and universal truth. Empirical evidence shows that Con-
gress often proposes or passes pieces of legislation that have nothing 
to do with solving problems, but rather are merely political state-
ments. 149 Putting aside obvious political statements, however, some 
people might characterize the legislative project not as an exercise in 
problem solving, but rather as an effort to effect a wealth transfer 
from one group to another. 150 
148. These three requirements for effective problem identification are drawn from 
Professor Seidman's discussion of the philosophical beliefs to which legislative drafters 
must subscribe in order to be effective. Seidman, supra note 5, at 32. 
149. A significant percentage of all bills placed in the legislative hopper do not seriously 
attempt to solve perceived social problems, or even to do the bidding of interest groups, 
but rather serve only as a way for a representative to attract publicity, or to go on record as 
a proponent or opponent of a particular idea. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL 
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 83 (3d ed. 1989). In addition, members of Congress 
spend a great deal of time and energy passing specialty biI1s for constituents, such as 
"commemorative" legislation establishing National Grapefruit Month. See Helen Dewar, A 
Day (or Month or Year) in the Sun: "Commemoratives" Accounted for Much of Legislation Enacted 
in '91, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1992, at A15. The scope of this nonsubstantive legislative 
activity boggles the mind. In 1977, four percent of all laws enacted were commemoratives. 
How CONGRESS WORKS 43 (Mary W. Cohn ed., 2d ed. 1991). By 1985, the percentage of 
commemoratives had increased to 59% of all public laws enacted by Congress. 1d. Even 
given Congress' recent tendency to enact fewer but more massive public laws, this increase 
is startling. 
150. This position is taken by many scholars who operate within the loosely knit group 
of public choice theorists. See Tollison, supra note 31. Stating a general theory of public 
choice is impossible because there are many variations on the set of core principles that 
have inspired many of the scholars. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991);Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of 
Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 143 (1989). 
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The recognition that legislatures are influenced to a significant de-
gree by organized interest groups and other factors has led to the de-
velopment of "public choice" theories of legislative behavior in the 
political science, economics, and legal fields. I51 A "public choice" 
model of legislation most often refers to one of the several economic 
models of legislation that have been proposed over the years, or, more 
frequently, to an amalgam of those various theories. I52 In their sim-
plest form, the economic models depict legislation as a product sold 
in a market by legislators to interest groups in exchange for money or 
votes. I53 In a more sophisticated form, the economic model places 
legislators in the thick of the market, where they act as brokers of 
wealth transfer from one group to another. I54 
151. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. 
REv. 873, 883 (1987). Much of the theoretical work relates to organization theory and 
group decisionmaking. A significant school of thought within the movement owes much 
to the work of Kenneth Arrow, who developed the famous theorem that bears his name. 
Arrow's Theorem holds that, under certain conditions, it is impossible to aggregate the 
preferences of a given group because the way in which voting is conducted could result in 
an infinite cycling of choices. See id. at 902. For a useful summary of Arrow's Theorem and 
its larger implications, see HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 209-15. Despite being thought-
provoking and insightful, Arrow's Theorem does not serve as the foundation for the model 
of legislative behavior most frequently referred to as the "public choice" model. Farber & 
Frickey, supra, at 904-06. Instead, the "public choice" theory of common parlance derives 
from the application of economic principles to the political process .. I have gathered some 
of the common threads of the various versions of the economic public choice theory for 
discussion here. 
152. Economic models of legislation have been in existence at least since the late 
eighteenth century, but the most recent wave of theories trace their roots to the 1950s. 
Mashaw, supra note 150, at 124. While the economic model possesses great power to 
explain how statutes get passed, scholars have debated whether a world view dominated by 
bargaining interest groups and excluding higher values runs the risk of becoming morally 
impoverished and ultimately politically illegitimate. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan &James M. 
Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 180 
(1988); Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 161 (1989); Farber & Frickey, supra note 151, at 906-24; Mashaw, supra note 150. 
153. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 496-99 (3d ed. 1986). 
154. Tollison, supra note 31, at 343. Although the legislative process may be seen as an 
economic transaction, it cannot be compared to such straightforward economic 
transactions as, say, buying a major appliance, because the groups that bargain for the 
legislation usually cannot take immediate delivery. While the economic theory of 
legislation casts legislators as brokers of legislatively enforced wealth transfers, id., it is an 
odd kind of brokerage arrangement because legislators get paid their commission even if 
they do not deliver the legislative product. The political system allows the sponsors of bills 
to return to interest groups and say, "I'm working hard for the passage of that law, but 
special interests, or the committee chair, or the other party have blocked its progress." 
How CoNGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 42-43. In exchange for the representative's 
efforts (not necessarily his or her results), the group will pay with political or financial 
support. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 71 (1990). At some 
point, however, the sponsor has to deliver the legislative product or run the risk of 
appearing ineffectual. Finding the right time to get the bill passed presents a tricky 
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Truth in Savings can be analyzed as an example of legislation as 
brokered wealth transfer. The legislation calls for a wealth transfer 
from banks to their customers. Proponents of Truth in Savings admit-
ted that the bill was intended to cause just such a wealth transfer. I55 
In the public choice view, Truth in Savings shifts the cost of deci-
phering information from the unsophisticated depositor to the bank. 
In exchange for that transfer, various members of Congress extract a 
commission in the form of additional political or financial support 
from the consumer lobby.I56 
While the history of Truth in Savings can be interpreted through 
the public choice model of legislation, the public choice view is not 
the only way to look at legislative behavior. The public choice model's 
primary modern intellectual counterweight is the neo-republican 
model. 157 Justifying Truth in Savings in the language of the neo-re-
calculation because it is in the legislator's self-interest to extract continuing support from 
the affected groups by having the bill come up in session after session. 
155. In the words of Dr. Richard L.D. Morse. long-time advocate for comprehensive 
deposit account disclosure: "The cost of explaining these complexities [of methods of 
interest calculation) will [after the enactment of Truth in Savings) become part of the cost 
considerations which the bank should calculate. Under the present law, the cost of 
deciphering is borne totally by the unsophisticated depositor." 137 CONGo REc. H6758, 
6762-64 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991). 
156. Of course. under the public choice theory of legislation, a wealth transfer that 
benefits one group will result in a decrease in the wealth of another group. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 354-55 (1990). The group from whom the 
wealth transfer is to be taken will resist the transfer and spend resources to prevent its 
occurrence. [d. If the rent-seeking group demanding the wealth transfer and the group 
from whom the transfer will be extracted are equally well-organized. the transfer will not 
occur. [d. The brokered wealth transfer will occur only if the constituency from whom the 
transfer is taken perceives the costs of opposing the transfer to outweigh the costs of 
allowing the transfer to take place. Tollison. supra note 31. at 343-44. In the case of Truth 
in Savings. the group from whom the wealth transfer was being extracted-the banking 
industry-did not fight the enactment of the law very strenuously, perhaps because it 
sensed long-term benefits would outweigh the short-term costs. or perhaps because many 
banks were already providing the disclosures required by Truth in Savings as required by 
state law or existing federal regulation, or perhaps because in that session of Congress the 
banking industry had more important issues on which it needed to spend its political 
capital. Truth in Savings was one small part of a very large bill. the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Pub. L. lO2-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified 
as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) contained many provisions that affected the business of 
banking much more profoundly than Truth in Savings, such as strengthened capital 
requirements. deposit insurance reform and new enforcement powers for regulators. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, § 305.12 U.S.C. § 18280 (Supp. 
IV 1992); id. § 311,12 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. IV 1992); id. § 307.12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. IV 
1992). In any event, the banking industry did not oppose the passage of Truth in Savings 
as strongly as it might have. 
157. In attempting a brief discussion of the "republican" model, one runs the risk of 
over-simplifying the case, especially in light of the fact that there is not one republican 
model, but many. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication. 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (\986) (discussion of republicanism from 
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publican modeP58 requires that we find Truth in Savings to be a pub-
lic-regarding solution to a community problem, the identification and 
solution of which came about through public-spirited deliberation. 
Because the neo-republican model is best viewed as an aspirational,159 
rather than a descriptive, model of legislative behavior, it should not 
be surprising that in its particulars the process by which Truth .in Sav-
ings was adopted fell short of the neo-republican mode1. 160 
feminist point of view). For a history of the republican tradition, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REpUBLICAN 
TRADITION (1975); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 
11 (1992). What follows, however, is a discussion of those elements that seem to form the 
paradigm of "neo-republicanism," which attempts to update traditional republicanism into 
a form more consistent with modern sensibilities. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1547-58 (1988). 
158. The following discussion of the neo-republican view of legislative behavior rests on 
the four foundational principles of citizenship, political equality, problem solving for the 
common good, and deliberation articulated by Professor Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note 
157. 
159. Although the republican model has been used to describe how legislatures work, at 
least in part, see, e.g., Allan W. Vestal, Public Choice, Public Interest, and the Soft Drink Interbrand 
Competition Act: Time to Derail the "Root Beer Express"?, 34 WM. & MARy L. REv. 337, 354-60 
(1993), it is not well-suited as a descriptive model. Instead, the republican model serves 
better as an aspirational model that provides guidance and direction. As Professor 
Sunstein points out, "The republican belief in deliberation is aspirational and critical 
rather than celebratory and descriptive .... Modern republicans do not claim that existing 
systems actually embody republican deliberation." Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1549. 
160. First, the neo-republican model holds as a fundamental assumption the idea that 
political power comes from the community. Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic 
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 811-833 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1555-58. 
The rights of citizens to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-together with their 
concomitant responsibilities to participate in the political process-playa central role in 
the lawmaking process. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1503-04 
(1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Republic]. (In actuality, however, laws are far more likely to 
originate in the offices of elected officials or at administrative agencies than from 
constituent requests. FILSON, supra note 12, at 29.) Truth in Savings clearly lacks this neo-
republican attribute. The real impetus behind Truth in Savings was not a general public 
outcry. In fact, during the hearings on the bill, Congressman Thomas commented on the 
lack of such public concern. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 2. Instead, from 1984 on, the 
bill owed its existence to the personal motivation of Representative Richard Lehman of 
California, the self-acknowledged "godfather" of Truth in Savings. Id. at 3. Representative 
Lehman testified that he introduced the 1984 version of the Truth in Savings bill "after 
noticing a great number of ... misleading advertisements in newspapers, magazines, and 
even on billboards on the side of the road." 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 5. Far from 
being an expression of the popular will, this legislative act was the ultimate paternalistic 
measure. 
A second key element of the neo-republican ideal is that the people and their 
representatives have access to the political process and participate in that process in a 
meaningful way. The neo-republican model posits that all citizens have equal access to the 
political machinery. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. 
REv. 4, 27 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Foreward]; Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1552-53. 
Similarly, their political representatives play meaningful and valuable roles in the political 
process within Congress. Under the neo-republican model, a representative's position in 
the legislature (that is, seniority, party affiliation, committee assignment) should not 
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influence his or her effectiveness because he or she, too, is one among many political 
equals. The history of Truth in Savings also lacks this second key element. As noted above, 
Truth in Savings was not a major concern for the people. They may have had access to the 
political system regarding the issue, but they did not use it. Moreover, the political 
representatives of the people did not playa truly meaningful role in the process either. See 
infra notes 225-42 and accompanying text. Although the neo-republican ideal aspires to 
the concept of political equality, see Michelman, Republic, supra, at 27; Sunstein, supra note 
157, at 1552-53, reality forces us to recognize that all representatives are not created 
equal-some have more talent than others, some have more seniority, some have better 
committee assignments; they do not enjoy equal power. Tollison, supra note 31, at 353-54. 
The third element of neo-republicanism calls for the legislature to address problems for 
the common good. Fallon, supra note 31, at 1698; Michelman, Foreward, supra, at 1503-04. 
It holds that at least some problems can be addressed with "substantively right answers" for 
the public good without regard to political ideology or individual preferences. Sunstein, 
supra note 157, at 1541. As we have seen, however, Congress did not in any rigorous way 
attempt to identify exactly what problem Truth in Savings was supposed to address. One 
might argue that, on its face, the statute should be considered for the common good 
because it obviously addresses the noble social goal of consumer protection. This assertion 
is the strongest neo-republican argument justifying Truth in Savings, and on the most 
superficial level, it seems consistent with the neo-republican ideal. On a deeper level, 
however, the broad purpose of consumer protection does not tell us much about the 
specific problem the legislation was intended to address or how that problem relates to the 
common good. 
Finally, the fourth and most vital element of the neo-republican model is public-spirited 
deliberation. The concept of deliberation occupies a paramount position in the neo-
republican model. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 
29,45-48 (1985). The theory holds that civic virtue motivates lawmakers to deliberate and 
reach the best conclusion consistent with the common good. Sunstein, supra note 157, at 
1548-51. Once again, Truth in Savings also lacks this element of the neo-republican 
model. The debates and hearings relating to Truth in Savings over the years are devoid of 
true deliberation. When Congress held hearings on the proposed Truth in Savings 
legislation, most of the persons testifying represented consumer groups. See 1991 Hearings, 
supra note 53; 1989 Hearings, supra note 89; 1984 Hearings, supra note 17. The groups 
uniformly supported the proposed legislation, although many tried to make the case for 
even more extensive disclosure. See, e.g., 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 53 (testimony of 
Edmund Mierwinski). In some cases, the banking lobby did not ev~n appear before the 
committee, but merely sent a letter to the committee registering dissent. 1989 Hearings, 
supra note 89, at 81; 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 174. In addition to the banking 
industry, the various federal banking regulators voiced their opposition to the legislation. 
See, e.g., H.R. 5094 REpORT, supra note 82, at 407, 412, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(CCH) No. 1245, at 407, 412. The federal regulators believed the then-existing federal 
regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.6, 329.3, 563.27. (1992), already offered the protection 
sought by the proponentl! of Truth in Savings. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 55 
(statement of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). The regulators also 
warned that additional regulatory requirements on the banking industry would be harmful 
both to the industry and its customers. 1d. at 56 (statement of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System); 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 4 (testimony of Martha Seger, 
Governor, Federal Reserve Board); H.R. 5094 REpORT, supra note 82, at 406-07 (testimony 
of L. William Seidman, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), reprinted in 
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1245, at 406-07. Yet, despite comments from the 
regulatory experts that the regulation was unnecessary, and despite the admission by the 
chief consumer group that its study of rising consumer banking costs was unscientific, CFA 
Study, supra note 52, the committee's published proceedings provide little evidence of any 
meaningful deliberation over how much deference to pay to the regulatory agencies or 
how much credence to give the consumer group's statistics. The failure to engage in a 
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The experience of the Truth in Savings Act and much recent schol-
arship tells us that more is going on in the legislative process than can 
be explained by the neo-republican model. 161 Yet, at the same time, 
the public choice model also fails to provide a complete explanation 
of how laws are enacted.162 Although Congress sometimes enacts ob-
dialogue with the regulatory agencies not only pays short shrift to the neo-republican ideal, 
it also provides an unfortunate example of the lack of coordination between the legislative 
branch and the regulatory agencies concerning strategies for regulatory implementation. 
See GARTEN, supra note 132, at 64-66. 
The actual subcommittee debate in the year Truth in Savings finally passed was fairly 
perfunctory. It consisted in large part of Representative Thomas of Wyoming (the most 
junior member of the minority party) questioning whether the bill was reaily necessary. 
1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 2-3. Debate beyond the committee stage was virtually 
nonexistent. The Congressional Record on the day the bill passed the House chronicles 
glowing endorsements of the measure, with the only negative note being a concern that 
the statute might "create another title in the 'Lawyers Full Employment Act.''' 137 CONGo 
REc. H6758, 6762 (daily ed. Sept. 24,1991) (statement of Rep. McCandless). The lack of 
debate should not come as a great surprise, as it is probable that few members of Congress 
were aware what the bill contained. In reality, most members of Congress (other than the 
committee members) probably never even read the Truth in Savings Act. According to 
one member of Congress, surprisingly few members of Congress even have the chance to 
read specific pieces of pending legislation. Symposium, supra note 1, at 9 (comments of 
Rep. Christopher Cox). 
161. See, e.g., jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
LJ. 1673 (1988) ("[W]hat is missing from the republican revival is an appreciation of the 
frightening power of man to subvert the offices of government for what can only be 
described as evil ends."); see also Donald]. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund,jr., The Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of Private Over Public 
Interest, 44 ALA. L. REv. 355 (1993). . 
162. One problem with the public choice approach is that it does not comport with 
empirical evidence. For instance, contrary to what would be expected by public choice 
theory, one research study found little evidence that PAC contributions influenced voting 
behavior. In those situations where a correlation existed, the PAC contributions were 
actually better seen as symptomatic of a more important and larger package of support for 
the representative from the interest group. janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional 
Supermarket: The Currency is Complex, 33 AM.]. OF POL. SCI. 1 (1989), reprinted in 8 THE 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989 689 (Joel Silbey ed., 1991) [hereinafter 
CONGRESS]; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199,236-68 (1988). 
Other scholars have criticized the methodology of the public choice approach as failing 
to give weight to legitimate concerns about the public interest that legiSlators may have 
had and instead constructing an ex post explanation for legislative behavior based on who 
benefitted from the legislation. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 36, at 692 (criticizing the 
public choice critique of the Glass-Steagall "wall" separating commercial and investment 
banking as a bargain struck by special interest groups). 
[T]he claims [of the public choice scholars] ... are based on deduction 
rather than discovered fact: convinced there is no rational economic policy 
to support a wall of separation between banking and the securities industry 
... they conclude that the only possible alternative explanation is a skewing 
of the political process by those who later turned out to be immense 
beneficiaries of the statute. 
Id.; see Rubin, supra note 9, at 5-31 (offering a comprehensive criticism of the public choice 
movement and concluding that its focus on economic motivations, while providing the 
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vious political bargains .into law as public choice theorists would pre-
dict,163 at other times it enacts laws that appear to benefit no 
particular interest group.164 
On close examination, therefore, neither model describes all legis-
lative enactments. Because both models are incomplete, to look at 
the actions of legislatures exclusively through one theoretical lens or 
the other distorts one's perception. Instead of viewing legislative be-
havior as either "neo-republican" or "public choice," it may be more 
profitable to visualize it as lying on a continuum, defined on one end 
by the paradigmatic neo-republican model and at the other end by 
the pure form of the economic public choice model. The explana-
tion for most legislation would lie somewhere in between these two 
extremes. Describing legislative behavior at either end of the spec-
trum presents little difficulty because we can merely invoke the lan-
guage of either the neo-republican or the public choice paradigm, as 
the case may be. In reality, however, very few pieces of legislation can 
be completely explained solely in the language of either the public 
choice or the neo-republican model. 165 
While the two models seem incompatible, at least three ways 
emerge in which they work together to shape legislative behavior: (1) 
legislators must justify their actions in the language of the neo-republi-
can model; (2) the public uses the neo-republican model as a stan-
dard against which to evaluate legislative behavior; and (3) individual 
legislators may find inspiration in the ideals of the neo-republican 
model. 
1. The Justification Role 
The neo-republican model embodies our ideals and myths about 
what we want our government to be. We have largely defined the le-
gitimacy of political action in light of the model's foundational princi-
benefit of a simple model, distorts the legislative process by failing to consider that legisla-
tive behavior is more complex than a reelection-maximizing model countenances: "[Legis-
lators] want to be re-elected, as they readily admit, but they also want to represent their 
constituents' views, to make good public policy, and to be well-respected by their peers. All 
these motivations are quite conscious, and none are overwhelming in their impact"). 
163. Some scholars have suggested that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 provides an 
example of interest-group bargaining for legislation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,jR. & PHILIP 
P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 40-46 (1988). 
164. Examples of this type of legislation might include proposals to reduce the deficit or 
to "reform" welfare. Some scholars maintain that even traditional economic regulation 
cannot be entirely explained by the public choice model. See ARNOLD, supra note 154, at 
224-61. 
165. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 37-64; Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note 
161; Vestal, supra note 159. 
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ples. 166 Those principles represent potent political ideals. 
Representatives understand that the political legitimacy of their ac-
tions will be judged by their citizen constituents under a civics class 
neo-republican model. Therefore, representatives understand that 
they must justify their actions in terms of the neo-republican ideal.167 
While by no means an ironclad checking mechanism, the justification 
function of the neo-republican model does impose some discipline on 
the legislative process.168 Although the flexibility of language allows 
legislators a great deal of latitude in explaining their actions-enough 
so that some actions taken solely for political or personal gain might 
nevertheless be capable of rationalization using the general terms of 
the neo-republican ideal-the language is not infinitely flexible. Ac-
tions incapable of justification will not survive scrutiny. 
2. Standard to Evaluate Legislative Behavior 
In addition to its role in justifying legislative action, the neo-republi-
can model can also provide a check on the public choice model if we 
allow the models to exist side by side: one as aspiration, one as de-
scription.169 If legislative action falls too far short of the ideals of the 
166. The model of government by which most Americans judge the legitimacy of 
governmental action is informed by the lessons learned in civics class. The civics class 
model of legislative behavior shares the foundational principles of the republican model. 
See supra notes 16, 158. 
167. Seidman, supra note 5, at 7. 
168. Despite the justification requirement, representatives can nevertheless invoke the 
language of the republican model to disguise the fact that they are acting for political 
purposes or on behalf of special interests. No representative ever publicly admits to taking 
action purely for political purposes without regard to the common good. Similarly, no 
representative would urge passage of a bill (or argue against it, as the case may be) on the 
strength of the bald admission that powerful interest groups paid good money for it. All 
opposition (and support, for that matter) for proposed legislation must be cloaked in the 
language of public interest and common good. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 78 ("Requiring 
justifications does not, to be sure, guarantee 'reasoned analysis' on the part of the 
legislature. . . . But requiring justification does provide an important prophylactic 
function.") . 
169. The distinction between aspirational models and descriptive models raises some 
conceptual problems. Many Americans regard the model of legislative behavior they 
learned in civics class as a descriptive model, when it should really be understood as an 
aspirational model-like the republican model developed by modern legal scholars. 
Consequently, many Americans believe the civics class model describes how Congress does 
work, instead of how it ought to work. Because of this confusion, our citizens have 
encountered a great deal of difficulty rationalizing the actions they observe legislators 
taking. When citizens see legislators behaving as the political beings they are instead of the 
public-spirited beings required by the civics class model, they perceive the system to be 
broken because it does not comport with their mental models. 
The clash between the aspirational and the descriptive brings us back to Bismarck's 
observation about sausage and legislation. Our aspirational model of sausage provides one 
reason why we do not want to see sausage being manufactured: we want to believe that 
sausage is meat. While this mental model of sausage holds some truth-sausage does 
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neo-republican model, the people can discipline their representatives. 
Appropriate discipline might include not voting for the incumbent at 
reelection, spouting off on a call-in show, writing a letter to the editor, 
or starting a recall petition. Political adversaries of the incumbent will 
try to cast the incumbent's record in a light that raises concerns about 
how closely actual behavior has approached the neo-republican ideal, 
and the electorate will make the decision. 170 
3. Neo-Republican Model as Inspiration 
The neo-republican model also serves as a source of inspiration to 
individual legislators. Congressional representatives have been incul-
cated with the same values inherent in the civics class model of legisla-
tive behavior as the rest of mainstream America. Somewher.e in the 
cores of their beings, legislative representatives believe the underlying 
values of the neo-republican ideal are meaningful, and in some cases, 
those values may inspire the representative to "do the right thing."171 
In these ways, the two forces at the ends of the continuum-neo-
republicanism and public choice-work on each and every legislative 
act, not to their mutual exclusion, but rather in dynamic tension. In 
some situations, congressional behavior lies close to the neo-republi-
can end of the spectrum, and the resolution of community issues 
through public-spirited deliberation is the activity it truly concerns it-
self with. As congressional action moves further from the neo-republi-
can ideal, the goal of effecting wealth transfers from one interest 
group t~ another may play an increasingly important role in the legis-
lative process, but the need to justify the legislation in terms of the 
public interest and the common good remains. 
Given the dynamic tension between neo-republicanism and public 
choice, the legislative process should conform (or at least appear to 
conform) to the neo-republican model as much as possible. Moving 
in that direction would serve the legislators' interests in at least two 
ways. First, to the extent legislators themselves are frustrated republi-
contain meat-it certainly does not tell the whole story. If we saw sausage being made we 
would see that it also contains fat, gristle, spices, filler, and unspeakably disgusting parts. 
See 9 C.F.R. §§ 319.140-.182 (1993). It is not purely meat-it is at once something much 
more and much less than meat. Similarly, the republican model of legislation holds as a 
central belief, or at least a central aspiration, that legislators deliberate to solve problems 
for the common good. While this belief holds some truth-many, perhaps most, members 
of Congress probably believe that they are civic-minded representatives who want to do 
what is best for the people they represent, see Symposium, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of 
Rep. Barney Frank)-it does not tell the whole story either. The legislative process 
involves interest group pressures, dealmaking, institutional politics, and many other 
factors, along with at least some problem solving thrown in. 
170. Cf ARNOLD, supra note 154, at 71-73. 
171. Symposium. supra note 1. at 43 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank). 
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cans, making the process comport with the neo-republican ideal is the 
normatively right thing to do. Second, to the extent legislators are 
also actors in the public choice model, a process that more closely 
resembles the neo-republican model makes it easier to justify political 
actions and to fend off political opponents. 
To help keep the descriptive public choice model and the aspira-
tional neo-republican model as closely aligned as possible, legislative 
drafters should focus their attention on the problem~solving process. 
Problem solving comports with both extremes of the legislative behav-
ior continuum. The neo-republican paradigm holds as a fundamental 
tenet the goal of solving problems for the common goOd. 172 At the 
same time, the public choice paradigm also requires legislators to en-
gage in problem solving, although the problem takes the form of de-
vising an effective method to bring about a wealth transfer from one 
group to another. 173 Therefore, at both ends of the spectrum, legisla-
tors must find effective means to solve problems. 
Having established the central role of problem solving to the legisla-
tive project, I now turn to several obstacles that prevent effective prob-
lem framing in the legislative process. These obstacles include the 
failure to candidly identify values and facts, the failure to adopt a so-
phisticated model of the real world, the failure to separate causes 
from conditions, and the failure to appreciate the power of the prob-
lem framer in the legislative process. 
B. The Failure to Candidly Identify Values and Facts 
As currently established, the legislative process erects formidable 
obstacles to the problem-identification process. One of the greatest 
obstacles comes from the failure of legislatures to grapple with the 
interconnectedness of facts and values. Problems do not exist in the 
abstract. They only exist with reference to a set of values that classifies 
a given phenomena as problematic. Because everyone has their own 
unique set-of values, the same phenomena may present a problem for 
one person but not for another. 174 Therefore, one cannot identify a 
problem without first identifying, implicitly or explicitly, the values 
that are offended by the particular phenomenon at issue. 
172. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. 
174. Take as an example one of the problems identified during the hearings about 
Truth in Savings-the imbalance of power between banks and their customers. This 
condition may present a problem if one sees the concentration of economic power in a few 
large corporations as wrong. On the other hand, if one believes that the natural order of 
things calls for a class of wealthy people to control the economy and to be responsible to 
the masses under a notion of noblesse oblige. then the disparity in economic power presents 
no problem whatsoever. 
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Legislative drafters must struggle with this process every time they 
address a problem. In some way, the legislative drafter must ask her-
self: "Under what set of values does the phenomenon complained of 
constitute a 'problem'?" Because every legislator brings his or her 
own meaning to the text of the bill,175 if the drafter wants the bill to 
pass, she must craft the bill's text in such a way that, regardless of the 
meaning individual legislators bring, a critical mass of legislators-ap-
plying their own sets of values-will consider the phenomenon a 
problem that deserves attention. 
Truth in Savings provides an example of the difficulty in candidly 
identifying facts and values in the context of problem identification. 
Although the legislative materials do not provide a specific place 
where one may turn to discover the exact problem that Truth in Sav-
ings was intended to correct, the statute does contain a findings clause 
that should shed some light on the problem being addressed. 
Although the findings clause cannot be interpreted as speaking defin-
itively about the purpose of the statute,176 it must convey some infor-
mation about it.177 Truth in Savings makes the following findings: 
SEC. 262(a) FINDINGs.-The Congress hereby finds that eco-
nomic stability would be enhanced, competition between depos-
itory institutions would be improved, and the ability of the 
consumer to make informed decisions regarding deposit ac-
counts, and to verify accounts, would be strengthened if there 
was uniformity in the disclosure of terms and conditions on 
which interest is paid and fees are assessed in connection with 
such accounts. 178 
If we take the findings clause literally, the drafter has identified 
three problems that existed prior to the enactment of Truth in Sav-
ings: (1) the economy was not as stable as it could be; (2) depository 
institutions were not as competitive as they could be; and (3) consum-
175. When analyzing a bill, a legislator is like any actor who must interpret a written 
text. The reader brings his or her own set of beliefs to the text and interacts with the text 
to reach some meaning. The text does not determine the meaning the reader reaches, but 
it plays an important role in the process. See Daniel C.K. Chow, A Pragmatic Model of Law, 
67 WASH. L. REv. 755, 791-92 (1992). 
176. See WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAITING 168 (2d ed. 1984) 
("The main danger is that [purpose clauses) will not accurately reflect what the legislature 
did in the rest of the statute. The purpose clause, for example, may be underinclusive in 
that it does not appear to cover everything in the statute."); see also DICKERSON, supra note 
12, at 286; Hirsch, supra note 12, § 4.2, at 29-30. 
177. Judges will consider the purpose clause when interpreting the law in order to 
understand what purpose Congress intended the statute to achieve. STATSKY, supra note 
176, at 98. At a minimum, the drafter who put the bill together must have had something 
in mind as a problem when she set pen to paper. That is. she must have believed that a 
required system of comprehensive account disclosure would accomplish something. 
178. Truth in Savings Act, § 262(a), 12 U.S.C. § 4302(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
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ers' ability to determine the true terms of their accounts was not as 
easy as it might be. I79 While these official findings may provide some 
evidence of what the drafter perceived the problem to be, they appear 
to be at odds with the problems identified during the hearings. ISO 
The legislative drafter likely was aware of the real problems of imbal-
ance of bargaining power, deceptive advertising, and misleading 
methods of computing interest identified by the proponents. Yet, in-
stead of adopting those problems in the findings section, she chose to 
describe the purpose of the bill as promoting economic stability, in-
creased competition, and comparison shopping. 
The disparity between the official findings and the real problems 
evidences the drafter's efforts to translate the real problems into polit-
ically acceptable language. lSI The drafter phrased the findings clause 
179. A moment's reflection on these problems, however, should give the reader pause. 
Two of the goals-economic stability and the creation of competition-represent two of 
the most intractable problems in economic theory. Certainly, the drafter did not believe 
that Truth in Savings' disclosure requirement would correct these problems, although she 
may have believed that the statute's requirements would move the economy closer to those 
policy goals. While the first two goals are overly ambitious, the third goal, on the contrary, 
seems quite humble. The third goal of the legislation is to assist consumers in comparison 
shopping among banks for deposit accounts. The truly modest nature of the third goal 
becomes all the more apparent when one considers the fact that the law does not apply to 
. nonbank competitors for depositors' money, such as mutual funds or insurance 
companies, Rae Mims, Fed Gears Up to Release Truth in Savings Regulations, ABA BANKERS 
WKLY., Mar. 31, 1992, at 6; 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 29, 42-43 (testimony of The 
Consumer Bankers Association and the American Banker's Association, respectively), and 
does not even apply to similar nondeposit account products offered by banks, such as 
mutual funds and repurchase agreements. The findings clause does not tell us why 
consumers had difficulty comparison shopping before the law, nor does it tell us what 
improved comparison shopping will achieve. It merely says that customers could not easily 
comparison shop before, and now the law assists them in comparison shopping. Read 
closely, the third goal really amounts to a shorthand statement of the law's substantive 
provisions. See Rubin, supra note I, at 288. 
180. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text. 
181. There may be several ways to explain the disparity between the findings clause and 
the problems raised during the hearings. One way to view the disparity is as conclusive 
evidence that the drafter did not engage in an explicit 'problem-framing analysis, for if the 
legislative drafter had conducted such an analysis, it would seem logical to memorialize it 
in the findings clause of the statute. See Rubin, supra note I, at 289. From this 
interpretation, one might infer the more extreme position that problem solving is not the 
real purpose of the legislative effort. Such an interpretation, however, would fail to 
address the dynamic tension between public choice and neo-republicanism that results in a 
problem-solving exercise, or at least the appearance of one. See supra notes 161-73 and 
accompanying text. 
A second plausible explanation for the disparity is that the purpose of the findings 
clause is not to describe the problem addressed by the legislation, but instead to lay a 
foundation for federal jurisdiction. In a recent case from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the lack of Commerce Clause language in the findings clause 
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, § 1702, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. IV 1992), 
prevented the application of federal law to an act committed entirely within the state of 
Texas. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993). In holding that 
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without a congressional finding to the contrary, the act of carrying a gun into a Texas 
school was not within the realm of the Commerce Clause, the court stated: "Neither the 
act itself nor its legislative history reflect any congressional determination that the 
possession denounced by section 922(q) is in any way related to interstate commerce or its 
regulation, or, indeed, that Congress was exercising its powers under the Commerce 
Clause." [d. at 1366. On the other hand, if Congress makes formal findings invoking its 
power under the Commerce Clause, its enactments routinely will be upheld. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237 (1983) (upholding Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992»; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 754 (1982) (upholding Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-617,92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.»; Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 271 (1981) (upholding 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.». 
In fact, when Congress makes inroads on a substantive area of law traditionally within 
the domain of the state, the drafter will often include a findings and purpose clause to 
establish a rationale for the exercise of congressional power based on the Commerce 
Clause. HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 4.2; MEHLMAN & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 49 ("[T]he 
findings of fact may disclose the 'intrastate' nature of a regulation of commerce, thereby 
alleviating potential problems in connection with federal preemption."). That cannot be 
the case with regard to Truth in Savings, however, because the findings clause does not 
invoke the magic words of the Commerce Clause or any other constitutional justification. 
A third explanation for the disparity might be based on the assertion that the findings 
clause does not address the problem, but rather serves a formal or traditional role in the 
legislative process. In this view, the purpose clause plays a ceremonial role in the larger 
drafting effort, but does not carry any legal significance, nor does it attempt to convey any 
information about the law's substance. This view holds some validity. Certainly, findings 
clauses lack legal force and often are written so broadly as to effectively lack meaning. See 
DICKERSON, supra note 12, at 287 ("Who can make jurisprudential capital, for example, out 
of a 329-word 'Declaration of National Environmental Policy' that ... says no more than 
'Hurrah for Nature'?"); see also HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 4.2. That is not to say that all 
findings and purposes clauses end up as meaningless generalities completely lacking in 
candor. For example, the findings and purposes clause of the federal statute dealing with 
restrictions on garnishment uses some fairly strong language condemning the practice of 
garnishment: that garnishment "encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit," 
and "has frustrated the purposes" of bankruptcy law. 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (a) (1988) (emphasis 
added). On the other hand, the mere fact of the findings clause's existence suggests it has 
some meaning. A long-established rule of statutory construction states that a provision of a 
statute will not be read to be without meaning. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. 
Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[I]t is not to be presumed that the legislature 
intended any part of a statute to be without meaning."); Cooper v. Tazewell Square 
Apartments, 577 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (W.O. Va. 1984) ("[M]eaning [must] be given to each 
word and phrase of the statute"); Triplett v. Azordegan, 421 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (N.D. Iowa 
1976) ("[A] statute must be construed in such a fashion that no part of it is rendered 
superfluous and it will not be presumed that a statute contains useless or meaningless 
words."). 
Finally, the meaning of the findings clause may be nothing more than an attempt to 
justifY the law in the language of the nea-republican model. But it might also be 
something more than that. If the findings clause served only as a blatant attempt to justify 
the legislation, it could simply state: "The Congress finds that passage of this law will 
address problems affecting the common good and will make the world a better place." A 
findings clause this broad and platitudinous would truly lack meaning. But a truly 
meaningless findings clause like the foregoing would be remarkable. In practice, findings 
clauses end up somewhere between the truly meaningless broad statement and the truly 
frank articulation of the proponents' problems. The Truth in Savings' findings clause 
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of Truth in Savings this way because to do otherwise (that is, candidly 
state the problems) would have been politically difficult. For instance, 
to state the problem as bluntly as "banks have unfair economic power 
over their customers" might not have been politically acceptable-
that sounds too Marxist. Not enough legislators would have sub-
scribed to the drafter's underlying normative foundation to explicitly 
recognize that formulation as a problem. The relatively innocuous 
statement that the legislation promotes comparison shopping, how-
ever, is fairly uncontroversial, if not somewhat misleading. 
While watering down the problem to make it politically acceptable 
may be a fact of political life,182 from the point of view of legislative 
methodology, it gets the whole process off to a bad start. Lack of can-
dor on the part of the legislative drafter weakens the entire legislative 
process. 18S Without candor, the legal system can never be sure what 
the real problem is that the law is supposed to correct. Legislators 
cannot evaluate whether the legislative response called for in the bill 
is an appropriate remedy. And, perhaps most importantly, we will 
never know if the law was successful in correcting the problem if we 
never knew what the real problem was. 
In addition to the problems that lack of candor creates for legisla-
tive methodology, it raises other concerns as well. Intentionally ob-
reflects this pattern. It contains a substantial degree of specificity, at least by comparison to 
a truly broad statement. In addition, it appears on its face related to the substance of the 
law. Therefore, assuming a modicum of candor on the part of the drafter, the findings 
clause most likely suggests the reasons for the law's existence. 
182. From a political point of view, an innocuous problem also carries with it the added 
benefit of being unlikely to come back to haunt the legislator in the next election. 
ARNOLD, supra note 154, at 71-73. 
183. The su~ject of candor in the legal system has received extensive attention from 
legal scholars examining the adjudication process. The scholarship reveals the benefits of 
candor in the judicial process to be at least threefold: (1) candor establishes the .moral 
authority of the bench and the public trust necessary for the judiciary to function, David L. 
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 736-37 (1987); (2) candor acts 
as restraint on judicial power by requiring a reasoned response to a reasoned argument, id. 
at 737-38; and (3) candor makes the law predictable by giving parties notice of the real 
basis for a court's decision and allowing other courts to follow suit, Nicholas S. Zeppos, 
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 CEO. LJ. 353, 401 (1989). 
Despite the purported benefits of candor in the adjudication process, however, it has not 
been seen as a universally desirable goal in the adjudication process, and some scholars 
suggest it may in fact be unobtainable. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. 
REv. 296 (1990) (finding that there may be pragmatic reasons, such as creating the 
appearance of judicial restraint or decreasing the search time for judges and lawyers, for 
eschewing "introspective" candor and instead employing formalistic techniques of 
adjudication); Zeppos, supra, at 409-12 (finding that true candor may be impossible 
because judges may not have the self-awareness to identify what the "real" reasons are for 
their decisions: "Until we put to rest doubts about our understanding of the judicial 
decisionmaking process, the calls for judicial candor are premature, if not altogether 
unrealistic. "). 
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scuring the true purpose of a bill brings a measure of dishonesty into 
the legislative process. IS4 In the great flurry of paper that swirls 
around Congress, the vast majority of congressional representatives 
know practically nothing about the bills on the calendar, except per-
haps a rough idea of their stated purposes. Furthermore, most mem-
bers of Congress likely will never even read the bill, never mind have 
any idea what took place in hearings regarding it. ISS In this way, lack 
of candor undermines the legislative process because it compromises 
the honesty and the moral authority of the legislation's proponents. IS6 
Putting the moral force of candor aside, lack of candor in the iden-
tification of a problem also makes life more difficult for those who 
must interpret, enforce, and comply with the law. This is the point 
where legislative methodology and statutory interpretation overlap. 
Candor in the problem-framing phase would tend to make interpret-
ing the enacted statute easier because the world would be on notice of 
the real reasons for the legislative action. IS7 However, if the problems 
to which the law was addressed have not been fully and honestly iden-
tified, but rather have been watered down for political purposes, those 
actors charged with putting the law into effect will be given an incom-
plete directive. If the actors who actually implement the law have 
been misinformed about the law's real purpose, chances are great that 
the law will not effectively address the real problems it was intended to 
correct. 
In determining the purpose of the law, enforcers, interpreters, and 
subjects must rely primarily on the text of the statute. Although the 
184. Such intentional obfuscation occurs with regularity. Purdy, supra note 19, at 89-90. 
Sponsors try to phrase the title and purpose sections of bills to influence the committee-
assignment process, to mislead interest groups or political opponents, and to manipulate 
the bill's placement on legislative calendars. [d. On occasion, the manipulation is more 
insidious. Reed Dickerson recounts the following episode: 
When I was drafting laws for the Pentagon, a high-level lawyer from the 
National Security Agency (NSA) asked me to 'fuzz up' a draft bill so that, 
when the particular provision came back to NSA to be administered, they 
could interpret it to mean what they wanted to have subtly hidden in it. 
Although such an action would certainly not have been unprecedented, I 
indicated that I would not participate in any scheme that put blinders on 
Congress. 
DICKERSON, supra note 12, at 13. 
185. Symposium, supra note I, at 9, 11 (comments of Rep. Christopher Cox). 
186. For a discussion of the analogous role of candor in the judicial con text, see Zeppos, 
supra note 183, at 401-02. As in the judicial candor situation, lack of candor at the 
legislative level may result in increased cynicism about the role of legislatures, lack of 
respect, and ultimately loss of legitimacy. Shapiro, supra note 183, at 737. 
187. This has been offered by legal commentators as one of the great benefits of judicial 
candor. Zeppos, supra note 183, at 40l. Many have raised questions, however, of whether 
candid opinions provide any greater prediction value than dynamic interpretations of 
statutes masquerading as originalist opinions. [d. at 403. 
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statutory language is probably the best indicator of the intent of the 
legislature, the language of the statute has its inherent limitations. 188 
Because the enforcers, interpreters, and subjects of the law need to 
understand what the law really says, those actors may have to look be-
yond the language of the statute, to its underlying purpose. 189 
Despite the desirability of candor for the purpose of articulating a 
meaningful problem, political realities present a difficult obstacle to 
the would-be candid problem framer. Candor runs counter to the 
political realities of the legislative process.190 Being too candid about 
one's purpose may only result in the failure to amass a critical 
amount of support for one's proposal. The legislative proposal must 
be set forth in somewhat opaque terms in order to keep the bill's pros-
pects for passage alive. 19I 
In addition, because our system requires that legislative actions be 
justified in the language of the neo-republican ideal, often the true 
purpose of the law cannot be forcefully stated. The neo-republican 
ideal requires that the purpose of the law be cast in terms of a benefit 
to the public interest. If the true purpose of the legislation is to ad-
vance the private advantage of an interest group, for instance, the 
neo-republican ideal prevents the drafter from being completely 
forthright about the law's purposes. Therefore, even if a consden-
188. Given the inevitable differences of opinion that will arise when several people read 
the same text, we must provide some way for them to discuss the meaning on common 
ground so that they might persuade one another of the right view. Agreeing what the 
statute was supposed to achieve helps establish that common ground. Chow, supra note 
175, at 791-95; see also Alienikoff, supra note 9; Eskridge, supra note 9. 
189. Although the exercise of determining the purpose of a statute smacks of an 
archeological investigation in the originalist tradition, see Alienikoff, supra note 9, at 22-32, 
even scholars who propose a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation consider the 
purpose of the statute to be relevant in the development of the statute's interpretation. 
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 9; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9; Rubin, supra note 9. 
190. See supra note 184. Sometimes lack of candor in bill drafting is employed for noble 
ends, however. The most celebrated case of intentional manipulation of a draft bill's 
purpose and title was the bill that eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was 
drafted somewhat differently for each chamber of Congress so that in the House it would 
be referred to the sympathetic Judiciary Committee, chaired by Representative Emanuel 
Celler of New York, instead of the unsympathetic Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee, chaired by Representative Oren Harris of Arkansas. In the Senate, the bill was 
drafted in such a way as to ensure its referral to the Commerce Committee, chaired by 
Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington, instead of to the Judiciary Committee, chaired 
by Senator James Eastland of Mississippi. KERNOCHAN, supra note 26, at 15-16; OLESZEK, 
supra note 149, at 86-87. Although changes in the House and Senate rules since the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 affect the procedures for the referral of bills, they do 
not eliminate the incentive to manipulate the referral process through crafty drafting. 
CURTIS & WESTERFIELD, supra note 3, at 90-91; KERNOCHAN, supra note 26, at 15-16. 
191. Angus MacIntyre, The Multiple Sources of Legislative Ambiguity: Tracing the Legislative 
Origins of Administrative Discretion, in AoMINISTRATrvE DISCRETION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 72-74 (Douglas Shumavon & H. Kenneth Hibbeln eds., 1986). 
1334 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
tious legislative drafter were to identify the problem honestly, she 
would have to confront the political realities that accompany problem 
framing, and craft a politically acceptable formulation of the problem. 
C. Lack oj a Sophisticated Model 
In order to identify problems and propose solutions thereto, a 
drafter must have a mental model of how the real world works. Using 
her mental model, the drafter can test her approaches to the problem 
as she progresses through the drafting stage. Her model should also 
permit her to project how the world will work after the legislation has 
been enacted. Mental models may be sophisticated or simplistic. In 
the case of Truth in Savings, the model employed by the drafter ap-
pears to have been relatively simplistic. 
From the language in the findings section, the predominant model 
employed by the drafter was one of perfectly competitive markets, 
from the school of neo-classical economics. 192 The purpose of the 
statute was based on the traditional regulatory goal of correcting mar-
ket failures. 193 Market failures are those situations that develop from 
time to time that tend to push our economy away from the result that 
would obtain under a purely competitive market system. 194 The find-
ings contained in the legislation invoke the language of correcting 
market failure by employing terms such as "economic stability," "en-
hanced competition," and "informed decisions."195 
Within the framework of the market failure model, however, the 
drafter of Truth in Savings committed some methodological errors. 
192. A market is said to operate under perfect competition when the following four 
conditions are met: (1) there exists in the market enough buyers and sellers such that no 
one buyer or seller may influence prices; (2) the products sold in the market are fungible; 
(3) no ba~riers to entry or exit exist in the market; and (4) buyers and sellers have perfect 
information. Finding an actual market that exhibits these characteristics presents a 
daunting challenge. Few, if any, actual markets meet the definition of perfectly 
competitive markets. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & AlAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 418-19 (1979). 
193. THOMAS W. DUNFEE & FRANK F. GIBSON, LEGAL AsPECTS OF GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS 7-12 (3d ed. 1984); A. LEE FRITSCHLER & BERNARD H. Ross, 
BUSINESS REGULATION AND GoVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING 41-42 (1980). 
194. Traditionally, economists have recognized three specific departures from perfect 
competition as "market failures": (1) imperfect information; (2) natural monopoly; and 
(3) externalities. Imperfect information is a market failure because perfectly competitive 
markets require complete, cost-free, information to function. Without complete 
information, consumers may make inefficient decisions that will result in an inefficient mix 
of goods in the market. Natural monopolies are those businesses for whom the laws of 
supply and demand permit but a single efficient producer. Externalities are the costs or 
benefits imposed on third parties as a side effect of a given transaction, which are not 
reflected in prices. For a general discussion of these market failure problems, see ROBERT 
E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 36-39 (1983). 
195. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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Most importantly, she failed to define the market. Economic markets 
are usually defined in terms of geographic dimensions and product 
line dimensions. 196 Even if one takes the geographic dimension of 
the market corrected by Truth in Savings to be the entire United 
States, no effort was made to give the market a meaningful product 
line dimension. 
One possible product. line would include all deposit-like investment 
products where the potential exists for sellers to take advantage of 
relatively unsophisticated savers. This market would include the prod-
uct line identified by Truth in Savings itself-accounts at depository 
institutions as defined in section 19(b)(1)(A), of the Federal Reserve 
Actl97_but would also include other products with similar attributes, 
such as money market mutual funds, insurance annuity contracts, and 
repurchase agreements. While such a product line dimension makes 
sense, it is not the dimension adopted in the legislation. From a pol-
icy perspective, it is difficult to rationalize the decision not to include 
these other products within the definition of the market. A political 
reason, however, clearly exists for leaving those products out. As Rep-
resentative Torres candidly stated, those products probably should 
have been a part of the law, but to include them would have meant 
referring the legislation to another committee. 198 
Given that political realities prevented a meaningful definition of 
the relevant market, supporters could still justify Truth in Savings as 
an attempt to correct a market failure in the market for deposits 
within the banking industry alone. A failure exists in this market, pro-
ponents could argue, because of imperfect information in the rela-
tionship between banks and their customer. Because the theoretically 
perfect market depends on complete information to function prop-
erly, a comprehensive disclosure statute could be seen as promoting 
this aspect of the theoretical model. 199 
196. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); U.S. Dep't of 
Justice Merger Guidelines §§ 2.1, 2.3, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'II 13,103 Uune 14, 1984). 
197. Truth in Savings Act, § 274, 12 U.S.C. § 4314 (Supp. V 1993). 
198. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 1 (comments of Rep. Esteban Torres, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage). 
[d. 
I understand there are concerns that the subcommittee print does not 
apply to other financial service providers, which compete with depository 
institutions. . . . However, to broaden the scope of. the legislation may 
create jurisdictional problems which could delay the passage of the bill, and 
obviously this is of tremendous concern to myself and the members of the 
subcommittee. 
199. Correcting failures of the market to supply information is a traditional justification 
for economic regulation. BREYER, supra note 130, at 26-28. This approach has been 
pursued with great vigor in the area of securities regulation. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717 
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While the market failure rationale may be a coherent argument in 
favor of Truth in Savings, it is not necessarily a convincing one. It fails 
to convince because it accepts the "more perfect market" goal without 
determining its feasibility (or even its desirability). Perfect markets 
are very rare and exist in few sectors of economic life.20o Certainly, 
the financial services market falls far short of the conditions necessary 
for the perfectly competitive mode1.201 Given that the best allocation 
of re~ources, as represented by the attainment of the conditions of 
pure competition, will not be achieved in the financial services mar-
ket, the general theory of second best states that no reason exists a 
priori to believe that fulfilling the remaining conditions will improve 
the overall efficiency of the system.202 In such a situation, one cannot 
be sure that correcting the remaining conditions will result in in-
creased, rather·than decreased, allocative efficiency.203 Consequently, 
without an empirical study to the contrary, no determinate argument 
can be made that increased deposit account disclosure is better, in an 
economic sense, than the status quO.204 
(1984). But increased disclosure is not always seen as a value-neutral improvement to the 
operation of an efficient market. For instance, disclosure in the securities industry has 
been attacked as ineffectual and for benefitting one group at the expense of others. Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. 
L. REv. 669 (1984). 
200. 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBER'IY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF 
FREE PEOPLE 65-66 (1979). 
201. The market for bank deposits fails to achieve the conditions of perfect 
competition: (1) while the products sold in the market are similar, they are not fungible; 
(2) big players can exert strong influence on market prices even though there are many 
players in the market; and (3) there are extremely high barriers to entry. The arguable 
lack of perfect information only adds but one small brush stroke to a picture of a market 
that is clearly not perfectly competitive. 
202. The general theory of second best states that if the best allocation of resources 
depends on the attainment of a given set of conditions, but the conditions are 
unattainable, there is no way to know-short of performing an exhaustive empirical 
study-whether attaining the rest of the ideal conditions will improve the allocative 
efficiency of the system or make it worse. BREYER, supra note 130, at 16-17; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IOWA L. REv. 371, 377 (1993); 
Richard S. Markovits, The Case for "Business as Usual" in Law-and-Economics Land: A Critical 
Comment, 78 IOWA L. REv. 387 (1993). 
203. Markovits, supra note 202, at 388. 
204. One could say that the theory of second best proves too much and that Congress 
should refrain from adopting any economic legislation because of the complexities of 
making it effective. The theory does not require such an extreme conclusion, however, but 
rather insists on the more modest position that when economic regulation is proposed it 
ought to be consistent with a sophisticated understanding of how things actually work and 
how they will work after enactment. Regulatory options should not be dictated by a dearly 
held model, such as the model of perfectly competitive markets. Instead, we should 
continually question and test the premises on which our models are based to ensure the 
models' continued usefulness in understanding the real world. We must recognize that 
our models represent a theory about reality, not reality itself. Blind adherence to a model 
results in skewed perception because we will tend to rationalize reality in terms of the 
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Another reason to question the value of the perfectly competitive 
market model as a guide for developing banking regulation is that our 
entire system of banking regulation tries to prevent unfettered compe-
tition in the banking industry. The financial services markets in the 
United States are not perfectly competitive by design-we have made 
a public policy choice to trade off the benefits of competition for the 
benefits of a more stable banking system. Our national banking pol-
icy values stability.205 The national experience with free competition 
in the banking industry during the nineteenth century was not a pleas-
ant one, and we do not want to repeat the experience.206 A moment's 
reflection makes clear that perfect competition in the financial mar-
ket is not only unattainable, it is probably undesirable as well, as in-
creased competition tends to result in less stability. Trying to create 
perfectly competitive markets may result in a cure worse than the 
disease.207 
Accordingly, adopting an overly simplistic model of how financial 
m~rkets operate blinded the drafter of Truth in Savings to alternative 
approaches.208 The history of Truth in Savings reveals no serious at-
tempt to address the problems through any means other than a com-
model instead of evaluating the model in terms of reality. For an interesting discussion on 
this topic, see Chow, supra note 175, at 777-80. 
205. See NICHOlAS A. LAsH, BANKING LAw AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
23 (1987). . 
206. On the good side, the free banking era was marked by almost pure competition: 
barriers to entry were low, there were many participants in the banking market, and 
government interference was kept to a minimum. Gordon, supra note 36, at 56. On the 
bad side, the era was marked by frequent bank failures, unstable money, and widespread 
fraud. KERRY CoOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW 
COMPETITION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 46 (1984); Gordon, supra note 36, at 56, 
58. 
207. Considering the obvious shortcomings of the drafter's economic model, one must 
question the sincerity and candor of the economic justification offered in the findings 
clause. The drafter may have been attempting to justify Truth in Savings as economic 
legislation only to obscure its true purpose as social legislation. Although we think of 
disclosure statutes primarily as a method of promoting efficient markets, they are often 
employed for the purpose of outlawing certain behavior. BREYER, supra note 130, at 16l. 
In the area of banking law, for instance, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), aims to prevent lenders from "red-lining" 
certain neighborhoods. [d. at 161-62. Truth in Savings may be seen as such a piece of 
social legislation. The witnesses identified many practices that they considered unethical 
or unfair. Although the statute speaks in the relatively neutral language of "disclosure," 
with the goal of making markets more competitive, its underlying purpose aims to force 
banks to expose their arguably unethical or unfair practices to the light of day and, by 
doing so, create an incentive for them to stop employing those practices. While this social 
goal may be noble, once again it raises the concerns that flow from lack of candor in the 
definition of the problem. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. If the problem 
the legislation sought to address was the unfair practices of banks, that should have been 
the stated purpose of the law, not mere disclosure. 
208. See supra notes 116-40 and accompanying text. 
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prehensive disclosure requirement. By failing to challenge her 
underlying model, the drafter committed a serious methodological 
mistake.209 
D. The Failure to Distinguish Between Causes and Conditions 
A problem solver must be careful to identify the problem in light of 
causes and conditions.210 The problem solver must undertake two in-
quiries. First, she must examine the problem to discover how the 
problem is caused. Second, she must determine whether the cause of 
the problem can be corrected through legislation or whether. it is an 
uncorrectable condition oflife on earth.211 Without separating causes 
and conditions, the legislature may waste valuable resources address-
ing phenomena that cannot be corrected or may address phenomena 
that are not problems in their own right as much as they are symp-
toms of larger problems. Failure to examine problems critically to en-
209. The drafter's mental model limited the legislative response to measures that would 
correct the market failure to the exclusion of other alternatives. This limitation made for a 
false choice in the policy decision between an imperfect market and an attempt at a more 
perfect market. As Nobel-prize winning economist Friedrich Hayek has observed, "The 
test should not be the degree of approach towards an unachievable result, but should be 
whether the results of a given policy exceed or fall short of the results of other available 
procedures." 3 HAYEK, supra note 200, at 67. 
210. Seidman, supra note 5, at 62. By identifying the true causes of a problem, we may 
avoid Thoreau's observation that "[tlhere are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to 
one who is striking at the root." HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 68 (Modern Library ed. 
1937). 
211. An example of causes and conditions illustrates the point. Assume a migrating 
species of bird winters in Louisiana and flies to the Canadian tundra to mate and rear its 
young. As constituents in the bird's flyway notice a decrease in the population of the 
species, they press Congress for action. A drafter confronted with the task of preparing 
legislation must determine how to correct the problem of decreasing bird population. 
Employing her sophisticated model of the problem, she solicits the expert advice of 
ornithologists, wildlife experts, hunters, and others. She commissions an empirical study. 
After doing her homework, she concludes that the observed decrease in bird population is 
caused by a number of factors, most importantly are the loss of mating habitat due to 
hydro.,electric development in Canada and the increase in predators resulting from the 
return of the timberwolf. Before she can formulate a response to the problem, she must 
appreciate the conditions within which this phenomena occurs, including such things as 
these: (1) the birds fly from the arctic to the Gulf coast; (2) the wolf is increasing in 
numbers and preys on the nesting birds; (3) Canada is a sovereign nation over which the 
U.S. Congress has no direct control. These conditions are facts of life. She must craft her 
response to address the cause of the problem, but recognize the limits imposed by the 
conditions. Her response to the problem must take both causes and conditions into 
account. If the cause of the problem is lack of mating habitat in Canada, a law that 
prohibits hunting the birds in Louisiana will not correct the problem. It might ameliorate 
it a little, but will not correct it. The real solution, however, requires action in Canada. 
The legislative response must be crafted in such a way to get Canadian cooperation on the 
problem. 
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sure that the solution reaches the cause often results in legislative 
responses that are mere band-aids. 
In the case of Truth in Savings, for example, the problems com-
plained of in the hearings may actually have been better characterized 
as symptoms of larger problems. The changes in the relationship be-
tween banks and their customers may in large part have been driven 
by economic changes in the financial services marketplace. Banks 
had to find ways to cut costs and increase noninterest income.212 The 
problems complained of in the hearings may have been symptomatic 
of changes facing banks in the competition for deposits. If this was 
the case, the proper way to address the "problems" would have been 
to address their underlying cause: the changes in the financial serv-
ices industry. On the other hand, the problems may have been symp-
tomatic of a much more insidious problem: the banking industry's 
having too much power in the economy and misusing that power.213 
If this was the case, the appropriate response should have targeted 
that "cause." In either event, the drafter never attempted to deter-
mine whether the problems complained of were problems in their 
own right or symptoms of something bigger. 
When developing legislation, drafters must appreciate that they can-
not control everything that contributes to the cause of a problem. 
Certain things are beyond human control-. such as the laws of phys-
ics, human nature, and the weather-and must be viewed as condi-
tions of life on earth that the drafter must accept as a given.214 Her 
legislative response to a problem must seek to correct the cause of the 
problem, while understanding that existing conditions may not be 
212. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
213. The illustration of possible analyses of the Truth in Savings problems points out 
that the separation of causes and conditions may in fact be another normative judgment 
that must be made in the legislative process. Seidman. supra note 5. at 62. 
214. In addition to these unchangeable conditions oflife on earth, the drafter must also 
consider values to be conditions. Societal values can change relatively quickly. Things 
identified as problems today may not be considered problems 10 years from now, and, 
conversely, things that we have not yet identified as problems may in 10 years time be very 
,pressing issues. For an example of how a nonproblem can change into a problem as a 
result of changing societal attitudes. consider the experience of the McDonald's 
hamburger chain with polystyrene foam containers. When first introduced, the styrofoam 
clamshell design was hailed as an efficient, cheap, and effective means of keeping fast food 
warm and protected. As societal concerns about the environment-and especially about 
municipal landfills-increased, the styrofoam clamshell container came to be seen as a 
problem by the average citizen (it mayor may not have been a real problem. but it was 
perceived as one). Eventually McDonald's returned to paper-packaging in light of public 
pressure. See PETROSKI, supra note 13, at 220-25. For this reason, problems, once 
identified. ought to receive continuing scrutiny. Truth in Savings existed in bill form from 
1968 through 1991. That time period saw a revolutionary change in the financial services 
market and in the attitudes of the typical consumer of financial services. The Truth in 
Savings bill, however. showed little response to these changing conditions. 
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subject to change. In the context of Truth in Savings, the conditions 
that the drafter might have identified could have included: (1) banks 
are profit-oriented enterprises and will not voluntarily give up an ad-
vantageous position; (2) consumers lack sophistication; (3) consum-
ers rarely read or understand business or legal documents; and (4) 
consumers have a choice of financial services providers who will pro-
vide savings account products. Assuming Congress could identify 
what problem it sought to address, an appropriate version of Truth in 
Savings would have to target its efforts at the cause of the problem 
(whatever that cause had been determined to be), while taking cogni-
zance of the conditions under which the legislation would be imple-
mented. An appropriate response would address the causes, while 
accepting the conditions as given. There is no evidence that Truth in 
Savings was ever subjected to this sort of analysis. 
E. Lack of Appreciation for the Problem Framer's Power 
Problem framing may receive short shrift in the legislative process 
because Congress fails to appreciate the problem framer's significant 
role in the development of legislation.215 Although the legislative 
drafter is not free to draft legislation to whatever whim the sponsor 
may desire,216 how she frames the problem may have a great effed on 
215. On the other hand, the lack of a more rigorous problem-framing step may be due 
to an intense appreciation of the problem framer's power and a reluctance on the part of 
problem framers to give up that power. 
216. The problem framer must conform the problem to long-standing political and 
legal conventions, including such considerations as: 
1. Substantive Constraints. The Constitution limits Congress' power to make laws in 
several substantive respects, such as prohibiting ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 3, and titles of nobility. id. cI. 8. Additionally, the amendments 
to the Constitution place certain subjects off limits, including, for example, laws 
establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or laws abridging free speech 
or the press or the right of the people to peaceably assemble. Id. amend. I. Finally, the 
Supreme Court has identified some substantive areas-such as the right to privacy, Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969)-that, while not specifically articulated in the Constitution, nevertheless 
are protected from unfettered legislation. 
2. Consistency with Traditional Public Policy Goals. The problem and the solution 
identified by the drafter must be consistent with, or at least capable of being rationalized in 
terms of, the traditional public policy goals of federal legislation. In the area of banking 
legislation, the regulatory goals include such matters as: (1) providing a safe and sound 
banking system; (2) preventing concentration of economic power; (3) allocating credit to 
the most socially desirable uses; (4) protecting consumers; and (5) providing a financial 
system that can facilitate the conduct of monetary policy. See LAsH, supra note 205, at 22-
25; Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm Far Financial Regulation: 
Gettingfrom Here to There, 43 MD. L. REv. 413,446-54 (1984). 
3. Federalism Issues. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people: U.S. CONST. amend. X. Although Congress has 
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the bill's evolution. A skillful drafter can frame a problem in a way 
that dictates a particular solution. Even if the problem as framed does 
not determine the outcome of the legislative process, it often has 
great staying power and can shape the course of future negotiations 
over the bill's contents. 
The powers enjoyed by the problem framer, however, while consid-
erable, will not always carry the day. The problem framed by the 
drafter will be subject to the powers of the agenda setter, who also has 
a tremendous impact on the outcome of the legislative process. In 
addition, political forces inside and outside the legislature may ulti-
mately be responsible for passing or preventing the legislation. 
found justification for almost any activity it has desired to regulate based on the commerce 
clause, see, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that local "loan 
sharking" operation can be regulated by federal government through commerce clause 
because loan sharking in its national context affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that barbecue restaurant subject to Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 because it served food that was moved in interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that establishment providing 
accommodation for travellers deemed to affect "commerce"), nevertheless, every federal 
legislative venture into substantive areas previously governed by state law needs to address 
the issue of federalism. To argue otherwise would suggest that the Tenth Amendment has 
no meaning. In fact, the Tenth Amendment may have virtually no meaning, as it has long 
been held to merely state "but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. lOO, 124 (1941). 
In light of the current Court's conception of federalism, however, the Tenth 
Amendment may enjoy a resurgence of authority. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 
2408 (1992). In the banking field, federalism has special meaning because of our unique 
dual banking system. The differences between the state and federal systems of bank 
regulation have led to a competition of sorts between them. Some commentators have 
lauded this regulatory competition as a method that reduces regulation to the optimum 
point consistent with safe and sound banking practices. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual 
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, in REGULATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 
AND INDUSTRY 1 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). Other commentators have been less 
deferential to the dual banking system, claiming that the differences between state and 
federal regulation are more apparent than real. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, 
The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677, 678 (1988). 
4. Coherence. Finally, the legislative drafter should strive for coherence between the bill 
she drafts and the overall body of statutory and regulatory provisions covering the topic. 
For instance, if the larger legislative agenda envisions reduced regulation on banks as a 
method to stimulate business lending, see Agency Actions to Reduce the Negative Impact of 
Regulations on Credit Availability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions 
Supervision, Regulation and DepOSit Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 60, 61-62 (1993) (statement of John P. LaWare, Member, 
Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 79 FED. REs. BULL. 781, 781 
(1993), a law increasing the regulatory burden should not be passed as it fails the 
requirement of coherence. Coherence requires some degree of coordination between the 
legislative branch and the regulatory agencies. GARTEN, supra note 132, at 64-66. 
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1. Significance of Framing Effects 
The artful problem framer possesses significant powers. How she 
frames the problem can strongly influence the actions of those who 
must make decisions based on the problem as,framed.217 In one fa-
mous example of the power of framing effects, subjects were asked to 
choose between two different cancer treatments, radiation or surgery. 
The subjects were given information about the probability of living 
through each treatment. When the expected outcomes of the two 
procedures was stated in terms of survival rates, subjects chose surgery. 
When the exact same information was restated in terms of mortality 
rates, however, significantly more subjects chose radiation.218 
The problem framer, therefore, has an opportunity to influence de-
cisions of fellow legislators by framing the problem artfully. Although 
the framing effect may be just a special case of the requirement that 
the underlying normative foundation on which a problem rests be 
consistent with the normative values of a critical mass of legislators,219 
it appears t<;> be more than that. Framing effects reflect something 
217. For instance, if a state legislature takes up debate about a bill dealing with hostile 
corporate takeovers and the bill's sponsor has framed the issue as "unscrupulous out-of-
state corporate raiders are making'millions at the expense of our state's shareholders, 
management, and employees," that description of the problem will strongly influence the 
direction of the public debate on the topic and will, in large part, dictate a solution to the 
issue that penalizes hostile offerors. Using loaded language can help a problem framer 
obtain a given result, but, even on a less blatant level, research has shown that framing 
effects influence the decisions of otherwise rational people. See Sovern, supra note 69, at 
30-33. 
218. HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 39-40 (citing Barbara J. McNeil et aI., On the 
Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1259-62 (1982». 
In summary, the researchers presented the test groups with a hypothetical choice between 
two treatments for cancer: either surgery or radiation. McNeil et aI., supra, at 1260. The 
first group considered the following information in the following form: 
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the postoperative 
period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are alive at the end of 
five years. 
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy all live through 
the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and 22 are alive at the end 
of five years. 
Id. Only 18% of the first group preferred radiation therapy. Id. at 1261. In contrast, 44% 
of the second group chose radiation when exactly the same information was presented as 
follows: 
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during surgery or the postop-
erative period, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66 die by the end of 
five years. 
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die dur-
ing treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by the end of five 
years. 
[d. The researchers found a pronounced framing effect whether posing the choice to 
clinical patients or to doctors. HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 40. 
219. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. 
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deeper in the decisionmaking process where otherwise rational deci-
sionmakers can be subconsciously manipulated by the force of 
words.220 
2. The Resiliency of the Original Problem 
The problem framer also possesses the power to set the stage upon 
which discussion of the issue will take place for years to come. She 
can exploit this power because legislative proposals display remarka-
ble resiliency from one Congress to· the next. 
Truth in Savings provides an extreme example of the resiliency of a 
bill. A proposal for federal legislation mandating comprehensive dis-
closure of deposit account terms, the basic idea of Truth in Savings, 
was first introduced in the 91st Congress, in 1968.221 It finally passed 
in the 102d Congress, in 1991. Despite the fact that the financial serv-
ices industry changed dramatically between 1968 and 1991, the pro-
posed Truth in Savings legislation remained remarkably static.222 In 
220. Framing effects have been likened to the linguistic equivalent of optical illusions. 
Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing 
on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 399 (1990). 
221. Bonfanti, supra note 49, at 12. 
222. The basic Truth in Savings idea has shown amazing resiliency. In the 92d and 93d 
Congresses, Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana sponsored bills that would have required the 
disclosure of key terms in the interest calculation and regulated the methods by which the 
accounts could be advertised. Id. at 12-13. The elements of Senator Hartke's proposals 
formed the core of the Truth in Savings idea through its various reincarnations until it was 
finally passed in 1991. Versions of Truth in Savings were introduced in the 94th Congress 
(§ 107 of the Financial Institutions Act of 1975, S.1267, contained Truth in Savings 
provisions, as did H.R. 14), id. at 14, the 95th Congress (H.R. 829 required the disclosure 
of key terms and fees), id., and the 96th Congress (H.R. 3461 was essentially the same as 
H.R. 829, introduced in the previous Congress), id. After a brief hiatus, Truth in Savings 
resurfaced in the 98th Congress as H.R. 5232. That bill died in committee, but was 
reintroduced in the 99th Congress as H.R. 2282. In the 99th Congress, Truth in Savings 
was reported favorably out of committee with an amendment in the form of a substitution 
combining Truth in Savings with credit card disclosure. The bill emerged from committee 
as H.R. 5613 entitled the "Truth in Savings and Credit Card Application Act." H.R.5613 
passed the House by voice vote on October 7, 1986, 132 CONGo REc. H9313, 9313 (1986), 
but was not considered by the Senate, so it did not become law. Continuing its arduous 
journey, Truth in Savings reappeared in the 100th Congress as H.R. 176. The bill was 
unanimously passed by the House onJune 29,1987. 133 CONGo REc. H5761, 5761 (1987). 
Later, but before going to the Senate, the bill was included in H.R. 5094, The Depository 
Institutions Act of 1988, as subpart E of Title IV-consumer protection provisions. It did 
not pass Congress. It reappeared in the 101st Congress, where it was reintroduced by 
Representative Lehman as H.R. 736. 
The bill was passed by the House and a similar bill was passed by the Senate as part of the 
Money Laundering Act, but once it again failed to get enacted, this time because the 
conference committee failed to produce a conference report. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, 
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TRUTH IN SAVINGS ACT: REpORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 2654, 
H.R. Doc. No. 202, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991). In the 102d Congress, Representative 
Lehman again introduced Truth in Savings. His bill was numbered H.R. 447. Similar 
provisions were also contained as part of a larger banking bill, H.R. 6. The House Banking 
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its twenty-three years on Capitol Hill, the proposed legislation never 
changed to take into account the changing nature of the financial 
marketplace, such as the rise of alternative deposit products available 
from mutual funds, insurance companies, and credit unions. 
The resilience of the originally proposed approach perhaps owes 
less to the prescience of its drafters than it does to a fact of legislative 
life: the first version of the problem and its proposed solution often 
are the only articulations seriously considered during the legislative 
process.223 Of course, this resiliency provides a glaring example of 
bad problem-solving methodology because, over twenty-three years, 
the problem-whatever it was-must have changed somehow, given 
the dramatic changes in the financial services industry during that 
time. The response, however, did not change in step. 
In light of the fact that the original problem possesses the trait of 
resiliency, framing the original problem correctly takes on great im~ 
portance. The basic decisions made in the original drafting effort-
especially the framing of the problem and the identification of a re-
sponse-can make a lasting impression on the final version of the 
bill.224 
While the problem framer has real powers, she exercises them in a 
larger arena where other forces and players affect legislative fortunes. 
Specifically, the agenda setter may be able to override some of the 
problem framer's inherent power by manipulating procedure or by 
acting as a second problem framer. Additionally, political forces both 
within the institution and from outside force individual legislators to 
act in particular ways. 
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage 
conducted a hearing on both H.R. 447 and the Truth in Savings provisions ofH.R. 6. After 
hearing testimony, the subcommittee marked up the bills, and Representative Torres, 
chairman of the subcommittee, introduced the revised version of Truth in Savings as H.R. 
2654. Report 102-202 to Accompany H.R 2654, Truth in Savings Act, reprinted in Fed. Banking 
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1469, pt. 2, at 158-59 (Nov. 13, 1992). Eventually, H.R. 2654 was 
incorporated into the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
passed both chambers, and was signed into law by President Bush on December 19, 1991. 
223. Even if the problem framer specifically labels the early draft a "springboard" for 
discussion, it is likely that subsequent changes in the proposal will take the form of 
revisions to the original proposal. As legislators get caught up in their own negotiations on 
a particular bill, they naturally tend to address new concerns by adding or deleting 
provisions from the bill that is on the table. Rubin, supra note 1, at 279. The Truth in 
Lending Act provides an exceIlent example of this phenomenon. [d. at 268-69. 
224. Purdy, supra note 19, at 98. 
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3. The Agenda Setter's Procedural Power 
Scholars have demonstrated the power of the legislative agenda set~ 
ter to manipulate the outcome of the legislative process.225 The expe~ 
rience of Truth in Savings in both the House and the Senate in the 
100th Congress illustrates the power of the agenda setter quite clearly. 
In 1988, Congress was engaged in the very serious and difficult work 
of revamping the banking system. As commentators had been point-
ing out for years, the legal distinctions between commercial and in-
vestment banks, thrifts, insurance companies, and securities firms 
made little sense from an economic point of view because those firms 
had the capacity to deliver very similar products to the public.226 
Many commentators believed that the existing structure of bank regu~ 
lation was a burden that put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvan-
tage.227 In the 100th Congress, federal law was supposed to catch up 
with market realities and allow banks freer competition across product 
lines. The bills under consideration would have allowed banks to par~ 
ticipate in the securities and insurance business. 
In 1988, any bill granting banks securities powers had to get by two 
very powerful committees in the House of Representatives: the Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee-chaired by Femand St. 
Germain of Rhode Island-which had jurisdiction over banking, and 
the Energy and Commerce Committee-chaired by John Dingell of 
Michigan-which arguably had jurisdiction over any legislation deal~ 
ing with securities or insurance. Representative St. Germain228 and 
many on his committee229 were widely considered antagonistic to the 
idea of granting the banking industry wider powers. Any benefit to 
the banking ir;tdustry from his committee would come at great cost. In 
225. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey. supra note 151. at 901-06; infra notes 232-35 and 
accompanying text. 
226. See, e.g., Legislative Proposals to Restructure Our Financial System: Hearings on S. 1886, S. 
1891, and S. 1905 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 81. 82 (1987) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 74 FED. REs. BULL. 91, 92 (1988) 
[hereinafter Greenspan Statement]; COOPER & FRASER. supra note 206; Richard C. Aspinwall, 
On the "Specialness" of Banking. 7 ISSUES IN BANK REc. 16 (1983); Bevis Longstreth. Glass-
Steagall: The Case for Repeal, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 281 (1986); Curtis]. Polk, Chapter. 
Banking and Securities Law: The Glass-Steagall Act - Has it Outlived its Usefulness? 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 812 (1987); William]. Shafer. Note, Glass-Steagall Reform: It's Time to Replace 
the Crumbling Wal~ 14]. CORP. L. 973 (1989); Kelly A. Zazella. Note, Beyond 'The Wall": The 
American Financial System and Glass-Steagall Reform, 62 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 67 (1987). 
227. Greenspan Statement, supra note 226, at 91-92. For a general discussion. see 
Friedman & Friesen. supra note 216. at 414-42; H. Robert Heller. International Economic 
Challenges to American Banking. 9 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 323 (1990). 
228. Robert M. Garsson. Senate to Begin Hearings on Consumer Measures. AM. BANKER. Sept. 
8. 1988, at 22. 
229. Id. 
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the past, Representative St. Germain had been viewed as one who 
piled on consumer regulations to banking legislation to make it less 
palatable to the banking i,ndustry or as the price the banking industry 
had to pay for expanded powers.230 
As committee chair, St. Germain controlled his committee's agenda 
and, thus, had a great deal of power over the outcome of committee 
action. 231 As modern public choice scholars have amply demon-
strated, control of the agenda and the procedures employed in the 
decisionmaking process can determine the outcome.232 If the agenda 
develops through an open process whereby each legislator can pro-
pose an alternative, then the outcome of majority rule may wander 
anywhere because of preference-cycling problems.233 On the other 
hand, if one person controls the agenda, that person has sufficient 
230. Clifford L. Brody, What Happens if the Senate Goes Democrat?, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 
1984, at 15;Jay Rosenstein & Lee]. Miller, Protection Push, AM. BANKER,July 23,1984, at 2. 
231. OLESZEK, supra note 15, at 93. 
232. See, e.g., HEAP ET AL., supra, note 142, at 249-58; Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, supra 
note 9, at 547; Farber & Frickey, supra note 151, at 38-42. 
233. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 
10 (1985). An example drawn from the general principles developed in PETER C. 
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 65-71 (1986),and 
from an example used in JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, BEYOND NUMERACY: RUMINATIONS OF A 
NUMBERS MAN 262-64 (1991), illustrates the significance of voting procedure in 
determining outcome. Consider a 55-member committee charged with closing one 
military base from a list of five possible bases. The states with the bases are Louisiana (L), 
Michigan (M), Nevada (N), Oregon (0), and Pennsylvania (P). Based on the political 
consequences to each of them as elected individuals, the committee members have 
ordered their individual preferences for base closing as follows, with the state listed first as 
the one they would most like to close and the others listed in decreasing order of 
preference: 
18 members rank preferences: (1) L (2) 0 (3) P (4) N (5) M 
12 members rank preferences: (1) M (2) P (3) 0 (4) N (5) L 
10 members rank preferences: (1) N (2) M (3) P (4) 0 (5) L 
9 members rank preferences: (1) 0 (2) N (3) P (4) M (5) L 
4 members rank preferences: (1) P (2) M (3) 0 (4) N (5) L 
2 members rank preferences: (1) P (2) N (3) 0 (4) M (5) L 
Based on these stated preferences, it is impossible to determine which state's military base 
will be closed without also knowing the voting procedure that will be employed to aggre-
gate the preferences. The outcome of the group decision making process will hinge en-
tirely on the voting procedure, as the following discussion demonstrates. 
Those favoring closure of the Louisiana base will argue that a plurality method of voting 
should prevail in which the state receiving the most first-preference votes is selected. 
Under our hypothetical, Louisiana would be selected, as more members (18) have listed it 
as their first choice than any other state. 
The representatives from Louisiana and their political allies will argue for any method of 
voting other than the plurality system. They might propose a run-offvote between the two 
most-preferred states. In our example this would result in a run off between Louisiana, 
which received 18 first-preference votes, and Michigan, which received 12 first-preference 
votes. Under this system, Michigan would be selected, because in a vote between Louisiana 
and Michigan only 18 members would prefer to close Louisiana instead of Michigan, while 
37 members would prefer to close Michigan over Louisiana. 
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opportunity to manipulate the voting procedure to produce a desired 
result.234 Thus, the agenda setter can effectively trump the efforts of 
the legislative drafter by manipulating the outcome of the voting pro-
cess. Regardless of how artfully the drafter has framed the problem, if 
it does not gain the support of the agenda setter, it will have difficulty 
passing.235 
The Michigan representatives and their supporters can be expected to resist this method 
of voting. They might suggest a different system of counting votes, such as successive 
rounds of eliminating the state that received the fewest first preferences. The state that 
received the fewest first-preference votes in the first round of voting (Pennsylvania, in our 
hypothetical) w.puld be eliminated, and all of the remaining preferences would be adjusted 
accordingly. This would yield the following result: 18 votes for Louisiana, 16 for Michigan, 
12 for Nevada, and 9 for Oregon. In the next round, the state with the fewest first prefer-
ences from the previous round (Oregon) would be eliminated and the preferences again 
adjusted. By proceeding in successive rounds to eliminate the state with the fewest first 
preferences, Nevada's base will be selected for closing. 
Those who want to keep the Nevada base open will not support that method. They 
might suggest use of the so-called "Borda count," which reflects preferences in voting. See 
ORDESHOOK, supra, at 68; PAULOS, supra, at 263. For instance, Nevada might suggest that 
each first-preference vote count for five points, each second-preference vote count for four 
points, third-preference votes three points, fourth preference two points, and fifth prefer-
ence one point, and that each state be judged on its total number of points. Under this 
method, Oregon's Borda count comes out to 191 and is higher than all the others. Ore-
gon's base would be closed. 
Oregon's contingent will not support that voting method. They will argue that the best 
way to determine the outcome should be to pair off the states in head-ta-head votes. If one 
state beats all the other states, that state should be selected. In the parlance of choice 
theorists, this exercise would produce a "Condorcet winner." A Condorcet winner is the 
alternative that can beat any other alternative in a head-ta-head vote. See HEAP ET AL., supra 
note 142, at 221; ORDESHOOK, supra, at 66; PAULOS, supra, at 263. Under this method, 
Pennsylvania's base would be selected for closing. Obviously Pennsylvania will not support 
that method and will propose an alternative method, and so on. 
234. Shepsle, supra note 233, at 10. 
Id. 
If there is a monopoly agenda-setter-someone who is uniquely and 
completely empowered to pick and order elements of an agenda ... there 
is always sufficient opportunity for him to manipulate the sequence of votes 
to produce any final outcome he desires; the preferences of other 
legislative agents are no constraint. 
235. See Barbara Sinclair, Agenda Control and Policy Success: Ronald Reagan and the 97th 
House, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 291 (1985) (discussing President Reagan's policy methods and 
subsequent success as the congressional agenda setterin 1980), reprinted in CONGRESS, supra 
note 162, at 637. While scholars have taken great pains to demonstrate the power of the 
agenda setter with academic rigor, they could have established the truth of the proposition 
by taking a field trip to Capitol Hill and talking openly with committee chairs there. 
Representative John Dingell, long-time chair of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, has frankly stated before the Rules Committee: "If you let me write the 
procedure and I let you write the substance . . . I'll screw you every time." John 
McLaughlin, Detroit Powerhouse, NAT'L REv., Feb. 27, 1987, at 24, 24. 
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4. The Agenda Setter as Problem Framer 
The agenda setter also possesses the power to serve as a second 
problem framer by manipulating the amendment process to take ad-
vantage of substantive preferences of the voting group. Agenda set-
ters employ two common strategies when acting as problem framers: 
adding amendments to a bill until it collapses under its own weight, or 
proposing an amendment so unpalatable to the proponents of the 
legislation that they will vote against the overall measure if the amend-
ment is adopted.236 . 
The fate of the banking legislation considered by the House Bank-
ing Committee in the 100th Congress illustrates the power of the 
agenda setter as problem framer. 237 The Committee started with a 
bill that would have removed product line barriers from depository 
institutions and allowed them to engage in the securities and insur-
ance business.238 With respect to this controversial legislation, the 
members of the Banking Committee and Congress at large fell into 
three groups: proponents of broadened powers (Proponents), oppo-
nents of broadened powers (Opponents), and fence-sitters (Fence-Sit-
ters). Being political animals, very few members of these three groups 
had set their views in stone. They all recognized that some bargaining 
would take place. 
The Proponents, although having no appetite for additional bank-
ing regulation, understood that some additional regulatory measures 
would be the cost of getting the new powers they desired. The Oppo-
nents, although unwilling to let banks increase their powers, realized 
that such an expansion of power was possible. If powers were to be 
expanded, however, the Opponents wanted sufficient regulatory safe-
guards and "firewalls" built into the legislation. The Fence-Sitters 
were in the middle, understood both arguments, and sympathized 
with the Proponents, but preferred to stick with the existing regula-
tory scheme unless they could be convinced that the banking industry 
would not abuse its new powers. 
At the outset of the process, therefore, the three groups displayed 
the following preferences: 
Proponents: (1) Full New Powers (2) Regulated Powers (3) No New Powers 
Opponents: (1) No New Powers (2) Regulated Powers (3) Full New Powers 
Fence-Sitters: (1) Regulated Powers (2) No New Powers (3) Full New Powers 
236. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 214. 
237. The discussion that follows is based in large part on a hypothetical discussed in 
HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 251-52. 
238. For a description and discussion of the bills under consideration in 1988, see 
Shafer, supra note 226, at 989-97. . 
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Assuming that the three groups split the v9ting power in such a way 
that two factions voting together were needed to carry the vote, the 
Regulated Powers bill emerged as the natural middle ground.239 After 
these initial preferences were made known, therefore, the central is-
sue was no longer whether additional powers should be granted, but 
rather under what conditions they should be granted. 
At this point, the agenda setter took on the role of problem framer. 
To move the Full Powers bill before the committee closer to the Regu-
lated Powers bill-the middle ground-the agenda setter had to 
amend the Full Powers bill before the committee. During this amend-
ment/problem-framing phase, the agenda setter could consider 
amendments to the bill to make it palatable (or unpalatable, depend-
ing on the agenda setter's personal bias) to the critical mass oflegisla-
tors needed to pass it (or kill it). 
In 1988, many provisions were added to the Full Powers bill at the 
insistence of the Fence-Sitters and the Opponents. By the end of the 
amendment process, the bill called for toughened standards for the 
Community Reinvestment Act, rules relating to branch closings, a re-
quirement that all banks provide free check-cashing for government 
checks, a requirement that banks provide "lifeline" banking services, 
and, of course, Truth in Savings.24o The banking industry did not op-
pose each and every proposed new burden, because it understood 
that some new regulation would be the price the industry had to pay 
for expanded powers. 
At some point, however, the additional burdens tacked onto the bill 
began to outweigh the value of the new powers, especially in light of 
the fact that competitors in the securities and insurance industries 
would not be saddled with similar burdens. Once the additional regu-
lations became part of the bill, however, the Proponents were virtually 
powerless to get them removed, because to do so would have cost 
them dearly in political capita1.241 Faced with too high a regulatory 
price to pay for increased powers, therefore, the Proponents changed 
their preferences to prefer No New Powers over highly Regulated 
Powers. As a result, in the end the preferences of the factions lined 
up as follows: 
239. In the terminology of choice theorists, the Regulated Powers option emerged as 
the Condorcet winner-that is, in head-to-head votes against the other alternatives, it was 
the winner against the alternatives. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note ISO, at 51. Although the 
choice of Regulated Powers was the first preference of only one group, it emerged as the 
natural middle ground when all the groups considered the alternatives. HEAP ET AL., supra 
note 142, at 221. 
240. Garsson, supra note 228, at 22. 
241. Jay Rosenstein, House Afrproves Bill Governing Ads, Disclosures for Home Equity Loans, 
AM. BANKER,June 21, 1988, at 3,30. 
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Proponents: (1) Full New Powers (2) No New Powers (3) Regulated Powers 
Opponents: (1) No New Powers (2) Regulated Powers (3) Full New Powers 
Fence-Sitters: (1) Regulated Powers (2) No New Powers (3) Full New Powers 
With this rearrangement, the No New Powers bill now became the 
Condorcet winner-exactly what the Opponents wanted. In effect, 
the Opponents 'were able' to block the proposal for increased banking 
powers by creating a poison pill for the banking industry and saying 
"go ahead and take these new powers-if you dare." This episode, 
therefore, illustrates how the agenda setter can manipulate the com-
mittee's actions through a form of problem framing so that the propo-
sal adopted is actually supported by only a minority.242 
5. Systemic Political Realities 
In addition to the powers of the problem framer and the agenda 
setter, built-in systemic political realities shape the outcome of the leg-
islative process, as well. Individual power plays, turf wars, and per-
sonal political agendas often decide the fate of legislation. Truth in 
Savings in the 100th Congress again provides an example. 
Under the neo-republican ideat civic-minded legislators primarily 
desire to serve the public good without regard to personal power or 
committee assignments, and all representatives have a meaningful 
role in the legislative process without regard to seniority, committee 
assignment, or party affiliation.243 The observed reality, however, cer-
tainly departs from that ideal. Seemingly without regard to the gener-
ation of public-spirited debate on the underlying issues, the banking 
legislation in 1988 instigated a major turf battle between Representa-
tive St. Germain's Banking Committee and Representative Dingell's 
Energy and Commerce Committee.244 The Banking Committee 
steadfastly resisted attempts by the Commerce Committee to partici-
pate in review of the legislation, yet Representative Dingell vowed to 
"protect the jurisdiction of [the Energy and Commerce] 
[C]ommittee."245 Because both of these powerful House committees 
(arguably) had jurisdiction over subject matter in the banking reform 
bill, political realities resulted in two different versions of the bill. Ne-
242. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 150, at 39-40; HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 252; 
ORDESHOOK, supra note 233, at 71-82. 
243. Michelman, supra note 162, at 27; Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1552-53. 
244. The House Energy and Commerce Committee, chaired by Representative John 
Dingell, had jurisdiction over any legislation involving securities laws. Representative 
Dingell was seen as partial to the securities industry. In 1988, he was widely regarded as a 
"spoiler" in the banking reform process, with the power to block any proposal he did no~ 
like. Robert M. Garsson, Proxmire Seen Maneuveringfor Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 1988, 
at 2. 
245. Robert M. Garsson, Banking Panel Tums to its Own Turf Battle, AM. BANKER, Sept. 30, 
1988, at 3. 
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gotiations between the Banking and Commerce Committees reached 
an impasse in early October 1988. Eventually, the Committees agreed 
to one version of the bill, but it was late in the process. House 
Speaker Wright, generally believed to oppose the bill, did not put it 
on the calendar.246 
, Meanwhile, a companion bill t~the ~988 House version of Truth in 
Savings, H.R. 176, had already been proposed in the Senate as Title VI 
of S. 1866, the Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988.247 Sen-
ator Proxmire was retiring after the 100th Congress and wanted to 
leave his mark by securing the passage of this comprehensive bill. 
Had the Proxmire bill passed, it would, have represented the most 
wide-ranging change in regulation of the banking industry since the 
Depression.248 But the Proxmire bill did not pass. When it got 
bogged down in the Senate, Senator Proxmire proposed tying his en-
tire bill to H.R. 176-the House version of Truth in Savings-as an 
amendment. Because H.R. 176 had already been approved by the 
House, it would have been appropriately before the Senate. This par-
liamentary move would have allowed the full Senate to consider the 
Proxmire Financial Modernization Act and then return it to the 
House for ratification as an amendment to H.R. 176.249 Due to polit-
ical maneuvering by other senators, however, Senator Proxmire was 
unable to use H.R. 176 in his plan.250 Even if Proxmire had been able 
to get the amended version of H.R. 176 out of the Senate and sent 
back to the House, House Speaker Wright would in all likelihood not 
have asked the House Rules Committee to clear the bill for House 
action.251 
The legislative history of the bill in the 100th Congress illustrates 
congressional micropolitics at work. While the neo-republican model 
would have political representatives deliberating over laws addressing 
problems for the public interest, in fact, little attention is paid to the 
problem-solving aspects of legislation. Instead, Representative 
Dingell's drive to protect the political power that resided in his com-
246. Speaker Wright hailed from Texas, a state with wildcat S&Ls that already operated 
under very liberal state laws. See STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF 
AMERICA'S SAVINGS & LOANS 34-35 (1989) (providing an example ofthe poor S&L situation 
in Texas). Texas thrifts had little to gain from the banking reforms proposed in 1988. 
Speaker Wright was widely regarded as a friend of the thrift industry, see L. WILLIAM 
SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 189-90 (1993), and that industry affiliation may have 
influenced his perspective on banking reform. Id. 
247. See Shafer, supra note 226, at 989 & n.181. 
248. See generally id. (discussing advantages of Proxmire Financial Modernization Act). 
249. For a discussion of these House and Senate machinations, see Chances of Banking 
Reform Bill Enactment Said Slim, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 569 (Oct. 3, 1988). 
250. Id. 
251. Garsson, supra note 244. 
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mittee, Senator Proxmire's personal desire to leave his mark on the 
law, and Speaker Wright's personal allegiances and prejudices to-
gether played a major role in the legislative process. The issues that 
motivated Dingell, Proxmire, and Wright were personal matters that 
played out as micropolitical battles within Congress.252 The history of 
Truth in Savings, therefore, illustrates the principle that much of leg-
islative politics is micropolitics.253 
Because the importance of micropolitics in the legislative process is 
widely accepted, it is not overly cynical to suggest that major policy 
issues are often decided by micropolitical motives.254 In this view, 
however, hope for a true problem-solving approach to legislation 
seems lost. 255 The hope appears futile because the legislative process. 
seems driven in large part by micropolitical forces that are relatively 
impervious to the larger public policy decisions. At the same time, 
however, the power of micropolitical forces also underscores the need 
to make sure the original content of the bill has as much integrity as 
possible, since micropolitical forces might just as easily pass a bill as 
defeat it. 
The significance of political forces in the legislative process may cre-
ate despair about using legislation to address societal problems or it 
may present a glimmer of hope that a competent problem framer can 
help create an effective law. On the side of despair, agenda setters 
and others wield substantial political power throughout the legislative 
process, and that power can nullify the efforts of even the most consci-
entious problem framer. On the hopeful side, however, the political 
forces in the legislative process seem to affect the passage of a bill more 
than its content. The fact remains that a legislative proposal under 
consideration shapes the debate that follows. It also remains true that 
the original legislative proposal often passes with relatively few funda-
252. By micro political, I am referring to the political analog to microeconomics. In 
other words, the politics of the legislature as legislature, rather than the politics of the 
legislature as intermediary for the macropolitical forces of society generally. 
253. As Kenneth Shepsle has observed, "As far as I can determine, there is near-
universal consensus that much of legislative politics is micropolitics. There are no grand 
controversies, methodological or substantive, pitting microanalysis against macroanalysis." 
Shepsle, supra note 233, at 12. 
254. [d. (finding that although determining exactly what the self-interest of legislators is 
presents a challenge: "[Olne is not taken to be a cynic for seeing the legislature as an arena 
in which self-interested behavior is manifested, that is, in which micromotives determine 
macroperformance") . 
255. Although the micropolitical outlook may appear bleak, it is not completely devoid 
of hope. The powerful people who dominate Congress change over time. Of the power 
brokers involved in 1988-Proxmire, St. Germain, Dingell, and Wright-only 
Representative Dingell remains in office as of this writing. With different personnel come 
different micropolitical struggles, but chances are they will not always play out the same 
way. 
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mental changes. These facts, therefore, give the legislative drafter 
great incentive to serve her constituents by crafting her bill in a way 
that identifies the problem rigorously and proposes an effective solu-
tion. These facts should also serve as an incentive to modify the legis-
lative process to make it more of a problem-solving method. 
III. PROSPECfS FOR IMPROVING LEGISLATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Although Congress currently lacks an effective problem-solving 
methodology, hope exists for improvement. Any prospects for im-
provement must, however, come to terms with the need to candidly 
identify values and facts, make decisions based on a sophisticated 
model of behavior, address causes rather than symptoms, and ade-
quately deal with the political forces that permeate the process. The 
previous discussion, however, shows that the political process may not 
permit the candid separation of facts and values, that the use of mod-
els may be misleading if the policy analyst is not expert, and that the 
careful examination of an issue to determine causes and conditions 
frequently fails to occur. Even if a problem framer takes all these 
steps, the existing political process can negate· the problem framer's 
efforts. This part of the Article considers and evaluates several possi-
ble avenues for dealing with these factors to improve the problem-
solving ability of Congress. 
A. Change the Legislative Process 
An intimate and dynamic connection exists between the legislative 
process and the content of legislation.256 Intuitively, if one aims to 
improve the legislative product, it would seem necessary to change the 
legislative process. An especially important change in light of bills like 
Truth in Savings would be to separate the language of a particular 
legislative proposal from the underlying issue the bill is designed to 
address. As was the case in Truth in Savings, the language of the draft 
bill may so shape the discussion of the issue as to foreclose the consid-
eration of policy alternatives. 
Professor Edward Rubin has suggested changes to the current legis-
lative methodology that would uncouple the text of a statute from the 
problem identification process.257 Professor Rubin's problem-solving 
methodology flows from the familiar public policy analysis employed 
to evaluate policy options.258 While Professor Rubin believes that per-
256. See OLESZEK, supra note 149; SMITH, supra note 10; TERRY SULLIVAN, PROCEDURAL 
STRUCTURE: SUCCESS AND INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS (1984). 
257. Rubin, supra note I, at 283-306. 
258. The public policy analysis proceeds stepwise in the following manner: (1) identify 
the problem; (2) define and rank goals for solving the problem; (3) specify all relevant 
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forming a complete methodical policy analysis in the course of the 
legislative process is likely impossible, he nevertheless believes that 
public policy analysis can form the foundation of a more effective leg-
islative methodology.259 
Professor Rubin's methodology for the design of regulatory statutes 
avoids the problem of the bill's language setting the stage for the rest 
of the deliberation by starting the legislative process with an issue, 
rather than a fully drafted bill. After an issue has been identified, a 
hearing would be called, the purpose of which would not be to write 
statutory language, but rather to determine goals that generate crite-
ria for measuring the statute's ultimate success.260 After establishing 
the goals of the legislation, the next step would determine the rela-
tionship between those goals.261 The process would then focus on 
identifYing the implementing mechanism to carry out the function of 
identifYing the options available for achieving the goals identified.262 
The selection of the implementing mechanism would be made after 
due consideration of political factors, the expertise of the possible im-
plementing agencies, and the salience of the new assignment to a 
given agency's general mission.263 
Professor Rubin's approach reflects a general bias toward letting 
the implementing agency, rather than Congress, hammer out the de-
tails of regulatory policies.264 He offers little formal methodology with 
regard to substantive provisions of the statute, since he observes that 
legislators tend to focus on a bill's substance to the exclusion of all 
options for meeting the goals; (4) collect data relevant to each option; (5) predict 
consequences on the basis of the data collected; and (6) select the option that best 
achieves the goals. Id. at 282; see also CARL V. PATION & DAVID S. SAWICKI, BASIC METHODS 
OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 26-38 (1986). 
259. Rubin, supra note I, at 282-83. 
260. Id. at 286. Professor Rubin would focus on goals rather than on rigorous problem 
definition because, in his view, the way Congress works tends to conflate these two 
functions as a practical matter. Id. at 283. 
261. Id. at 286. 
262. Id. at 289. Professor Rubin identifies three general approaches to the 
implementation of a statute. First, the legislature can create a new judicial or 
administrative implementing mechanism. Second, it can restructure an existing judicial or 
administrative implementing mechanism. Third, it can create a new set of substantive 
provisions for an existing implementation mechanism. Id. at 291. 
263. Id. at 292-93. 
264. This position is not without its critics, who suggest that Congress has gone too far in 
delegating to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the 
Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 427 (1989). On the other hand, it 
has been argued that the goal of deliberative decisionmaking that serves as a central 
aspiration of the civic republican model may only be achieved through the operation of 
administrative agencies. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1541 (1992); see infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text. 
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else.265 Similarly, he would not suggest the development of an array 
of policy options during the legislative process because he believes 
that once the goal is chosen, the possibilities for its attainment will 
probably be apparent to the legislators.266 His approach represents a 
coherent and justifiable approach for improving legislative methodol-
ogy. It would avoid the problem ~f the proposed text of a bUI shaping 
the policy options by separating· the problem-identification process 
from the text drafting process. That change alone would result in the 
legislature's considering more options in response to problems. 
His methodology, however, also has shortcomings. First, the pro-
posed methodology does not call for a rigorous identification of the 
problem that the legislation is supposed to address. Professor Rubin 
appears too willing to give up on the possibility that the legislative 
process could ever perform a rigorous public policy analysis of pro-
posed legislation.267 Instead; he willingly forgoes a rigorous problem-
identification process and settles for a hearing to establish the goals of 
the legislation. The mere identification of goals, however, does not 
form a good basis for policy development. As Professor Rubin's own 
observations show, goals can be quite malleable and may be more a 
justification for a law rather than a reason for the law's existence.268 
Second, Professor Rubin does not suggest a methodology for link-
ing the proposed legislative response to the problem being addressed. 
He does not offer any methodology for guiding the creation of legisla-
tion other than articulating goals and carefully considering. the 
method of implementation. This lack of explicit methodology may 
result from his view of the legislative function primarily as the method 
by which to create authority for agencies to act. 269 In practice, how-
ever, Congress does not act solely by issuing directions to agencies. 
Often, Congress gets involved in the details of particular businesses, 
265. Rubin, supra note 1, at 295. 
266. ld. The final step in his methodology would call for either Congress or the 
implementing agency to gather data to evaluate the efficacy of the substantive provisions in 
light of the goals that had been identified. [d. at 299-300. This evaluative step might be 
achieved through "experimental" legislation-that is, legislation with limited geographic 
and/ or temporal applicability-or other means. [d .. at 302-06. 
267. In one sentence, Professor Rubin dismisses the possibility of a legislative drafter 
engaging in formal policy analysis, saying that "[e]ven the most politicalIy-insulated, highly-
trained, individual decisionmaker cannot follow this approach [formal public policy 
analysis] for even the most technical decisions." [d. at 282. 
268. In connection with the Truth in Lending Act, Professor Rubin noted that the bill's 
sponsors were quite willing to change the stated goals of their bill to suit evidence 
presented to the subcommittee. [d. at 281. In Professor Rubin's words, "Although the 
Subcommittee failed to consider alternative methods for reaching its goals, it was willing to 
consider alternative goals by which its chosen methods could be justified." [d. at 280-81. 
269. [d. at 283; Rubin, supra note 5, at 372-85. 
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especially banking-Truth in Savings being one example. Professor 
Rubin's approach would offer no guidance in these situations. 
Third, Professor Rubin's process trusts the congressional committee 
structure to carry out the process of issue identification and goal pri-
oritization. If the goal of the legislative process is to find substantively 
correct solutions to social problems, however, relying on the existing 
committee structure to carry out those tasks will doom the project to 
failure. Congressional committees are political hotbeds.270 Any issue 
that comes out of a committee will be shot through with political con-
siderations.271 In addition, committee members have too many de-
mands on their time to attend or participate whole-heartedly in 
committee hearings.272 Finally, committees are an improbable place 
for careful examination of the causes and conditions of an issue be-
cause most committee members already have their minds made up 
about the topic before any witnesses ever appear and do not care to 
obtain any additional information.273 
Overall, as a method for improving the problem-solving methodol-
ogy of Congress, Professor Rubin's approach would tend to achieve 
the important goal of separating the proposed language of the bill 
from the identification of issues and goals. It would, however, allow 
the political process to throw obstacles in the path of problem framers 
trying to analyze problems rigorously. 
B. Require Written Justification of Legislative Enactments 
Professor Robert Seidman has proposed a second approach to im-
proving legislative methodology. He would impose a requirement 
that Congress accompany legislative enactments with memoranda of 
law justifying the action, in much the same way that judges are re-
quired to write opinions.274 Professor Seidman focuses on the work of 
the legislative drafter and the need to justify the legislation in terms of 
the neo-republican ideal. 275 
270. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 93-97. 
27l. As we have seen, political forces may prevent a problem framer from being able to 
separate values from facts in the problem-identification process. See supra notes 181-82 and 
accompanying text. 
272. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 45; OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 98. 
273. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 98. 
274. Seidman, supra note 5, at 7-8. Although legislative enactments are already 
frequently accompanied by some information from the legislative drafter, those materials 
are often incomplete and of poor quality. Id. at 3-4. 
275. Id. 
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The first part of the memorandum would identify the problem ad-
dressed by the legislation.276 Professor Seidman insists that the 
drafter be candid about her underlying view of the world so that other 
players in the process might understand why she views the behavior as 
a problem. The drafter would be required to develop causal explana-
tions for the difficulty based on a sophisticated model. To perform 
this task, the drafter would have to distinguish between causes and 
conditions277 and provide adequate explanations.278 To ensure the 
rigor of this step, the explanations must be provable and not based on 
mere assertions of subjective values or attitudes.279 
The memorandum would also require the drafter to propose a solu-
tion to the problem identified. It would have to demonstrate how the 
proposed legislation would provide the most efficient solution by 
describing alternative possible solutions (from history, comparative 
law, scholarly writing, interested parties, or theory), describing the 
proposed solution and showing how it addresses the causes earlier ex-
plicated, demonstrating how the legislation will induce the behavior it 
prescribes, and preparing a cost-benefit analysis.280 
Professor Seidman's approach would go a long way toward ensuring 
that a rigorous problem-solving methodology guided the legislative 
drafting process. Following his system, a legislative drafter would put 
the world on notice as to what values she sees the world through. It 
would also require the drafter to defend rigorously her policy choices 
with the use of empirical evidence, and it would ensure analysis of the 
causes and conditions of the problem by making that analysis 
compulsory. 
Despite its many good points, Professor Seidman's approach suffers 
from several weaknesses. The foremost deficiency of the approach is 
that it fails to deal adequately with political influences.281 Professor 
Seidman concedes that for his method to work, the drafter cannot be 
just an advocate of the bill, but instead must be an advocate of the 
276. Professor Seidman sees all appropriate legislative problems as patterns of 
undesirable social behavior and all appropriate legislative responses as attempts to change 
that undesirable behavior. [d. at 60. 
277. [d. at 62. 
278. To merely state the absence of a proposed solution as a cause of the problem would 
not be a sufficiently adequate explanation. [d. at 63. 
279. [d. 
280. [d. at 65. Finally, Professor Seidman's approach, like Professor Rubin's, would 
require some mechanism to monitor and evaluate the efficacy of the solution in terms of 
the problem identified. This requirement might be met through any of several devices, 
such as a "sunset clauses" or a requirement of periodic reports to Congress. [d. at 74-76. 
281. Professor Seidman recognizes three separate aspects of the legislative project: 
power, substance, and form. [d. at 12. His approach deals with the substantive element, to 
the exclusion of the others. [d. at 15. 
, 
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legislative process.282 As an ideal, this approach carries much weight, 
but in the political world of Congress, a proposal for improved legisla-
tive methodology must take political reality into account. 
A second shortcoming relates to the first: the approach requires 
candor on the part of the drafter. Drafters would have to be forth-
right about the "grand theory" employed to rationalize the proposal. 
Despite the benefits that may 'flow from 'candor in the legislative pro-
cess, however, it may be politically impossible as a practical matter.283 
In addition to the many political obstacles that make candor difficult, 
on a more subtle level the drafter likely has only a dim idea of what 
her'true domain assumptions are or what "grand theory" she employs 
when looking at the world.284 
Third, the Seidman methodology places a great many demands on 
the drafter's time, resources, and expertise to prepare a comprehen-
sive memorandum justifying the legislation. Many drafters, especially 
those in congressional representatives' offices, will not have the time, 
resources, or expertise to carry out the task. Asking those staffers to 
employ sophisticated models to justify their proposals may result in a 
poor work product. 
Although Professor Seidman's approach possesses the beneficial as-
pects of a methodical system 'ror defining problems and analyzing the 
policy choices in terms of the identified problems, as a practical and 
political matter, it may not be a workable alternative. 
C. Delegate to Non-Congressional Bodies 
Some of the problems with the current legislative methodology may 
be overcome by involving non-congressional groups such as regulatory 
agencies, ad hoc committees, or standing "editorial boards" in the leg-
islative process. These groups would tend to de-politicize the process 
somewhat and also bring a degree of expertise to the substance of the 
legislation that congressional representatives may lack. 
282. [d. at 17 (citing Purdy, supra note 19, at 77-78). 
283. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text. 
284. In remarking about candor in the judicial context, Professor Zeppos noted: 
It is also possible that judges reach a result consistent with their personal 
preferences but convince themselves that they have done no more than 
read the originalist evidence. Thus, if we asked these judges to be candid 
and to tell us their 'real' reasons, they would look genuinely puzzled and 
point to their written opinions. 
Zeppos, supra note 183, at 409. A similar self-deception or lack of self-knowledge may 
affect legislative drafters as well. 
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1. Delegate to Ad Hoc Committees 
An alternative to the usual method of producing legislation would 
be to have Congress act only as a problem identifier and to delegate 
the study of those problems to ad hoc corpmittees. Congress has suc-
cessfully employed this method in the past in areas of substantive or 
political complexity.285 This method possesses several strengths. First, 
by impaneling an ad hoc group of experts, problems could be identi-
fied on more neutral ideological grounds than in the political arena. 
Second, the panel might be capable of highly sophisticated analysis 
and could examine matters closely to determine causes and condi-
tions. Third, the panels, being unelected and serving in an ad hoc 
capacity, might be less subject to political influences than elected 
representatives. 
On the other hand, the outside committee process would present 
extreme logistical problems for Congress. It makes sense in many situ-
ations where Congress lacks the political will to act or lacks the exper-
tise necessary to address the issue. Because of the time involved, 
however, it would not prove an effective method of carrying out the 
routine business of Congress. Also, appointing special commissions as 
a routine event might raise concerns about the legitimacy of the polit-
ical process. For example, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission may have successfully closed unneeded military bases 
precisely because it was an anti-democratic body and its proceedings 
were not entirely open to the public.286 
In addition, the process employed in the special committee may fail 
to meet the basic requirements of democratic'norms and the composi-
tion of the special committees might run afoul of democratic values. 
While commissions might be structured in such a way that all affected 
constituencies are represented, some parties with legitimate concerns 
may be left out or, worse yet, the commission may be stacked to give 
one viewpoint more weight. The special commission structure, there-
fore, may help achieve the goals of providing expert analysis of the 
problem with some insulation from politics, but it may not be politi-
cally acceptable. 
285. The examples of copyright law, bankruptcy law, military base closings, social 
security reform, and health care are discussed supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
286. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence 
in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 952-53 (1990) (suggesting the success of the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and other ad hoc national 
commissions has been due, at least in part, to the fact that the commission structure allows 
the creation of an informal bargaining mechanism outside of the public eye). 
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2. Delegate to Agencies 
Some commentators suggest that any hopes for rational policy deci-
sionmaking rest with the administrative agencies and not with Con-
gress.287 They favor a system where Congress identifies big issues and 
delegates to agencies the authority to carry out the policy articulated 
by Congress. This approach is consistent with the goal of insuring a 
coherent regulatory strategy by allowing the agencies to take broad 
congressional directives and translate them into specific policies.288 
Such an approach would also achieve the requirement that policymak-
ers look at the world with the aid of a sophisticated model, as the 
agency experts likely will be sophisticated in the issues presented. Fi-
nally, the opportunity afforded to interested parties to participate in 
the administrative process and the relative insulation of the regulators 
from the political forces that buffet Congress289 make the administra-
tive agencies the most likely place where true deliberation will take 
place and where good policy decisions will be made.290 
Other commentators, however, have questioned the view that ad-
ministrative agencies possess the expertise and political insulation 
often c1aimed.291 One of the most difficult matters to deal with in the 
context of independent agencies is the tendency of those bodies to 
come under the strong influence of the very industries they are sup-
287. Professor Rubin has been an advocate of allowing administrative agencies to playa 
more active role in policy development. In his legislative methodology discussed above, 
the purpose of the legislative effort would primarily be to direct an administrative agency 
to take action in a particular area. Rubin, supra note I, at 283. 
288. GARTEN, supra note 132, at 147-50. This process has been employed in many areas 
of substantive federal law. Most of antitrust law, for instance, flows from the very broad 
provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which basically 
allows the Justice Department to develop substantive antitrust laws through litigation and 
agency guidelines. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission was created with the relatively 
broad mission of preventing the use of "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(2) (1988). Along the same lines, the Federal Communications Commission was 
charged with regulating broadcasting "as public convenience, interest, or necessity 
requires." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). 
289. Although one might argue that the administrative agencies are subject to political 
forces as well, the forces seem to be somewhat attenuated because the executive branch 
must have its nominees approved by the Senate and because the P9litically appointed 
agency head must deal with an apolitical staff of civil servants who may undercut the 
particular political ideology of the agency chief. See generally Strauss, supra note 122. 
290. See Seidenfeld, supra note 264, at 1541-50. 
29l. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1402-09 ("Some critics tell us that 
independent agencies have been captured by the industries they regulate. Instead of 
praise for useful continuity, we hear complaints about excessive bureaucratic rigidity."). 
The authors go on to note that increasingly the agencies are being asked to decide political 
questions, rather than questions requiring the action of disinterested "experts." [d. at 
1405. 
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posed to regulate.292 If the agencies charged with developing policy 
are predisposed to one group, the problem-identification process will 
be skewed and the entire regulatory effort will go awry.293 
3. Adopt The Uniform Law/Permanent Editorial Board Model 
Another alternative regime for improving federal statutes is to take 
a page from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) and establish expert panels to oversee and re-
vise existing regulatory structures and suggest changes for their im-
provement.294 Congress has experimented on occasion with the use 
of expert or "blue ribbon" panels to help formulate national policy on 
an ad hoc basis.295 On a more permanent basis, however, it could 
establish "permanent editorial boards" (for lack of a better term) 
based on the model used for the development of uniform and model 
state laws.296 The uniform laws model would permit experts from in-
dustry, academia, and the legal profession to draft legislation. Such a 
panel would certainly operate with a sophisticated model of how the 
real world works and would have experience \\ith the problems the 
statutes should address. A standing editorial board could monitor the 
statute to make sure it is carrying out its intended purpose and ad-
dressing all the issues it was supposed to address without inadvertently 
raising new ones. 
292. When an interest group "captures" an agency, the agency begins to act as an 
advocate for a parochial interest rather than disinterested, independent experts. See 
Sunstein, supra note 69, at 426-28. 
293. Taking the situation with Truth in Savings as an example, an agency considering 
the issues presented by Truth in Savings could frame the issues in very different ways. With 
respect to the relationship between the bank and its customer, for instance, a regulator 
with a pro-consumer bias might identify the problem as unfair bargaining power between 
banks and their customers such that banks can dictate the terms of deposit accounts and 
customers must live with those terms. On the other hand, a regulator with a pro-banking 
bias might look at the bank-customer relationship and see a problem where banks were 
being subjected to potentially ruinous litigation arising from Perdue-type claims. See supra 
notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
294. Professors Neil Cohen and Barry Zaretsky have suggested such an arrangement for 
the unification of commercial law. Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial 
Law for the New Millenium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 551, 557-61 
(1993). 
295. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
296. For an overview of the structure and history of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see Frederick H. Miller et aI., Introduction to 
Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: The Centennial of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 46 Bus. LAw. 1449, 1449-51 (1991);JamesJ. White, Ex 
Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2096, 2097-103 (1991). For an overview of the process by 
which the Model Business Corporation Act (overseen by the American Bar Association, 
rather than the NCCUSL) is revised, see Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 
TEX. L. REv. 1455, 1458-63 (1985). 
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Although in theory a politically insulated, independent panel of ex-
perts proposing a new law might be expected to produce a high qual-
ity proposal for legislation, the evidence from the uniform-laws 
process does not necessarily bear out that assumption.297 In the 101 
years of its existence, the NCCUSL has proposed between 200298 and 
360299 acts, depending on how one defines an "act." The quality of 
the uniform law proposals has varied considerably. Using the number 
of states that have adopted a proposed uniform law as a proxy for 
quality, the NCCUSL's success rate has been quite modest. Only 
twenty-two acts have been adopted by more than forty states,300 while 
107 acts have been enacted in fewer than ten states.301 
Evidence of the uneven quality of the uniform acts need not rest 
solely on the record of adoptions. Common experiences establish 
that the uniform law process sometimes produces a poor product. 
While the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has been hailed as "the 
most spectacular success story in the history of American law,"302 
many professors and lawyers can relate horror stories of particular 
provisions (or entire articles) that do not work very well, despite 'the 
prolonged efforts of many dedicated and talented persons at the NC-
CUSL.303 Although specific flawed provisions in a statute as complex 
297. The NCCUSL is an elite group, typically composed of prominent lawyers selected 
by the governor of their home state. White, supra note 296, at 2096. In Professor White's 
words, the NCCUSL is a group "much more sophisticated in the law and more interested 
in long-range questions than they would be if they [were elected legislators who] had to 
stand for reelection every two or four years." [d. 
298. [d. at 2103. 
299. Richard E. Coulson, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and the Control of Law-Making - A Historical Essay, 16 OKLA. CrIY U. L. REv. 295 (1991). 
300. White, supra note 296, at 2103. Actually, this number somewhat overstates the 
success rate because the Uniform Commercial Code-by far the NCCUSL's most 
successful project-replaced several different earlier successful uniform acts and itself is 
counted as at least three acts (original 1962 version and subsequent revisions). [d. at 2103-
04. 
301. [d. at 2103. Of that 107, 77 have not been adopted by even five states, and beyond 
that a number of proposed acts were never adopted by any jurisdiction. [d. 
302. JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (3d ed. 1988). 
303. Probably the most notorious example of a botched provision of a uniform law is 
§ 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In the words of Grant Gilmore, § 2-207 is 
"arguably the greatest statutory mess of all time" and "was a miserable, bungled, patched-
up job-both text and Comment-to which various hands ... contribute~ at various 
points, each acting independently of the others (like the blind men and the elephant)." 
Letter from Grant Gilmore, Professor of Law, Vermont School of Law, to Robert S. 
Summers, Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School (Sept. 10, 1980), reproduced in 
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 514 (5th ed. 1993). Section 
2-207's poor performance may be a function of the strained process it underwent on the 
way to becoming part of the UCC and the subsequent changes made to the provision after 
its original formulation. For a discussion of the background of § 2-207, see WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 302, § 1-3. 
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as the VCC should not serve as an indictment of the entire uniform 
law movement, they may belie the idea that careful deliberation by a 
panel of experts will, produce a flawless product.304 In fact, no 
shortage of criticism exists concerning the efforts of the NCCUSL's 
recent drafting efforts.305 
A more serious problem with the uniform-laws process is that the 
elite experts involved in the drafting process may leave a distinctive 
stamp on the content of the proposed laws that end up treating one 
class of persons more favorably than others.306 The anti-democratic 
aspect of the expert panel settling all the details of the legislation de-
flects m~ch of the legitimate input from elected representatives and 
may silence the political voices of some segments of society who 
should have a say in the process.307 
304. The process of drafting uniform law provisions is nothing if not deliberate, For a 
discussion of the torturous process involved in the development of the revised Articles 3 
and 4 and new Article 4A, see William D. Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and Message, 26 
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 811 (1993), 
305. A symposium issue of the Alabama Law Review on Article 2A contained pieces 
critical of both the drafters' underlying policy choices and the language used in the Article 
to put those policies into effect. See Symposium, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 
ALA, L. REv, 559 (1988), A similar symposium issue on the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 
produced similar criticisms, See Symposium, Revised U, C. C. Articles 3 & 4 and New Article 4A, 
42 ALA. L. REv, 373 (1991). The fact that so few "uniform" acts are in fact uniform 
provides some evidence of dissatisfaction at .the state legislature level with the product 
produced by the NCCVSL. Cf F, Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr" 
Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda. 45 Bus. 
LAw. 2519 (1990) (discussing the VCC's strengths and weaknesses despite its actual 
uniformity among the several states). 
306. For instance, Articles 3 and 4 of the VCC have been criticized as pro-bank and anti-
consumer, a result achieved primarily because of the composition of the drafting 
committee, See generally Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA, L. REv, 679 (1991) (noting the negative effects on 
consumers, specifically in the regulation of checking accounts); Edward L. Rubin, 
Efficiency, Equity and the Praposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4. 42 ALA. L. REv. 551 (1991) 
(noting the failure of implementing economic efficiency or social equity for the 
consumer); Julianna J. Zekan, Comparative Negligence Under the Code: Protecting Negligent 
Banks Against Negligent Customers, 26 V, MICH.J.L. REFORM 125 (1993) (noting the increase 
in consumer responsibilities and in potential consumer liability). 
307. Professor Edward Rubin has related his experiences as chair of the ABA committee 
that had input into the revisions of Articles 3 and 4 in a surprisingly frank article that 
severely criticizes the drafting process. Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like 
a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A, L. REv, 743 
(1993). In the article, he states that the revisions of Articles 3 and 4 do the bidding of the 
banking industry with little regard to the interests of other groups affected by the payments 
process, especially consumers. See id, He notes: 
In the process of drafting and enacting the revisions of Articles 3 and 4, 
however, one of the major forces was not present. Banks were well 
represented; corporate users were· represented intermittently; but 
consumers were virtually unrepresented. The result was that the banking 
industry and its attorneys dominated the entire process, save for a few brief 
interludes .. , , The banking industry is entitled to be represented, of 
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Another possible drawback to this method is that it may tend only 
to codify existing practice308 and ignore new ideas or innovative ap-
proaches to the problem.309 The result of this tendency may produce 
a law that will require frequent revisions and amendment, especially if 
it has many technical provisions.310 This result defeats the goal of em-
ploying experts in order to achieve a sophisticated view of the 
problems addressed in hopes of implementing innovative and effec-
tive policies. In light of these several criticisms, therefore, creating 
"permanent editorial boards" may not result in more effective 
legislation. 
D. Post-Enactment Review 
An alternative to changing the legislative process to get the legisla-
tion right in the first place is to create post-enactment review mecha-
nisms whereby the legislation would be required to justify itself based 
on the problem it was supposed to solve. Reviewing the legislation 
after enactment would affect the legislative process because sponsors 
of legislation who want their statutes to remain in effect will be more 
explicit about what goals the law seeks to achieve and how those goals 
course, and it can be expected to lobby assiduously for its positions. But 
the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws should not lend their names to the bankers' 
enterprise. When then do, as occurred with the Article 3 and 4 revisions, 
they give the banking industry the ability to clothe itself with public policy, 
and to overwhelm most state legislatures with a false aura of public-oriented 
impartiality. This was a disgrace. If the ALI and NCCUSL cannot do better 
under their present structure, both organizations should be extensively 
reformed or entirely abolished. 
Id. at 787-88; see also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws 
Process: Some Lessonsfrom the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83 (1993) (analyzing 
the current structure of the uniform laws drafting process and concluding that it "is almost 
custom-made for the drafting and enactment of pro-business legislation"). 
308. See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 626-27 (1981) (voicing concern that 
the codification process tends to enshrine the practices of the past). 
The basic flaw in our analysis was our failure to perceive that the twentieth 
century financing assignee was not in the least like the stranger who, one 
hundred and fifty years earlier, had bought goods, commercial paper, and 
other property in an open market without being able to find out about the 
prior history of whatever he bought. 
Id.; see also Richard Danzig, A Comment on the jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 
STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975). 
309. Commenting on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, Professor Hamilton 
stated: "A major consequence of the Committee's large plurality of practicing attorneys 
was a substantial conservatism. By and large, this group was reluctant to consider 
innovative proposals unless the need for them had been demonstrated by actual practice 
or experience." Hamilton, supra note 296, at 1466. 
310. Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26 Loy. LA. 
L. REv. 683, 686-88 (1993). . 
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will be achieved. Post-enactment review would also provide legislators 
with valuable feedback about which approaches work and which do 
not.311 In general, four approaches have evolved to carry out post-
enactment review: enhanced judicial review, sunset clauses, oversight 
committees, and law revision or audit commissions. 
l. Enhanced Judicial Review 
There seems to be a dynamic link between the judiciary and the 
legislature where the actions of one may result in actions by the 
other.312 Professor Cass Sunstein has argued for heightened judicial 
review of congressional enactments to reinforce the ideals of the neo-
republican model and, by implication, to improve the content of legis-
lation.313 Professor Sunstein would seek to heighten the rationality 
requirement of the equal protection, due process, contract, and emi-
nent domain provisions of the Constitution.314 Under such an ap-
proach, the courts would not defer as a matter of course to legislative 
actions, but rather would have to find that the legislature in fact acted 
to attain a legitimate purpose and not just in response to interest 
group pressures.315 In addition, courts would insist on a tighter fit 
between the statutory means and the articulated policy ends.316 By 
providing a "negative feedback loop" to legislators, judicial review 
would create incentives to make the problem-solving process more rig-
orous and deliberate. 
Professor Sunstein's approach might make legislatures more delib-
erative, but it might as easily make them more devious. Given the 
complexity of the legislative process and Congress' sheer size,judicial 
review of the deliberative nature of the legislative process may be a 
weak method of improving the legislative product. 317 Even if the judi-
ciary were to take a more active role in the critique of the legislative 
process by articulating a set of values that support our legal system and 
311. Designers of legislation need information about the failure of statutes in order to 
improve statutory design, See supra note 13. 
312. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 CEO. LJ. 565 (1992) (discussing how judicial review affects the 
deliberative processes in the other branches of a democratic government); Mark C. Miller, 
Congress and The Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 CONST. LJ. 317 (1993) (examining 
how different congressional committees handle constitutional matters). 
313. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 164 (1990); Sunstein, supra note 
160, at 69-72. 
314. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 69. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
317. Seidenfeld, supra note 264, at 1541. 
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form the basis for governmental policy,318 the use of judicial review 
would likely fall short of improving the problem-solving process by 
enhancing the neo-republican ideal.319 The effect of judicial review is 
too far removed from the policy-development process to make an 
impact. 
2. Sunset Provisions 
Commentators have remarked on the modern explosion in statu-
tory law320 and the need to elhni'nate unnecessary or obsolete stat-
utes.321 One approach to weeding out laws is to make legislative 
enactments terminate after some set period of time, subject to explicit 
review and reauthorization.322 During the 1970s, a number of states 
adopted sunset laws designed to force the review of government pro-
grams after a certain time period.323 Under these statutes, the review 
of government programs often is delegated to an independent audit 
agency with the power to make recommendations to the legislature.324 
At the national level, a sunset law was introduced in Congress but was 
never passed.325 
318. This approach has been suggested by Professor Frank Michelman. Michelman, 
Forward, supra note 160, at 66-73. 
319. Seidenfeld, supra note 264, at 1542. Professor Sunstein concedes that the judicial 
branch acting on its own will not be able to accomplish a great deal in bringing politics 
closer to the republican ideal, but nevertheless maintains that if courts adopted a more. 
explicit republican outlook on the political process they could exert some influence on the 
political process. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 68. 
320. See Hutchinson & Morgan, supra note 6, at 1753 (providing statistics on explosion 
of legislative activity at state legislature level and number of cases before Supreme Court 
involving application of a statute). 
321. See, e.g., Garwood et aI., supra note 67, at 793. 
322. An early proponent of this idea was Professor Theodore Lowi. Professor Lowi 
found inspiration in the writings of Thomas Jefferson to propose a "Tenure of Statutes 
Act," which would place a limit of five to ten years on every organic act of Congress. 
THEODORE]' LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 309-10 (1969). In Professor Lowi's view, the 
required termination of the program would require serious thought on the part of 
Congress as to whether to keep the program alive and would supplant the largely 
superficial (in his view) review of programs that occurs each year during the 
appropriations process. Id. 
323. More than 75% of the states have some form of sunset legislation on the books. 
KI::EFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 350; see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-104 (West 
1990 & Supp. 1993). 
324. THE EFFECfIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW 17, 21 (Richard E. Brown ed., 
1979). The Connecticut.sunset law·is an example of this arrangement. CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 2c-3 (West 1988). ' 
325. For a discussion of the fate of the proposed federal sunset legislation, see ESKRIDGE 
& FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 860-61. It may be that because of the interaction between the 
judiciary and the legislature, formal statutory sunset provisions are not necessary because 
judges already employ their own "sunset" powers when interpreting statutes. Dean 
Calabresi has suggested a twist on the statutory sunset scheme. He argues that judges 
should be entitled to interpret legislative enactments in a manner relevant to modern 
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Despite their early momentum, sunset laws have not lived up to 
their advance billing.326 It is not clear whether the use of sunset laws 
would provide meaningful feedback to legislators· necessary to im-
prove the problem-solving methodology of Congress. Many sunset 
laws deal only with statutes creating government agencies. By focus-
ing on that particular implementation mechanism, the laws would be 
underinclusive in their attempt to eliminate ineffective statutes.327 
On the other hand, if sunset laws were extended to statutes that did 
not create agencies, the risk of politi.cal f~rces terminating necessary 
or useful statutes looms large,328 as does the risk that statutes would be 
evaluated on inappropriate grounds.329 In addition, overinclusive 
sunset provisions may undermine government morale and effective-
ness as the various agencies approach their "drop dead" dates. Such 
an effect could adversely affect the regulatory scheme.33o While sun-
set laws could prove quite disruptive, the feedback they would provide 
legislative drafters appears quite attenuated. 
3. Oversight Committees 
Congressional oversight committees could monitor the effective-
ness of statutes. Congress engages in oversight activities on an ongo-
ing basis.331 Typically, congressional oversight activities are thought 
conditions, or even to eradicate obsolete or anachronistic laws. GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 34 (1982). He goes further to state that judges 
already do so without explicit recognition of what they are doing. [d. at 190 n.3l. 
326. KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 350. 
327. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 86l. 
328. See CALABRESI, supra note 325, at 6l. 
329. The methods of evaluation would have to be subject to close analysis. The match 
between the problem addressed by the statute and the method of evaluation should be 
demonstrated as rigorously as possible in order to avoid improper evaluations. A brief 
illustration demonstrates the practical importance of the relationship between the 
problem and the standard for determining the effectiveness of a policy. In the 1970s, the 
federal government implemented a wide-ranging program designed to reduce drunk 
driving called the Alcohol Safety Action Project (ASAP). Part of the program called for 
identifYing recidivists and channelling them out of the criminal justice system and into 
alcohol-abuse treatment programs. The purpose for this effort was to help alcohol abusers 
come to grips with their drinking and thereby reduce the incidence of repeat offenders. 
The ASAP pilot program's effectiveness was measured, however, in terms of whether it 
produced a decrease in alcohol-related fatalities in the cities where it had been 
implemented. No statistically significant reduction was noted, so treatment programs were 
labelled as ineffective in the fight against drunk driving. The obvious mismatch between 
the treatment program's goals and the method used to evaluate it highlight the need to be 
clear about the link between a law's purpose and the way in which attainment of that 
purpose will be judged. See Eric J. Gouvin, Note, Drunk Driving and t~ Alcoholic Offender: A 
New Approach to an Old Problem, 12 AM.J.L. & MED. 99,123-24 (1987). 
330. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 863. 
331. In general, the oversight activities of Congress can be broken down into four 
substantive areas: review of policy implementation; review of the administrative structure; 
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of in connection with authorizations,332 appropriations,333 and ex-
plicit oversight-investigatory actions,334 although the informal (and 
cumulative) aspects of congressional monitoring should not be under-
estimated.335 The General Accounting Office provides additional 
oversight of programs, and its activities often form the basis for formal 
congressional hearings.336 When congressional oversight works well, 
it can ferret out waste and mismanagement,337 allow politically elected 
representatives to exercise some control over the unelected adminis-
trative bureaucracy,338 and provide useful information back to the leg-
islature.339 Conceivably, the oversight function might inform the 
legislature about the effectiveness of particular programs, the accu-
racy of particular problem descriptions, and other matters relating to 
the problem-solving capacity of Congress. 
Placing such a burden on existing oversight mechanisms, however, 
may be overwhelming. The existing system of congressional oversight 
is far from perfect.340 One obvious shortcoming is that it is not sys-
tematic, but rather is somewhat rare (in its formal mode) and fairly 
particularistic in its inquiry.341 Even with congressional agencies 
charged with oversight of particular programs, the level of inquiry can 
vary considerably based on the personalities of the parties involved or 
review of the individuals charged with implementing policies; and review of the 
expenditure of public funds. For a general discussion, see KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 
342-66. 
332. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 268. 
333. Id. 
334. The explicit oversight-investigatory activities of Congress are carried out most 
visibly by two standing committees, the House Committee on Government Operations and 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, which have more or less free reign to look 
into the operation of government programs. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM 
THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 12 
(1988). 
335. Id. 
336. Id. at 16. 
337. See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 357-62. 
338. The oversight process performs this function by (1) providing an avenue to allow 
Congress to add flesh to administrative directives that were necessarily broad or vague 
when passed; (2) keeping a check on bureaucrats' policy choices; and (3) challenging the 
executive branch over policy implementation. See FOREMAN, supra note 334, at 17l. 
339. Id. at 13. 
340. For an overview of the many shortcomings of political oversight, see Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 AoMIN L. REv. 1 (1994). 
341. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 486; Keefe & Ogul, supra note 10, at 360; 
FOREMAN. supra note 334, at 84. It appears that no one really knows how much oversight 
Congress engages in, as the definition of "oversight" is far from precise and could include a 
wide range of informal activities, such as the review of required agency reports, informal 
communication with regulators, and ad hoc groups within the Congress. OLESZEK, supra 
note 149. at 277. 
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ideological matters.342 Because congressional oversight will necessar-
ily be a political process, impartial evaluation of programs may be be-
yond its reach.343 Because of the overwhelmingly political character 
of the existing oversight process, therefore, it may not serve as the best 
way to improve the underlying legislative methodology. The political 
realities that bedevil the problem-framing process will resurface in the 
context of political oversight of those statutes. 
4. Law Revision/Audit Commissions 
Another way to .provide feedback to legislators about the effective-
ness of their statutes is to revise the laws systematically. Although Con-
gress has from time to time revised the federal laws, the process does 
not proceed with the regularity that it does in other countries.344 One 
method for effecting such a systematic revision process is to create a 
law revision commission. This idea is not a new one.345 Justice Benja-
min Cardozo called for the creation of a law revision commission 
more than seventy years ago to help sort out the chaos of federal legis-
lation,346 and he has been joined over the years by others,347 includ-
ing Judge-now Justice-Ruth Bader Ginsburg.348 An active law 
revision commission could go a long way toward consolidating and 
updating statutes and removing archaic language, Latin expressions, 
342. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 485·86 (relating the experience of oversight 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a function of the personalities involved); KEEFE & OGUL, 
supra note 10, at 362 ("Oversight is an 'intensely political activity.' Its performance varies 
with changes in political climate."). 
343. As currently structured, the oversight process serves as part of the dynamic 
checking mechanism between Congress and the executive. Frequently, the oversight 
process is more a form of "guerilla warfare" on specific administration policies than it is an 
impartial evaluation of the "right" policies. See OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 277·78. 
344. Canada has performed seven complete revisions of its federal statutes since 
Confederation in 1867. Peter E. Johnson, Legislative Drafting Practices and Other Factors 
Affecting the Clarity of Canada's Laws, 12 STATUTE L. REv. 1,3·4 (1991). 
345. Justice Cardozo noted in 1921 that in the countries of continental Europe the 
project had already "passed into the realm of settled practice." Benjamin N. Cardozo, A 
Ministry of justice, 35 fuRV. L. REv. 113, 114 (1921). 
346. Justice Cardozo envisioned a "Ministry of Justice" as a courier between the judiciary 
and the legislature, helping to keep communication open so Congress would be made 
aware of particularly troublesome statutes that might profitably be amended. Id. at 113·14. 
347. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking - judges Who Can't and Legislators 
Who Won't, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963) (proposing an agency to oversee and revise 
proposed legislation); Bernard S. Meyer,justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 
MD. L. REv. 659, 675·79 (1983); Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC'y 142,145 (1920) (proposing a "ministry of justice, charged with the responsibility of 
making the legal system an effective instrument for justice"). 
348. Justice Ginsburg has called for Congress to systematically take a "second look" at 
statutes, especially those identified by the judiciary as ambiguous. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
& Peter W. Huber, The lntercircuit Committee, 100 fuRV. L. REv. 1417,1429·34 (1987); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995,1011·17 (1987). 
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transition provisions, and other obsolete material.349 Such a commis-
sion might also create an incentive for legislators-who want to see 
their enactments stay on the books-to pay closer attention to the 
effectiveness of the legislation being produced. 
Several states operate such commissions,350 as do other major Eng-
lish-speaking industrial countries.351 In fact, the United States already 
has such an office, called the Office of Law Revision Counsel.352 
Although on paper the Office of Law Revision Counsel's powers 
sound impressive,353 its modest staffing, limited compensation levels, 
and lack of participation by members of Congress translates into lim-
ited prospects for meaningful revision of federal statues as a practical 
matter.354 Justice Ginsburg has suggested raising the functions of the 
Office to a more active status and putting members of Congress in 
charge of the operation.355 By invigorating the Office, the judiciary's 
task of deciphering legislation might be made easier and the quality of 
the legislative product may improve. 
How directly such a commission would affect the legislative process 
is an open question. If political realities require the passage of a bad 
law, a bad law will be passed. Because law revision commissions have 
the power to recommend change, but not to enact it, their effective-
ness rests on the legislature's taking action. Yet, the legislature'S fail-
ure to act (or to act properly) is exactly the problem the law revision 
commission must wrestle with in the first place.356 As with oversight 
committees, the political process may frustrate attempts to enforce 
discipline on the lawmaking power of Congress. 
349. Johnson, supra note 344, at 3-4. 
350. In general, state law revision commissions fall into one of three models: (1) those 
that perform administrative duties and revise statutes, e.g., Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
I, §§ 91-95 (West Supp. 1992); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.83 (West 1986 & Supp. 
1993); (2) those that revise laws by unifying and reorganizing laws scattered throughout a 
state's statutes, e.g., Maryland, MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2-1315 to 2-1318 (1984); and 
(3) those with broader powers to recommend substantive changes to the law, e.g., 
California, CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 8280-8298 (West 1992); New York, N.Y. LEGIS. LAw §§ 70-
72 (McKinney 1991). For a general discussion, see Catherine T. Clarke, Comment, A 
Survey of the District of Columbia Law Revision Commission, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1309 (1985). 
351. For instance, Great Britain operates such a commission, see MICHAEL ZANDER, THE 
LAW-MAKING PROCESS 367-74 (2d ed. 1985), as does Canada, see Johnson, supra note 344. 
352. See 2 U.S.C. § 285 (1988). 
353. The Office of Law Revision Counsel is charged with proposing amendments to 
"remove ambiguities, contradictions and other imperfections both of substance and of 
form" from the federal statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (1988), the submission of 
recommendations for the removal of "obsolete, superfluous and superseded provisions," 
id. § 285b(2), and the periodic preparation and publication of the U.S. Code, id. 
§ 285b(3). 
354. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 348, at 1432. 
355. Id. 
356. CALABRESI, supra note 325, at 63-64. 
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E. Institutionalize the Policy Analysis Functipn 
Rather than focusing on post-enactment review, changing the legis-
lative process in order to get the policy right in the first place may be a 
more profitable approach. One way to move toward that goal would 
be to modify the legislative process to ensure that every bill receives 
the benefit of some formal policy analysis. Many bills considered by 
Congress already undergo sophisticated policy analysis.357 Although 
Congress has developed some policy analysis expertise,358 a significant 
number of bills, like Truth in Savings, nevertheless slip through with-
out ever being subject to a methodical analysis. 
Because political influences can skew a problem framer's perspec-
tive of the world,359 it may be advisable to provide for a process 
whereby policy analysis can take place relatively free from the influ-
ence of unmitigated political power.360 . Ultimately, the decision to 
pass a law must be a political one-and Congress possesses that power 
under the Constitution-but as a matter of public policy, it may make 
sense to get the legislative project off to an apolitical start. 361 The 
357. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
358. Congress as an institution can .carry out policy analysis through at least four 
congressional support offices: the Office of Technology Assessment, the General 
Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research 
SeIVice. See FOREMAN, supra note 334, at 16; KEEFE & OCUL, supra note 10, at 345. 
359. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. 
360. The interaction of policymaking and politics is tidily summed up in the following 
passage: 
Law-making would be a complex process if it consisted only of deciding 
how best to implement a particular policy through the statute book, but is 
in many cases inevitably and rightly complicated by disagreements over the 
policy itself. That, it may be thought, is the job of the politicians and the 
political parties and so, to a large extent, it is, but law-making is not solely 
the concern of politicians and political parties: it is a mattt;r of taking 
effective, timely, and appropriate action and its complications and 
ramifications make it too serious a matter to be left to the politicians or, 
indeed, anyone body of people of opinion. 
Michael Rush, Making Better Law: A Review o/the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative 
Process, 14 STATUTE L. REv. 75, 75 (1993). 
361. Despite the desire to make Congress into an efficient and rational policymaking 
organ, however, it would be foolhardy and undesirable to eliminate all political elements 
from the legislative process. Congress is a political body and it may in fact seIVe more 
important functions than merely solving problems. For instance, it may seIVe primarily as a 
mechanism for harnessing political forces through debate, oversight, and constituent 
representation in such a way to keep a check on the government as a whole. It may also be 
that Congress does solve problems, but does so in a much more subtle and complex way 
than formal policy analysis can take in. See FOREMAN, supra note 334, at 1-10. Some 
scholars have suggested that critiques of Congress that focus on rationality and 
effectiveness miss the point because they equate "effectiveness" of legislation in the public 
policy sense with effectiveness of the representative role, which are different matters 
altogether, and because they fail to deal with the contextual constraints placed on the 
institution. See Joseph Cooper, Assessing Legislative Performance: A RepLJ to Critics of Congress, 
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creation of an extra-political362 policy analysis office-an Office of 
Public Policy-may lead toward more coherent regulation and 
legislation.363 
Exactly how such an office would operate in its many details is be-
yond the scope of this Article. One could, however, imagine a change 
in the legislative process where all congressional committees, adminis-
trative agencies, and executive branch departments would be required 
to send all new legislative proposals to the Office of Public Policy, 
along with a report on the public policy analysis of the bill, if any, that 
had already been performed. The Office of Public Policy's first action 
upon receiving a proposal would be to determine whether consider-
ing the proposal merits the expenditure of congressional resources. 
This initial screening step would weed out the vast majority of bills.364 
13 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 21,22-26 (1986), reprinted in CONGRESS, supra note 162, at 
809. Casting the legislative process as a straightforward problem-solving activity may fail to 
encompass the process' dynamic give-and-take nature and the "hard fought compromises" 
reflected in the statutes provisions. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. 
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986). 
362. Many independent agencies in the federal government are set up in such a way as 
to minimize the force of the political winds. Although some agencies nevertheless end up 
subject to political influences, see Cutler & johnson, supra note 122, at 1402-05; Strauss, 
supra note 122, others-such as the Federal Reserve Board-maintain a meaningful 
degree of independence, see Sunstein, supra note 69, at 427 n.89. Of course, creating a 
truly apolitical organization composed of human beings is probably an impossible task, 
and lack of political accountability brings its own set of problems. See supra notes 268-70. 
To promote the extra-political nature of the Office of Public Policy, its staff might be 
required to develop along certain lines. For instance, to minimize the power of seniority, 
prevent the creation of policy fiefdoms, and foreclose the natural process of ossification 
that seems endemic in bureaucracies, the permanent employees of the Office of Public 
Policy might be required to step down after some set period of time, perhaps five years. To 
provide continuity, the staff might be broken up into five different groups, one of which 
would be required to move on in a given year. 
363. The idea of an independent policy analysis body to assist the legislature has a long 
pedigree. john Stuart Mill advocated the creation of a "Commission of Legislation" in the 
mid-nineteenth century. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 237-39 (H.B. Acton ed., E.P. D':Itton & Co. 1980) (1861). More recently, 
Professor Sunstein has suggested the creation of a similar agency in either the executive or 
the legislative branch. SUNSTEIN, supra note 313, at 108. The approach outlined here 
expands on that idea and ties it into the legislative process. An Office of Public Policy 
could result from a consolidation and expansion of the policy analysis functions provided 
by the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, the 
Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office. The current 
scattered policy-analysis functions may be a relic of an earlier era in congressional 
organization that stressed decentralized power and perhaps should now evolve into the 
more centralized nature of the congressional structure. See Roger H. Davidson, The New 
Centralization on Capitol Hil~ 50 REv. OF POL. 345 (1988), reprinted in CONGRESS, supra note 
162, at 829. 
364. Of the nearly 10,000 bills introduced during the 99th Congress, for instance, the 
number actually enacted was only 663. Most of the bills that were introduced had no 
chance of passage and were often proposed by legislators who had no intent that they 
actually become law. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 81-83. Many of those inconsequential 
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Proposals that did not clear this first screening would be sent back to 
the appropriate congressional committee without further action by 
the Office of Public Policy. Congress would then be free to act on 
those bills or not, depending on the political realities of the particular 
proposal. 365 
For proposals surviving the first cut, the Office of Public Policy 
would then examine the supporting analysis accompanying the bills. 
If sufficient, the Office of Public Policy would not repeat the analysis, 
but would forward the bill and its supporting analysis back to the re-
sponsible congressional committees.366 For the remaining bills, the 
Office of Public Policy would group them into subject matter groups 
and undertake a rigorous policy analysis, beginning with a thorough 
examination of the problem. To make the problem identification 
step as meaningful as possible, the Office of Public Policy would have 
to address underlying issues, rather than the language of a proposed 
bill.367 By separating the underlying policy from the statutory lan-
guage, the Office of Public Policy's analysis would be free to move in 
the best direction, rather than being shackled to the language of a 
proposed bill. 
bills were "commemoratives," see supra note 149, which would not require any policy 
analysis. In addition, a significant portion of the bills before Congress deal with 
administrative matters. These bills amounted to 11 % of all legislation in a recent 
Congress. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 43. These bills, too, would not 
require explicit policy analysis. 
365. Many of those inconsequential bills will nevertheless be enacted into law. Congress 
has long recognized the reality that most legislation is not important. The House has 
several short-cut methods of disposing of bills that clearly do not require consideration by 
the full House. The House consent calendar, the private calendar, and the procedure for 
suspending the rules, among other procedural mechanisms, allow the House to dispose of 
insignificant or noncontroversial bills without wasting the time of the entire body. How 
CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 46-49. In essence, an Office of Public Policy would 
create a special track for legislation at the other end of the spectrum, so substantial bills 
would be channelled into a special process as well. 
366. Congress might want to undertake a separate policy analysis of bills that originate 
in the executive branch as a matter of political power between the branches. 
367. Canada already has a process built into its parliamentary system that attempts to 
start legislation from the policy stage. Johnson, supra note 344, at 2. In Canada, bills 
originate primarily with the government. See CANADA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CANADA 9 (1987). All proposals for new legislation must be 
sponsored by a Cabinet Minister. The Cabinet Minister proposing legislation must present 
the idea to the Cabinet as a whole through a "Memorandum to Cabinet." The 
Memorandum to Cabinet is a policy paper only-it cannot contain statutory language or 
be accompanied by a draft bill. In this way, the Canadian system attempts to ensure that 
legislation starts with a coherent policy objective and that the statutory language reflects 
the policy, rather than having the policy be shaped by proposed legislative language. The 
emphasis on the policy, rather than the specific language of the law may in large part be a 
function of Canada's bilingual status and the need to make sure both the anglophone and 
the francophone drafters assigned to the bill are drafting with the same policy in mind. See 
id. at 9-10; cJ. Johnson, supra note 344, at 2. 
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The Office of,Public Policy might approach its task by assembling 
teams of industry professionals, activists, academics, and others to give 
a balanced perspective on the various issues. The teams would serve 
on an ad hoc basis to avoid the problems that go along with a seniority 
system and the drawbacks of the permanent editorial board system 
discussed earlier. In carrying out their work, the policy team would 
employ a method similar to Professor Seidman's approach as a helpful 
guide in the systematic exploration of the issues.368 The Office of 
Public Policy might be required to examine each alternative proposed 
solution and evaluate its potential effectiveness.369 The Office of Pub-
lic Policy would also be required to test the theories upon which the 
problems are grounded, to use empirical methods to evaluate the seri-
ousness of the problems, and to evaluate the expected effectiveness of 
the various proposed responses.370 
Finally, as part of its evaluative process, the Office of Public Policy 
might be required to analyze the proposed solutions in light of the 
larger regulatory scheme to ensure that the new proposals were con-
sistent with other laws, not redundant, and, most importantly, coher-
ent in light of the general regulatory policy. Mter completing the 
entire policy analysis process, the Office of Public Policy would then 
report its findings to Congress. Congress would then deal with the 
368. See supra notes 274-84 and accompanying text. 
369. Again, Professor Seidman's approach provides a good framework for the types of 
analysis that should be undertaken for each alternative response. The report of the Office 
of Public Policy should describe each proposed solution and show how it addresses the 
causes earlier explicated, as well as include a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed 
legislation. Seidman, supra note 5, at 65. In order for the proposed solution to be 
adequate, it must do the following: (1) fit with the explanations advanced; (2) have a high 
probability of inducing the problem-correcting behavior desired; and (3) be cost effective. 
Id. at 67-74. 
370. As currently structured, the legislative process does not explicitly require empirical 
testing of assumptions, or the collection of data to see if a problem exists, or the testing of 
a proposed solution's effectiveness. In the history of Truth in Savings, for instance, the 
limited empirical evidence of the problem came from the Consumer Federation of 
America's survey of the pricing of retail banking products and services. See, e.g, Jack 
Reerink, Consumer Account Fees Up 28% Since '90, Poll Finds, BANKING WK., June 14, 1993, at 
12. Although the Consumer Federation of America admitted that its study was neither 
scientific nor based on a statistically valid sampling, see CFA Study, supra note 49, the study 
nevertheless enjoyed wide currency, probably because it was one of the few studies that 
attempted to quantify the perceived problems in deposit accounts. Ac\ditionally, the 
current legislative process does not effectively work with empirical data to reach policy 
decisions, but frequently uses data merely as a way to justify existing policy choices. See, 
e.g., Rubin, supra note I, at 276 (describing role of empirical data in the adoption of the 
Truth in Lending Act). For instance, even if one accepts the Consumer Federation of 
America survey as empirical evidence for the existence of a "problem" involving deposit 
accounts, it nevertheless leaves open the larger question of whether a causal link exists 
between the amount of information disclosed or that would be required under Truth in 
Savings and the cost of maintaining deposit accounts. 
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analyzed bills as it does presently, the major difference being that af-
ter a proper analysis of the problem, the legislative process might have 
a better start. 
The weaknesses in such an approach are many. First, creating a 
new bureaucracy may only serve to replicate the political forces that 
distort the policy process in Congress. By virtue of its existence as an 
organization, the Office of Public Policy would place a great deal of 
power in the hands of the agenda setter.371 Attempts to make the 
Office extra-political would not prevent the agenda setter from exer-
cising his or her power, whether consciously or unconsciously. Of 
course, the very idea of an extra-political entity may be viewed with 
some skepticism. 
Another drawback to this approach is that it would delay the legisla-
tive process. Certainly, in the thick of legislative negotiations each 
new amendment offered to a comprehensive bill could not go 
through the Office of Public Policy. While the diversion of an issue 
into this track may result in the bill's being delayed for some time, it 
should be noted that under our current system important or contro-
versial bills rarely pass in the Congress in which they are 
introduced.372 
The prospects for improving legislation through structural changes 
in the legislative process deserve closer study, and perhaps even em-
pirical research. The matter of improving the effectiveness of legisla-
tion is too important to ignore. If we continue to look at legislation as 
a method of solving problems, we need to change the system to facili-
tate that process. We may never determine the "right" way to make 
laws, but as scholars focus attention on the problem-framing process, 
merely raising awareness of the issue may improve the legislative 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
Problem solving lies at the heart of the legislative enterprise. Yet, 
for a significant portion of bills considered during a session of Con-
gress, no process exists for rigorously identifying the problem ad-
dressed by the proposed legislation. Failure to identify problems 
imposes a great cost on the legislative process. Congressional re-
sources may be squandered addressing matters that are not real 
problems. Even if Congress responds to a real issue, failure to identify 
371. For a discussion of the powers of the agenda setter, see supra notes 225-42 and 
accompanying text. 
372. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 42. 
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the specific problem makes evaluating the proposed policy difficult, if 
not impossible. 
Congress fails to rigorously identify problems for many reasons, 
most of which are built-in consequences of legislative politics. Never-
theless, Congress could change the legislative process in hopes of pro-
moting a better problem-solving methodology. The proposals 
suggested so far have both benefits and drawbacks. A closer examina-
tion of these alternatives is in order, however, to prevent promulgat-
ing ineffective legislation like Truth in Savings. 
